Between domestic constraints and multilateral obligations - The reform of the Bundeswehr in the context of a normalised German foreign and security policy by Nuyken, Mark E.
  
 
 
 
Between domestic constraints and 
multilateral obligations - The reform of 
the Bundeswehr in the context of a 
normalised German foreign and 
security policy 
 
 
Mark Eckhardt Nuyken 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD 
 
 
2012 
 
 
 
Politics 
School of Arts and Humanities 
Division of History and Politics 
University of Stirling 
 
I 
 
Declaration 
I declare that the thesis has been composed by myself and that it 
embodies the results of my own research or advanced studies. Where 
appropriate, I have acknowledged the nature and extent of work out in 
collaboration with others included in the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
Mark Eckhardt Nuyken    Stirling, 25. January 2012 
  
II 
 
Acknowledgements 
My first thanks go to my two supervisors who have continuously kept a 
watchful eye over the process of writing this thesis. First, Prof Graham Timmins 
managed to keep me on track during the whole process, which in itself is a 
remarkable feat. His effort and enthusiasm for this project as well as his repeated 
encouragement to “kill this thing off” has been very much appreciated. Eventually, 
this thesis no longer just “looked like a thesis”, it actually turned into one. 
Secondly, Dr Peter Lynch as my secondary supervisor was very supportive during 
the progress panels when he contributed a valuable out-side view on the thesis, 
grilling me on more than just a few points. I would also like to take the opportunity 
to thank the support staff in the Division of History and Politics who have always 
had an open ear for my problems and helped me as best they could.  
On a personal note I would like to thank my family for supporting me in 
more than one way and without whom this thesis would not have taken shape. My 
mother Lorna deserves special thanks considering it was her initial idea to write 
this thesis. At the time it had not crossed my mind, so in effect, she is the one to 
blame. And also thanks to my sister Lesley who boasted about her “little” brother 
writing a PhD. No pressure there, then – but she knew that I needed pressure to 
get things done, so that was a smart move.  
Finally, I recognition must be given to my fellow research students sharing 
the office B19 with me. Especially in the final stages of this thesis when I was 
struggling with the IT I could rely on them to keep calm.  
  
III 
 
Abstract 
This thesis seeks to understand the developments in Germany’s foreign 
and security policy since the end of the Cold War. Primarily, this thesis will centre 
on the question of whether Germany can now, after being re-unified for more than 
20 years, be considered a normal actor in international relations. Although this 
subject has been debated extensively, the effects a possible change in foreign 
policy behaviour has on related fields of policy, have largely been left aside. This 
thesis therefore sets out to understand if there has in fact been a change in 
Germany’s foreign and security policy and will then apply the findings on the 
institution most affected by this change, i.e. Germany’s armed forces the 
Bundeswehr.  
It will therefore firstly discuss the perceived changes in German foreign 
policy since 1990 by analysing the academic debate on the process of 
normalisation and continuation. It will be argued that Germany has in fact become 
more normal and abandoned the constrained foreign policy of the Cold-War-era. 
The Bundeswehr will therefore have to be reformed accordingly to accommodate 
the new tasks set out by the changed foreign policy – most importantly peace-
keeping and peace-enforcing out-of-area missions. 
This thesis will therefore analyse the reform efforts made over the last 20 
years and apply them to the Bundeswehr’s large deployments in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan to determine how effective the reforms have been. Finally, this thesis 
will be able to contribute to the discussion on Germany’s status of a normal player 
in international relations with the added perspective from the Bundeswehr’s point 
of view. 
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Chapter 1 - Addressing the Bundeswehr 
Reform 
“It [the Bundeswehr] is the visible expression of our resolve to 
safeguard peace and security and to defend our freedom resolutely. 
Over the last few years the Bundeswehr has accomplished a lot under 
difficult circumstances. Its commitment to international peace-keeping 
missions has contributed to Germany’s increasing standing in the 
world. At home the Bundeswehr helped countless citizens during 
natural disasters and saved lives. I hope and I wish that this White 
Paper give an impulse for a wide debate throughout society about 
Germany’s capabilities to successfully safeguard its security under the 
current conditions of the 21st century.”1 – Angela Merkel (BMVg, 2006: 
3) 
In the course of the last two decades Germany has changed 
considerably, more so than other Western European nations. This is due to 
the fact that arguably no other nation has been affected by the collapse of 
the Cold War system to the same extent as the Federal Republic. The most 
obvious change was the re-unification of the two separate German states 
(the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and the German Democratic 
Republic in the east) and the opening up of their borders to Eastern Europe 
in 1990. However joyful these events were, they had a most profound 
impact on the foreign and security policy of this new Germany. How does a 
state react to such a change in international politics and how can it adapt to 
this new security scenario that appeared literally over night? What are the 
difficulties in adapting? This thesis will concentrate on Germany’s efforts to 
amend its security policy to the new scenario and the implications for its 
                                                 
1
 “Sie [die Bundeswehr] ist sichtbarer Ausdruck unserer Bereitschaft, Frieden und Sicherheit zu bewahren und 
unsere Freiheit entschlossen zu verteidigen. Die Bundesswehr hat in den letzten Jahren unter schwierigen 
Bedingungen beachtliches geleistet. Mit ihrem Engagement in internationalen Friedenseinsätzen hat sie zum 
Ansehen Deutschlands in der Welt beigetragen. Im Inland konnte die Bundeswehr bei Katastrophen- und 
Unglücksfällen zahlreichen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern Hilfe in der Not leisten und Menschenleben retten. Ich hoffe 
und wünsche, dass das vorliegende Weißbuch einen Impuls für eine breite gesellschaftliche Debatte darüber 
gebn wird, wie Deutschland seine Sicherheit in Frieden und Freiheit auch unter den bestehenden Bedingungen 
des 21. Jahrhunderts erfolgreich schützen kann.” – Angela Merkel 
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armed forces accordingly in order to answer the core question of this thesis, 
i.e. whether the reform of the Bundeswehr is an indication that Germany 
has begun to become a more active and assertive or even normal actor in 
international relations. 
Although the term ‘normal’ can have several differing interpretations, 
for this thesis’ purpose it will be argued that normal actors in international 
relations act out of factors relating to their national interests and domestic 
ideologies, convictions and agendas, pushing the decision-makers towards 
a specific policy. At the same time, decision-makers are also pulled towards 
certain policies by external factors, such as external expectations, alliance 
obligations or an external threat to the national well-being. As will become 
clear in this chapter, there are different interpretations of Germany’s foreign 
and security policy, however, the majority of them centre around the 
question of how far the behaviour of the German state can be considered 
normal. 
Besides highlighting the need for reform after the collapse of the bi-
polar world – i.e. the Cold War situation, in which the world was dominated 
by the two superpowers USA and USSR – in 1990, it will discuss the 
reforms as such and test the effectiveness by analysing the latest white 
paper on defence policy, the Weißbuch 2006. Seeing that the 
Government’s Weißbuch 2006 (White Paper 2006) is the most recent 
comprehensive document that introduces the latest reforms needed for the 
Bundeswehr to perform its functions in the post-Cold War scenario, it will be 
at the core of this thesis. By analysing the Weißbuch 2006, it will be 
possible to determine the factors that influence German security policy post 
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unification. It will also show the continuing necessity for reform with 
reference to the previous reforms over the 1990s, which the Weißbuch 
2006 labels as inadequate. 
This Weißbuch also defines the future tasks of the Bundeswehr and 
the reforms necessary for it to perform these tasks. As it also addresses the 
main factors contributing to the decision to reform the armed forces it will 
serve as a constant throughout this thesis against which the effectiveness 
of the reforms can be measured. However, as can be seen from Angela 
Merkel’s quote at the beginning of this chapter, she has issued this White 
Paper not only to outline the actual Bundeswehr reforms but also aimed for 
a wide debate on Germany’s security policy in general. This thesis will 
therefore also discuss to what extent such a debate has occurred and how 
this affects Germany’s ability to contribute to multilateral military missions. 
This thesis’ analysis of the Bundeswehr reform will be conducted by 
firstly looking at the general debate on German foreign and security policy. 
This first chapter will therefore discuss the dominant approaches to the 
study of German foreign and security policy in order to place this thesis in 
an overall context. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the nature of 
Germany’s foreign and security policy – of which the Bundeswehr is an 
integral part – to better understand the changes that have occurred after the 
collapse of the bi-polar system. This first chapter will address the question 
of whether the German state continues on its tested, more passive path or if 
it has begun to behave more assertive and active. This is to say – as 
previously outlined – it will be discussed if Germany has moved from the 
Cold War era of superpower dominance and obedience to becoming a 
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more normal actor pursuing national interests and fulfilling the expectations 
of its allies. 
The second chapter will then give an overview of the external 
changes happening around Germany. The 1990s saw considerable 
developments in international relations resulting from the end of the Cold 
War. This chapter will address these changes and show how they affected 
Germany and how Germany tried to adapt accordingly. How did Germany 
react to specific crises and how did these crises affect German policy 
making? What other internal or external factors influenced Germany during 
the 1990s? The answers to these questions will make it possible to then 
evaluate how well Germany adapted to the post-Cold War era and set the 
background for the actual need for Bundeswehr reform by briefly outlining 
the missions to which the German armed forces have contributed. The 
second chapter will also serve to illustrate the changing nature in German 
foreign politics, and to underline the theoretical discussion in chapter one. 
Chapter three will discuss the actual reform process and outline 
difficulties of implementation as well as the reasons for the specific 
measures undertaken. The changed background set out in chapter two will 
serve as a starting point to armed forces reform. By first looking at the 
Bundeswehr during the Cold War, it will be possible to contrast the ‘old’ 
Bundeswehr and its main tasks with the ‘new’ Bundeswehr and its range 
field of operations. It will primarily discuss the shortcomings of its Cold War 
tasks and purposes as well as answer questions revolving around the 
armed forces’ structure. Why was the old Bundeswehr deemed to be out-
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dated? How was the reform implemented? What effect did the reform have 
on the Bundeswehr’s capabilities and operational status?  
Finally chapters four and five will test these measures by analysing 
the two major operations in which the Bundeswehr has been deployed in, 
namely KFOR (Kosovo Force) during the Kosovo Crisis in 1998/99 and the 
on-going ISAF (International Security and Assistance Force) operation in 
Afghanistan.  
These two case studies will discuss the domestic debates 
surrounding the deployment of troops to these two theatres by looking 
primarily at the parliamentary debates of the time. What were the major 
arguments put forward in support and against deployment respectively and 
what were the concerns of decision makers? How did the general public 
react to deployment? Has the White Paper 2006 in fact launched the 
desired debate on German deployments? Answering these questions will 
shed light on how far Germany has in fact become accustomed to military 
actions and will therefore help to determine the extent to which Germany 
has normalised. These chapters will concentrate on the domestic debates 
and will omit foreign debates on purpose. As the core of this thesis centres 
on Germany’s reaction to the changed post-Cold War scenario rather than 
the international perception of this subject, it will omit international debates 
on purpose. Whereas Germany’s security has traditionally been achieved 
through its deep integration within the Western system of alliances, “its 
[inner] insecurity, uncertainty and even schizophrenia came from the ghosts 
of the past and the fact of division” (Garton Ash, 1994: 81). Any changes of 
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German foreign and security policy will therefore have their origins in 
domestic debates. 
These case studies will test the hypothesis that Germany has in fact 
become a more normal international actor. As this thesis aims at analysing 
Germany’s increased international assertiveness in conjunction with the 
Bundeswehr reforms, case studies of the main military deployments provide 
valuable insight in the Bundeswehr’s ability to contribute to Germany’s 
changed foreign and security policy. In general, case studies are very 
useful to examine a subject descriptively from numerous angles which will 
serve the purpose of this thesis well, considering that the point of these 
case studies is to support the thesis’ main argument by outlining Germany’s 
increased military deployment rather than fully explaining the underlying 
rationale governing the decision-making process. Case studies are useful in 
answering questions such as “What happened?”, “How did it happen?” and 
“What was connected”, and since these questions are at the core of 
answering the research question set the use of case studies is best suited 
for this thesis (Thomas, 2011: 21).  
It has to be noted, however, that case studies are open to criticism 
regarding the research procedures, i.e. what exact questions are being 
asked and what sources are being used to answer them. Therefore, case 
studies can be subject to the researcher’s own bias in that it can be argued 
that researchers will find “what he or she had set out to find” (Yin, 2012: 6). 
In order to limit this bias, this thesis will therefore primarily use primary 
sources while conducting the case studies. Although it can be argued that 
the selection of certain primary sources is subject to the researcher’s bias 
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as well, seeing that they are primary sources they still describe the case 
objectively in that no further bias has been introduced by third-party 
interpretation.  
Finally, case studies’ findings cannot be applied to a wider context 
(Yin, 2012: 6). As they concentrate on very specific cases (in this thesis the 
Bundeswehr deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan), it will not be 
possible to use the finding to answer more investigative questions if there is 
a general trend in the German public or even political culture that would 
explain such a shift. However, since this thesis’ main aim is to outline the 
developments in German foreign and security policy in conjunction with the 
Bundeswehr reform, rather than providing an in-depth explanation of the 
motives or underlying rationale, the descriptive nature of case studies will 
be sufficient for the purpose of this thesis. 
The final chapter will summarise the findings which will the make it 
possible to answer the core research question of how far Germany has 
become a normal actor in international relations over the last twenty years.  
Why Germany?  
The reason why this thesis analyses the German armed forces 
reform is that Germany and its capabilities are important factors in the study 
of European security. As Europe’s largest economy and arguably its 
Musterknabe (favourite pupil), continuous German support for further 
development of common security policy will remain vital. Germany’s 
traditional role as a motor of continuing European integration as well as its 
commitment to the transatlantic relationship and NATO’s importance for 
European security adds weight to the case for Germany.  
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In addition to that Germany is in the unique position of having close 
traditional ties with both the United States of America, Germany’s most 
important ally and protector during the years of the Cold War, on the one 
hand and Russia, Germany’s most important supplier of energy resources, 
on the other. This position makes Germany an important negotiator 
between Europe and the United States and Russia. Germany therefore 
fulfils a bridging function between the US and Russia as well as within the 
European Union. As will be further discussed in chapter 2, Germany has 
been considered by previous US administrations to be a ‘partner in 
leadership’ (Baring, 1997: 173), highlighting that Germany’s allies have 
recognised its unique position.  
On the other hand Germany has traditionally been very reluctant to 
contribute to military solutions if diplomacy had failed. As shall be discussed 
in the following chapters, even in the cases when Germany did contribute to 
a military, the internal debate made the decision-making process slow and 
tedious seeing that Germany’s troubled history forced decision-makers to 
be very cautious not to conjure up the old image of German militarism. At 
the same time, external pressures from allies as a result of Germany’s 
increased international standing and influence in international organisations 
after unification placed German politicians in a difficult situation. Germany’s 
handling of the Kosovo Crisis and its constraints on its contingents for 
KFOR are a very good example for this and will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. As a predominantly political and economic player, Germany has 
traditionally been a difficult and reluctant ally in matters of security.  
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Germany is therefore an interesting case as it is an important 
political and economic actor, deeply committed into the EU, NATO and the 
UN, with close relationships to both the West and the East, yet at the same 
time seemingly unwilling or unable to act in accordance to its political and 
economic weight. 
Germany continues to be an interesting actor in European politics, 
although in the past it has primarily concentrated on social and economic 
politics rather than military operations with the underlying rationale that 
social order and economic stability would generate security which in turn 
would make military intervention unnecessary. However, Germany’s 
contributions to various international operations indicate a shift in this 
particular attitude. Consulting the numerous publications on German foreign 
and security policy after unification it becomes clear that this shift has not 
gone unnoticed in the academic world. 
Approaches to German Foreign and Security Policy 
Anyone embarking on the study of German foreign and security 
policy will quickly come across the main debate surrounding this subject, 
i.e. the debate on normalisation versus continuity. At the core of this lies the 
question if Germans have indeed adopted a more normal foreign and 
security or if they have in fact continued to follow the self-restrained policies 
of the Cold War period. Although there are numerous other theories they 
revolve around these two prominent lines of argument.  
At least in academic circles the new ‘German Question’ is that of 
whether Germany’s policies are those of continuation, i.e. continuing the 
well-tested Cold War era policies of close western integration and co-
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operation within the western international system and organisations. The 
following are the main concerns regarding the new German status: 
• Germany’s continuing role as Europe’s motor for further 
integration;  
• Germany’s armed forces remaining under NATO command;  
• Germany’s increasingly closer co-operation with its new eastern 
neighbours and  
• The question of Germany continuing its diplomatic preference for 
solving conflicts in the international theatre? In this case 
Germany would emphasise holding true to its “story of success” 
while at the same time re-assuring its partners and allies of 
Germany’s continued commitment to European stability 
(Hellmann, 2001: 43-44). 
While this point of view may be very persuasive it has been argued 
that Germany’s foreign and security policy has in fact changed considerably 
from 1990 onwards. Given that with unification Germany had arguably 
obtained its full sovereignty again, commentators have argued that it would 
now use this new sovereignty to further its own national interests, which 
would result in Germany becoming a more normal player. Although this 
train of thought appears valid it must be considered how much sovereignty 
Germany – or in fact states in general – retains in a more and more 
integrated European Union, a military alliance such as NATO and growing 
economic interdependence in a globalised world. 
It is argued that Germany’s deep integration within the western 
international system was artificially upheld by the bi-polar system of the 
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Cold War, thus with its demise, Germany could act more freely 
internationally. As a result Germany would no longer have to justify its 
decisions to its partners, pursue a more pragmatic and increasingly self-
confident foreign policy, guided by its national, rather than transatlantic or 
European, interests (Hacke, 2002. 7). 
On the surface this interpretation makes sense, yet Germany 
remains a member of numerous organisations which limit its overall 
sovereignty. On this notion of sovereignty this thesis will therefore argue 
that Germany remains a semi-sovereign state not because of the limitations 
brought about by the artificial Cold War scenario, but rather because of 
Germany’s deep integration into organisations such as the EU and NATO. 
Furthermore, this limitation is not limited to Germany; rather it is 
experienced by its allied nations as well, thus making semi-sovereign 
nations the norm rather than the exception.  
Since this debate on continuation and normalisation stands at the 
centre of the discourse on the developments of German foreign and 
security policy, the two sides need to be discussed in more detail, 
especially with regards to the need to reform the armed forces. A shift in the 
nature of German foreign policy also affects the Bundeswehr – therefore a 
discussion of this debate is essential. 
Continuation of the well-proven 
As pointed out above, the proponents of continuation point to 
Germany’s lasting preference for co-operation, integration and generally 
multilateral solutions when conducting its foreign and security policy as this 
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had already served Germany well and had re-assured its allies that 
Germany would continue to be a reliable partner. This would further be 
enshrined by Germany’s collective memory of the war, especially in the 
cases of the ‘Bonn Republic’s’ decision makers, or the ‘affected generation’ 
(Hellmann, 2001: 47).  
Hellmann’s ‘affected generation’, i.e. those politicians who had been 
affected by their experiences during the war, can therefore be seen as 
having developed a dominant political-military culture. Such a culture would 
need to comprise more than just a collection of free-floating ideas but rather 
constitutes a broad collective consciousness which is in turn 
institutionalised within the political system. This institutionalisation is the 
result of a gradual process within which the on-going interpretation of the 
past plays a central role (Berger, 1997: 41-42). 
In the case of Germany, Berger points to the collective experience of 
total defeat in WW II, combined with the country’s partition which caused a 
fundamental change in German thinking. The prosecution of war criminals 
by the victorious allies, although only partially successful, deepened the 
feeling of having not only been defeated militarily, but also morally. It was 
therefore very difficult – however due to the Allies’ need for trained and 
experienced civil servants to govern post-war Germany not impossible – for 
anyone, who had collaborated with the old regime, to assume any political 
position in the new Federal Republic. Other members of the Axis, most 
notably Japan, did not undergo such a rigorous process, since members of 
the old Tojo government returned later as leading politicians, therefore not 
developing a similar culture of reconciliation (Berger, 1997: 46). 
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This collective experience of the affected generation has, according 
to Berger, has been at the very core of German political culture and can 
therefore explain the considerable domestic and international friction 
associated with the gradually increasing demands made on German 
security policy in the post-Cold War era. A more assertive German foreign 
policy in combination with a prevailing culture of policy constriction upheld 
by the affected generation would therefore be highly unlikely.  
The collective experience and memory of Germany’s Stunde Null 
(Zero Hour) would therefore influence the affected generation to always 
seek international approval of its actions, culminating in the political 
mantras of “never again” (i.e. no more wars started by Germany) and 
“never alone” (i.e. no more German special paths or “Sonderwege”) (Erler, 
2011: 1). Over the 1990s Germany therefore tended to avoid policies which 
could have been interpreted as unilateral or as another ‘Sonderweg’ by, for 
example, continuously emphasising the Franco-German relationship and 
further European integration or avoiding any implications of re-militarising 
German foreign and security policy. For example, after unification and with 
its regaining of full sovereignty, Germany could have integrated the former 
East German armed forces into the Bundeswehr, thus creating a force of 
some 670,000 troops in the centre of Europe. However, in 1990 Germany 
agreed to cut this number down to 370,000 troops to fulfil the conditions set 
out in the Two-plus-Four Treaty which regulated the German unification. 
Interestingly enough it was the NATO allies who prevented Germans from 
reducing that number even further, since they valued Germany’s “strong 
conventional contribution to NATO” (Hellmann, 1997: 32). 
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This preference for multilateral, non-militaristic approaches to 
international affairs, which had been deeply imbedded in the German 
political culture can still be found in Germany’s political discourses (Maull, 
2004: 19), also affecting the next generation of politicians, those who have 
not been influenced directly by WW II. Considering the preference for 
multilateral solutions it has been argued that Germany has, in fact, not been 
a fully sovereign state, since most decisions would have to be run by 
Germany’s partners; Germany would therefore be in effect a ‘semi-
sovereign’ state.  
During the Cold War, West German politics were particularly 
penetrated by foreign influences. Since Germany was divided and reliant on 
the United States for both political and military support, Germany lacked 
direct control over aspects of what defines a sovereign state. This was 
further cemented by the Federal Republic placing its armed forces under 
NATO command and emphasising its commitment to the rejection of 
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, West Germany’s deep integration within the 
EC makes it harder for German politicians to formulate a policy with only 
West German national interests at the core. Semi-sovereignty is therefore 
an “external condition of West German politics” (Katzenstein, 1987: 9). 
Katzenstein continues to stress that semi-sovereignty not only tames 
West German politics, but also its society. After 1945 the new German state 
lacked the traditional potential for conflict, since the landed aristocracy of 
Eastern Prussia were now part of the Eastern bloc and had no longer any 
influence on their traditional parts of society, i.e. the military, bureaucracy 
and conservatism. Remaining agricultural interest groups were pooled in 
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both the CDU and FDP of which the former also opened itself to Catholics 
and Protestants, thus bridging this traditional potential for conflict. Finally 
regional rivalries ended with the demise of Prussia (Katzenstein, 1987: 13). 
Although the idea that West Germany was not fully sovereign can be 
found in other authors’ publications, Katzenstein’s argument that semi-
sovereignty goes beyond the external aspects of sovereignty but in the 
case of West Germany rather extends into the internal workings of the 
state. Due to co-operative federalism (a federal system, in which federal 
states co-operate amongst each other but also with the Federal 
Government on numerous policies), catch-all parties (parties that expand 
over the traditional political ideologies to gather more wide-spread support) 
and coalition governments, among other things, bold policy initiatives are 
effectively suppressed, even when a new government is elected into power. 
Katzenstein, therefore, concludes that West Germany’s semi-sovereign 
nature would also in future only allow for incremental change, both 
domestically and in foreign policy (Katzenstein, 1987: 80-82). 
Although Katzenstein’s analysis was published before unification, it 
is safe to say that it still bears significance in the study of Germany and of 
German foreign and security policy. However, as Paterson points out, 
Katzenstein’s analysis concentrates heavily on the internal workings of the 
Federal Republic (Paterson, 1996: 168). In accordance with Katzenstein, 
Paterson argues that the Bonn republic was constrained by the external 
semi-sovereignty of having the armed forces under NATO command and 
having to cope with the four-power-status. Germany’s close relationship 
with France added to the external semi-sovereignty. 
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Paterson takes the argument further with regards to the EU (and its 
predecessors) by arguing that the Länder (Germany’s 16 federal states) 
contributed to Germany’s semi-sovereignty by inserting “themselves more 
deeply into the making of European policy”, thus effectively bypassing the 
Federal Government (Paterson, 1996: 169). 
It has to be said, that whereas the above mentioned factors of semi-
sovereignty are imposed on the Federal Government, with the exception of 
the Franco-German relationship, German policy makers have traditionally 
demonstrated little desire to take on a leadership role within the EU, a 
position the then Foreign Minister Kinkel (1993-1998) of the German Liberal 
Party (FDP- Freie Demokratische Partei) described as a ‘culture of 
constraint’ and Paterson calls a ‘leadership avoidance reflex’, which 
reflected the strong reliance on international organisations (Paterson, 1996: 
170). This is not to say that Germany lacked influence rather that Germany 
paid much attention to ensuring that any new advance within the 
Community was perceived as a Franco-German initiative, rather than a 
German one, again trying to avoid even the suspicion of a German 
‘Sonderweg’. 
German unification could have ended Germany’s external semi-
sovereignty; the internal workings of the Federal Republic did not 
experience any substantial change. Yet, German semi-sovereignty persists 
on two levels. First, Germany still acts in a semi-sovereign way deeply 
embedded in multilateral institutions with continuingly strong ties with 
France. The Franco-German axis has remained as stable as in pre-
unification years for a long time; only recently signs have surfaced showing 
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considerable strain on this special relationship in the course of the financial 
crisis and the differing preferences in solving this cisris. Second, internal 
sovereignty is challenged by the increasing influence the EU has on its 
member states. Germany in particular has seen its Länder participate more 
fully in European politics (Paterson, 2005: 281).  
The idea of semi-sovereignty is a good explanation of Germany’s 
preference for multilateral solutions, but it does not address the notion of 
anti-militarism which proponents of the continuation theory perceive in 
German foreign and security policy. In fact, proponents repeatedly describe 
Germany as a ‘civilian power’, a nation that attempts to civilise international 
relations by replacing “the military enforcement of rules (politics based on 
power) with the internationalisation of socially accepted norms (politics 
based on legitimacy)” (Harnisch & Maull, 2001: 4). 
In order to implement this internationalisation of socially accepted 
norms, a civilian power would pursue six objectives.  
• First, the monopolisation of force would constrain the use of force 
through a system of collective security.  
• Second, deep integration within international organisations and 
general multilateralism, combined with a partial transfer of 
sovereignty would strengthen the rule of law.  
• Third, a civilian power would be committed to the promotion of 
democratic procedures within and among states.  
• Fourth, violence as a means of conflict management would be 
perceived as non-desirable, thus a restraint on violence would be 
promoted.  
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• Fifth, a civilian power would work towards establishing wide 
ranging social justice in order to support legitimacy of the 
international order.  
• Finally, interdependence would further the civilian power’s cause 
to civilise international relations. 
The traditional civilian power would therefore be a power, which 
would promote and at times even initialise international action, be willing to 
shift autonomy and sovereignty to international institutions and would put 
short-term national interests behind the primary goal of realising a civilised 
international order (Harnisch and Maull, 2001: 4). 
Why then can this concept of civilian power be so readily applied to 
the study of German foreign policy? Tewes makes a point in saying that a 
general civilisation of international relations has take place since World War 
II, especially across Europe and North America. Generally speaking, 
conflict solutions tend to follow a non-military approach with the use of 
violence as a last resort, decisions are taken to a large extent within 
multilateral institutions and international law has been gradually 
strengthened. However, Tewes argues that Germany and Japan constitute 
special cases, since both had experienced total defeat and were both only 
readmitted into the international community as redeemed nations ,(Tewes, 
1997: 100). 
Since the tamed nature of the German state, both constitutionally 
and socially, did not allow for the continuation of the Machtpolitik of the first 
half the 20th century, Germany adopted a policy of surrendering partial 
sovereignty to international institutions in return for a gradual re-integration 
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into the international community, a policy that allowed domestic actors to 
“reap the benefits of economic interdependence” (Tewes, 1997: 102). It has 
therefore, according to Tewes, always been in the interest of the Federal 
Republic to pursue the path of a civilian power. 
Not only did Germany surrender parts of its sovereignty to 
international institutions, it also actively worked to strengthen and widen 
these institutions. The Federal Republic’s continuous role in Europe’s 
constitution-building process as well as in its pro-active Eastern policy 
emphasise the desire to civilise European politics with its neighbours 
(Risse, 2004: 27).  
Although according to the ideal type, a civilian power would authorise 
the use of force only in conjunction with a legitimising ruling from an 
international institution, in recent years Germany has been engaged in 
operations which can be interpreted as the end of Germany being a civilian 
power. The greatest challenge for the civilian power approach took the form 
of Germany’s engagement in NATO’s Kosovo campaign of 1999, which had 
not been sanctioned by the United Nations. In his article “German foreign 
policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘civilian power’ Maull argues that Germany has 
in fact remained a civilian power even though it had acted against the UN 
Security Council. Primarily, Maull emphasis that Germany’s approach to the 
crisis had always been characterised by firmly held beliefs, not material 
interests and a desire to be a reliable ally within both NATO and the EU 
(Maull, 2000a: 17). Multilateralism therefore remained at the core of 
German foreign policy. 
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Maull however concedes that the civilian power’s traditional aversion 
towards military force could no longer be sustained with regards to 
Germany after this crisis. He maintains that Germany had already 
embarked on a path of making more use of its military during the break-up 
of Yugoslavia when the tensions between the reluctance of using force and 
the firmly held beliefs became more and more severe. Germany did 
therefore not cease to be a civilian power; it rather implemented gradual 
modifications to its foreign policy. Furthermore, Maull points out, that the 
constitutional constraints on the use of German force is still very strong and 
open to interpretations, which in turn would leave a repetition of the Kosovo 
engagement open for challenges in the Constitutional Court (Maull, 2000a: 
18). Similarly, although Germany has sent its troops to Afghanistan, this 
was not purely done out of power political reasons, rather out of 
considerations of civilising international relations (Risse, 2004: 29).  
Maull therefore concludes that Germany remains a civilian power, 
because even after the military contributions to Kosovo and Afghanistan 
Germany is still committed to multilateral institutions and continues to be 
reluctant and constitutionally restrained from using its military without UN 
approval. 
Taking into account the arguments for seeing Germany’s foreign 
policy as a continuation of the Cold War era, i.e. multilateral approaches to 
foreign policy and a very reluctant stand on military deployment, the reform 
of the Bundeswehr is necessary only to accommodate for the occasional 
deployment in a relatively secure area, but would mostly continue to 
concentrate in defensive operations. That would, however, not fully explain 
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the more profound reforms set out in the Weißbuch 2006, which aims at 
making the Bundeswehr in general more deployable, more sustainable 
during more robust operations and acquiring new transport capabilities and 
more deployable equipment to be capable to take on out-of-area missions 
in the first place (BMVg, 2006: 11-12). 
Becoming a ‘normal’ power? 
As the the Weißbuch 2006 aims at a more deployable Bundeswehr it 
is necessary to consider the possibility that Germany has in fact embarked 
on a more normal foreign policy to accommodate its allies’ expectations to 
contribute to operations in accordance with its increased international 
weight. When discussing the concept of normalization, however, one needs 
to have a look at a more ‘traditional’ outlook on the term ‘normal’ as 
opposed to the one outlined earlier in this chapter. 
Proponents of the normalisation process argue that German foreign 
and security policy has in fact become more normal over the last twenty 
years the term ‘normal’ referring to a more realist approach of international 
relations. According to realist ideology, a ‘normal’ state would endeavour to 
accumulate as much power as possible in order to improve its standing in 
the international arena. In the case of Germany, the new-found sovereignty 
after unification would allow the country to discard the artificial restraints of 
the Cold War and conduct its foreign and security policy as other – ‘normal’ 
– nations do. Arguing from this realist point of view, Mearsheimer argues 
that since the bipolar system had collapsed the new multi-polar 
environment would present ample opportunities “for bullying and ganging 
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up” (Mearsheimer, 1990: 32). Special emphasis needs to be paid to unified 
Germany in this scenario, since according to Mearsheimer Germany would 
make use of its newly found increase of power and dominate Europe in 
much the same way it had done in the 1930s. Furthermore, Germany would 
also aim at acquiring nuclear capabilities in order to safeguard itself from 
blackmail from other nuclear powers and “to raise its military status to a 
level commensurate with its economic status (Mearsheimer, 1990: 36). In 
essence, Germany would rid itself of its constraints it had placed upon itself 
during the Cold War and would evolve into a new hegemon in a very 
unstable multipolar Europe which would also see the resurface of 
nationalism. 
Although also contributing to the normalization/continuation debate, 
Philip H. Gordon takes a more nuanced neo-realistic approach. Before 
discussing Germany’s post-unification foreign policy, Gordon briefly 
discusses West Germany’s traditional approach to this policy area. The 
Cold War saw a West German foreign policy which, according to Gordon, 
was characterised by four traits.  
• First, the Federal Republic followed a “policy of responsibility”, 
which is to say that emphasis was placed on the importance of 
justice, responsibility and morality as a result of Germany’s 
troubled past. Examples of the influence of this policy could be 
seen in the deep integration into western alliance mechanisms, 
the compensations paid to victims of the Third Reich and the 
constitutional ban on wars of aggression. Since German 
governments were well aware that their foreign policy was being 
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observed not only by the international community, but also be the 
German general public, any actions that could be interpreted as a 
return to German “power politics” were avoided. 
• Second, the “civilian policy” favours economic power over military 
power. Although West Germany had its own armed forces ever 
since 1955 which played an important role in NATO’s policy of 
deterrence, it was never intended as anything else but a territorial 
defence force. This intention was mirrored in the Grundgesetz 
(Basic Law) arguably banning German troops from participating 
in any military operation outside NATO territory.  
• Third, the “parochial policy” describes the tendency of German 
politicians to limit West Germany’s role to Europe. Whereas 
Germany had been very active within Europe to promote the 
European Community (EC) or formulating its Ostpolitik, it played 
hardly any role in the Middle East peace process or any other 
process global importance.  
• Finally, the “multilateral approach” emphasises the fact that West 
Germany made great use of the international organisations to 
pursue its national interests, rather than acting alone.  
Although some outcomes were mostly satisfying German interests, 
like the above mentioned Ostpolitik, West German politicians always 
stressed the shared interests of their allies in order to gain the necessary 
support (Gordon, 1994: 226-228) by pointing to for example ‘European 
interests’, rather than ‘German interests’. Whereas other states might have 
used a multilateral approach as a ‘less expensive’ option in that it saves 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
24 
 
resource by pooling them with the allies, for West German governments 
multilateralism allowed for a internationally widely supported foreign policy, 
which was extremely important for a nation still re-establishing as a 
respected member of the international community. The multilateral 
approach was therefore perceived as the only way for West Germany to 
conduct its foreign policy without raising suspicions abroad, a concern 
which is still traceable today. Multilateralism for West Germans decision-
makers was thus more of a reflex to appease the neighbours than the result 
of rational considerations. 
In his analysis of the foreign and security policy of the unified 
Germany, Gordon immediately clarifies that the basis on which foreign 
policy formulation is built will not change that much, however, he points out 
that the radical changes that took place in and around Germany will have 
their effects on the Federal Republic (Gordon, 1994: 228-229). Although 
German politicians took great care to highlight the continuation of 
Germany’s multilateral approach, Germany’s size, wealth and geopolitical 
position would make it more difficult to maintain a low profile in the post-
Cold War world. 
Among other examples for this development Gordon offers, the 
military deployment is possibly the best one. Gordon shows that within the 
short time of only three years, the German society has come to accept the 
need for increased military contributions to several operations. This did, 
however, not happen quickly as the intensity of the operations grew only 
very gradually from the symbolic and financial support for Operation Desert 
Storm to contributing to a number of international military operations, 
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ranging from AWACS missions over Serbia to humanitarian operations in 
Somalia and Cambodia. Taking into account that out-of-area missions had 
traditionally been seen as being banned by the constitution, an 
interpretation firmly held throughout the political spectrum, these steps are 
even more noteworthy (Gordon, 1994: 231).  
Overall, Gordon summarises his arguments by saying that  
“the new Germany is no longer so dependent for security on the 
United States, is directly affected by Europe’s most critical problems, 
and is led by a generation of leaders born late enough to bear no guilt 
for Nazi crimes. While Germany will remain acutely sensitive to how its 
foreign policy is perceived abroad, the pressures or obligations to play 
a reserved, parochial, or multilateral role will not be as strong in the 
future as they were in the past” (Gordon, 1994: 233).  
Although his analysis is more differentiated than Mearsheimer’s, 
Gordon clearly expects unified Germany to evolve into a state with a 
“normal” foreign and security policy, a state that would also unilaterally 
pursue its own interests. Unlike Mearsheimer, however, Gordon does not 
see this as a threat to European stability. During the 1990s, many 
proponents of normalisation emphasised Germany’s embedded nature 
within its alliances, be it the EU, NATO or the UN, which in turn enabled 
Germans to conduct an easily calculable foreign policy (Bald, 2001: 222). 
This way of conducting foreign policy allowed German governments to 
reassure their allies by avoiding any German “Sonderwege” while at the 
same time pursuing and satisfying national interests through close co-
operation. By conducting its foreign and security policy through 
institutionalised multilateral channels Germany has been able to combine 
the pursuit of interests with the need to reassure its partners. 
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This calculable foreign policy would at first concentrate on the role of 
the mediator between the transforming Eastern Europe and the West. 
Germany’s aim to stabilise its Eastern neighbours with the help of its 
Western partners would only be achieved if it formulated clear interests and 
take the initiative in seeing these interests fulfilled, especially considering 
the initial indifference of the USA under George W. Bush towards Europe 
(Baring, 2000: 266). Germany could therefore no longer afford to delegate 
responsibilities to its partners, while at the same time Germany would still 
be affected by its traditional Mittellage (central position) within Europe and 
would therefore need allies to advance its interests (Baring, 2000: 269).  
In 1998 the process of normalisation was accelerated as Chancellor 
Schröder’s centre-left Social Democrat – Green Government embarked on 
a more confident foreign policy. This more confident foreign policy was the 
result of a generational change as the new government was made up of 
politicians who did not belong to Hellmann’s affected generation.2 Although 
Schröder’s rhetoric emphasised the need for continuation – the need for 
multilateral priorities and civilising international relations –, his policies of 
transatlantic co-operation and European integration were characterised by 
a sense of realpolitik. Especially in EU politics, Schröder realised that a 
deeper European integration would strengthen Germany’s position within 
the Union (Hacke, 2002: 7-8). At the same time, Europe would still need the 
United States to compensate for the missing European military capabilities 
– as seen during the Kosovo Conflict.  
                                                 
2
 See (Hellmann, 2001: 46-47) The Bonn Republic was characterised by the affected generation, i.e. those 
directly affected by WWII, whereas the Berlin Republic saw the rise of politicians who were no longer directly 
affected by this experience therefore did not restrain themselves as much 
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In addition to this, the Schröder Government paid much attention to 
emphasising Germany’s newly found confidence. German national interests 
were more openly prioritised over European interests. Schröder’s approach 
to international affairs was therefore twofold. First, German issues needed 
to be solved in Berlin and not elsewhere and secondly, Germany could no 
longer hide behind the cheque-book-diplomacy of the early post-unification 
years (Schröder, 2002: 8). This confident Germany would be a clear 
advocate of a strong Europe, emancipated from – but not entirely separated 
from – the United States, which, as already pointed out, were no longer 
primarily interested in Europe under George W. Bush (Schröder, 2011: 3).  
This new approach to the transatlantic relationship came to the 
forefront during the controversies surrounding the war in Iraq in 2003. As a 
sign of a more normal foreign policy, the Schröder Government broke with 
Germany’s tradition and openly criticised the US policies, especially 
regarding the conflict in Iraq. Interestingly, this criticism was not only felt 
amongst the political elite, but rather it represented general public opinion 
towards the United States. Not only did the government therefore create a 
precedent in openly and directly criticising its most valuable partner, but it 
did so with wide public support, suggesting that the German society in 
general was comfortable with this new, ‘normal’ foreign policy (Neu, 2004: 
23). 
Although this confrontation will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
2, proponents of the normalisation process point to this period of a 
confident Germany breaking with the United States for proof, that Germany 
no longer solely relies on its traditional partners but rather seeks new ones, 
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should the need arise. This new ‘German way’ could be perceived as a sign 
that its foreign policy is being re-aligned along much more national 
orientation (Rudolf, 2002: 16). 
One might put this development down to the difficult relationship 
between Schröder and Bush, yet Angela Merkel seemed to continue this 
development – albeit in a more diplomatic guise. Merkel renewed the US-
German “partnership in leadership” which had been offered to then German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl by George Bush, Sr. after unification. However, at 
the same time Merkel was very vocal about her concerns regarding the 
Bush (George W. Bush) Administration, especially regarding the 
Guantanamo prison camp in which suspected terrorists are held prisoners, 
highlighting the apparent violations of human rights and her rejection of 
torture (Merkel, 2011: 1). This criticism, however, was much more 
constructive as Schröder’s as can be seen by Bush’s reaction highlighting 
Berlin’s productive role in international relations. Similarly, Merkel 
maintained good relations with Paris and London without limiting her room 
for political manoeuvres by too close alliances (Hacke, 2006: 31-32).  
More recently, however, Germany has increased its standing on the 
European stage to that of an embedded hegemon, i.e. a dominating state 
within a clear political framework of international organisations. In the case 
of Germany it can be argued that over the last two decades Germany has 
shown signs that it is capable and willing to take on the leading role within 
Europe (Crawford, 2007: 34). This approach to the study of German foreign 
and security policy incorporates the arguments of continuation, as implied 
by the term ‘embedded’, while at the same time acknowledging the more 
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assertive behaviour German politicians have displayed over the last few 
years. Germany’s emphasis on multilateral solutions and the importance of 
international organisations remains unchanged. Rather than arguing that 
the means and channels through which Germany conducts its foreign policy 
have changed, both Crawford and Karp argue that the manner in which 
foreign policy has changed. The core questions they argue are not about 
Germany’s overall goals, but about “how Germany views its role in 
European institutions, how it uses its institutional power, how it expects to 
be rewarded and what rewards it is willing to offer others” (Karp, 2009: 15). 
This quote implies that Germany is still deeply embedded within the alliance 
mechanisms but politicians are more direct in formulating their preferences. 
The nature of German foreign policy of multilateralism has therefore not 
changed, but its tone has become more assertive more in line with that of a 
hegemon. 
Although this concept is intriguing, it has to be noted that it does bear 
resemblance with the idea that states in general have over the last few 
years lost parts of their sovereignty to international organisations and the 
increasing interdependence which would be reflected in the ‘embedded’ 
attribute. With that in mind this supports this thesis’ argument that Germany 
with its integrated foreign policy has become more self-confident and more 
normal in that it pursues its national interests out of domestic impulses as 
well as external expectations and pressures. 
Concentrating on the policy sector of German military reform Tom 
Dyson approaches the topic of the more normal German foreign and 
security policy by analysing the behaviour of policy leaders, most notably 
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the Ministers of Defence. In his book “The Politics of German Defence and 
Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post Cold-War Era” 
he maintains that many scholars neglect the importance of “material factors 
emanating from the domestic political context”, therefore insufficiently 
explaining policy change in Germany (Dyson, 2007: 5). 
Dyson stresses the importance of the Ressortprinzip, the 
departmental or ministerial principle, and the role of leadership within the 
ministries as the defining factor of changes in German defence policy. 
Dyson identifies three distinct leadership roles, which in turn are linked 
leadership styles and strategies. First, policy entrepreneurship aims at 
radical policy change by pushing a preferred policy solution. The leader 
takes the role of an initiator of change, creating an atmosphere of constant 
crisis and thus legitimising the radical change through persuasion in order 
to gain support for the proposed policy change. Second, policy brokerage is 
most closely associated with incremental change by means of policy 
learning and the ability to include the opposition in the process. Finally, 
policy veto-playing involves preventing the formulation of policy change by 
blocking any new policy ideas or sidelining the agents of new policy 
initiatives (Dyson, 2007: 7).  
Comparing the two post-Cold War governments in Germany, i.e. the 
governments of the Federal Chancellors Helmut Kohl (1982 -1998) and 
Gerhard Schröder (1998 – 2005), Dyson maintains that the Kohl 
government place significant importance on defence and security. Kohl 
perceived this policy area as Germany’s historical obligation, as a means to 
repay the western allies for their support not only during the re-unification 
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process, but also during the Cold War as such. Schröder, on the other 
hand, placed a higher priority on the economy, which resulted in him 
making security and defence less often a ‘Kanzlersache’, thus changing the 
context for the defence and security policy subsystem (Dyson, 2007: 13). 
The Ressortprinzip and therefore the individual departmental leader 
is of such significance, because the chancellor does not actually engage in 
the ‘day-to-day’ ministerial management, but rather sets out the strategic 
guidelines. Any changes and policy initiatives implemented in the field of 
security policy are therefore attributed to the defence ministers, since it is 
their responsibility to appoint their respective state secretaries and 
Generalinspekteure (chiefs of staff), thus having almost complete control 
over the Bundesverteidigungsministerium using the strategic culture as 
means to legitimise policy proposals (Dyson, 2007: 13-14). 
Although Dyson’s analysis of the role of leadership with regards to 
Germany’s decision-making process is very interesting, for the purpose of 
this thesis it is too much concentrated on the role of individuals. Since the 
concept of normalisation in itself describes a trend in changing policies the 
analysis of certain individuals’ views and approaches would not suffice in 
determining the validity of this perceived trend. 
To say that Germany has become or is becoming a ‘normal’ power in 
the traditional realist sense of the word, i.e. a country primarily concerned 
with power politics, would be simplistic at best. It is still very much a 
multilateral player utilising its standing to further its own agenda. In the 
increasingly unipolar environment of the post-Cold War era Germany 
adapts its policy choices accordingly. This should, however, not be 
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mistaken with policy normalisation in a strictly realist understanding. While 
both Schröder and Merkel have displayed a more confident and pragmatic 
approach to international politics, Germany is no longer “reflexively 
multilaterlist, nor instrumentally self-serving” (Karp, 2009: 27). This shift 
from reflexive multilateralism to pragmatism, combined with a more 
assertive foreign policy within the frameworks of international organisation 
is therefore at the core of the current German normalisation argument. With 
the more assertive foreign policy in mind a more assertive Bundeswehr is 
needed for support.  
If Germany acts more self-confident on the international stage it will 
be expected to contribute militarily in those cases where diplomacy fails. 
For this it needs armed forces capable to be deployed with relative ease 
and able to sustain a prolonged mission in difficult circumstances. 
Germany’s increased weight and the expectations of its allies force 
Germany to modernise its armed forces in order to accommodate these 
changes. As the Weißbuch 2006 clearly addresses these issues it is 
obvious that German decision makers have come to the same conclusion. 
This thesis will therefore follow the assumption that Germany has in fact 
become a more normal actor in international relations and needs to reform 
its armed forces accordingly.  
Summary 
In summary, the proponents of the idea of continuation point to the 
arguably unique characteristics of German politics. They argue that due to 
Germany’s preference for multilateralism as a result of its semi-sovereignty 
both internally and externally co-operation is very much part of German 
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political culture which in turn means that multilateralism will remain central 
to Germany’s foreign and security policy. Any German Sonderweg would be 
perceived as a return to the power politics of the past which would in turn 
antagonise Germany’s partners and – probably more importantly – 
Germans themselves. Although ‘continuationalists’ acknowledge that 
Germany has become more assertive in its foreign policy, they maintain 
that Germany remains heavily influenced by its collective experience of 
WWII as well as its collective – positive – experiences of the post-War era. 
As has been outlined earlier, the idea that German foreign and security 
policy aims at civilising international relations through diplomatic and 
sometimes economical means is readily applied. Considering Germany’s 
contributions to both KFOR and ISAF these fit the bill due to their 
humanitarian background and their multi-lateral approach. 
Proponents of normalisation, on the other hand, point to the 
increasing display of confidence amongst German politicians – and the 
general public – to argue that Germany is in fact undergoing significant 
change. Although it is relatively easy to refute Mearsheimer’s fears of 
Germany returning to the power politics of old, especially the Schröder and 
Merkel Governments have left the traditional path of German reflexive 
multilateralism to further their agenda. Whereas Schröder’s rhetoric has 
been pointed to as proof of Germany pursuing its interests while at the 
same time emphasising its independence from its partners (Germany’s 
issues being dealt with in Berlin), Merkel is argued to display similar 
characteristics, albeit more nuanced. Although not being a truly ‘normal’ 
state from a realist point of view, Germany’s increasing self-confidence as 
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well as its increasing use of its influence within international organisations 
would suggest a more normal foreign policy. 
It is this increasing self-confidence displayed by Germany’s leaders 
from different parties that points to a shift in German foreign and security 
policy towards becoming more normal in a realist way. This thesis will 
therefore adopt the realist perspective of normality, i.e. the pursuit of 
national interests being at the core of a nation’s decision-making, to 
determine the correlation between Bundeswehr reform and Germany’s 
foreign and security policy. Although it has been argued that Germany 
makes extensive use of multilateralism and international organisations it 
has become clear that these mechanisms have been initially employed to 
further German interests without  it being stated so openly.  
If the Berlin Republic’s foreign policy does in fact differ greatly from 
its predecessor’s policy, that would in turn impact on the armed forces as 
one tool of foreign and security policy. A more normal foreign policy would 
have to incorporate a more active defence policy and a more active role for 
the Bundeswehr to accommodate for Germany’s increased presence on the 
international stage. The Weißbuch 2006 aims at preparing the Bundeswehr 
for its more active role to bring it in line with the new foreign policy outlook. 
To test the hypothesis of Germany having embarked on a process of 
normalisation the following chapter will discuss Germany’s foreign policy 
post-unification to determine the degree of difference between the Bonn 
Republic and the Berlin Republic. When this hypothesis is proven, it will 
then be necessary to see how successful the Weißbuch is in achieving its 
set goals. 
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Chapter 2: The evolution of German foreign 
and security policy since 1990  
“We Germans want nothing more than to live with all our 
neighbours in freedom and democracy as well as in union and peace. 
[…] Our policy shall be a good example. […] On the eve of its 
unification Germany declares the following in front of the international 
community: We will assume our responsibilities both in Europe and in 
the world”3. – Hans-Dietrich Grenscher (Genscher, 1997: 881) 
As stated in the introduction, the need for armed forces reform needs 
to be established before the actual discussion can be undertaken. This 
chapter will therefore deal with the central question of why Germany started 
the reform process in the first place. In order to do this, an overview of 
German foreign and security policy after unification will be at the core of this 
chapter. 
Generally, every country’s foreign and security policy is defined by its 
immediate surroundings. In the case of Germany, these immediate post 
World War II surroundings were difficult to say the least. Both German 
states sought close integration in their respective alliance systems in order 
to reassure their partners that no threat would emanate from Germany thus 
securing the partners’ support in rebuilding both countries.  
The following Cold War made this close co-operation even more 
important for the survival of Germany – the blockade of West Berlin by the 
Soviet Union highlighted the need for security clearly – culminating in the 
accession of both German states into their respective military alliances.  
                                                 
3
 „Wir Deutschen wollen nichts anderes, als in Freiheit und Demokratie, in Einheit und in Frieden mit allen 
unseren Nachbarn leben. […]Unsere Politik will eine Politik des guten Beispiels sein. […] Deutschland am 
Vorabend seiner Vereinigung erklärt vor der Staatengemeinschaft: Wir werden unserer Verantwortung in Europa 
und in der Welt gerecht werden.“ – Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
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These circumstances changed dramatically after unification in 1990. 
The traditional scenario of the bi-polar world, which had defined Germany’s 
post-war policies, gave way to changing world. Before a discussion of 
German foreign and security policy post unification can be undertaken, 
Germany’s situation during the Cold War needs to be addressed in brief. It 
will make clear the changes that took place within Germany, transforming it 
from a country reliant on allied support for its security to a country that 
played a significant role in European security. This chapter will deal 
primarily with German foreign and security policy of the 1990s which in turn 
impacts on the definition of military capabilities as an integral part thereof. 
By analysing Germany’s policies regarding the crises of the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it will become clear 
that by becoming a more active player Germany would need armed forces 
capable of supporting this particular role.  
The Cold War and West Germany 
The Cold War had a great impact on Germany and its foreign and 
security policy, quite understandably so, if one considers that the frontline of 
this conflict divided the country into two. This, paired with the experience of 
complete military and moral defeat in World War II, resulted in a nation 
searching for international rehabilitation. Starting from this Stunde Null (zero 
hour) of defeat, the West German state, which had been created under 
close observation by the victorious Allied Powers, strived for quick 
economic and political reconstruction as well as close integration in 
Western organisations. In the case of East Germany, close co-operation 
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with the Soviet Union and its satellite states was equally important to 
achieve.  
Not only did West Germany relatively quickly join NATO in 1955, but 
it also performed an important role in the European integration process by 
co-founding the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
continuing to develop this further, first into the European Economic 
Community (EEC) which served as the predecessor of today’s European 
Union (EU) (Hancock & Kirsch, 2009: 43). Konrad Adenauer, the first 
Federal Chancellor of West Germany, was convinced that this 
Westintegration (integration in the western system of alliances) combined 
with Bündnistreue (allegiance to the alliance) served to re-establish West 
Germany within the international community as a trustworthy partner. 
However, he also believed that creating an economically strong West 
German state, well integrated within western institutions and alliances 
would radiate eastwards, in effect pulling East Germany out of the 
Communist bloc, thus resulting in a unified Germany (Hacke, 1997: 67-68).  
This rationale clearly shows the rationale of the time firmly rooted in 
realism. Realism as a theory in the study of international relations assumes 
at its core that the international stage is defined by a state of anarchy in 
which the individual nation states are in constant competition and conflict 
with each other in a struggle for security and ultimately survival constantly 
rationally evaluating the costs and benefits of their actions (Burchill, 1996: 
71). In the Case of West Germany, Westintegration and Bündnistreue 
ensured two things for West Germany.  
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First, it secured West Germany in the classical sense by being part 
of an alliance, thus increasing West Germany’s defensive capabilities 
practically overnight by adding US and other Western European forces to 
the cost – benefit equation should the Soviet Union attempt an attack on 
West Germany. Secondly, especially Westintegration enabled West 
Germany to conduct its foreign policy in close conjunction with its partners 
thus accumulating more influence in the international community than on its 
own. Had West Germany articulated clear interests towards its partners, 
this could have been interpreted as German realpolitik, which in turn would 
assume a new German attempt of dominance within Europe. However, by 
going through the channels of integration any German interests could be 
articulated as European interests thus minimising the partners’ suspicion 
towards West Germany. It can therefore be said that Westintegration and 
Bündnistreue served West Germany well, they both guaranteed security 
while at the same time allowed West Germany to accumulate influence. In a 
realist sense West Germany therefore succeeded in attaining security as 
well as having influence within the international community. These two 
commodities were extremely important if West Germany wanted to achieve 
its most important goal of unification. 
This had been on the West German agenda from the very start as 
can be seen in the preamble of its constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law) which originally stated that it was the task of all Germans to strive for 
unity and, more politically more explosive declaration, that the Grundgesetz 
applied to all Germans – East and West (Parlamentarischer Rat, 2002: 
Preamble). In effect, the “Founding Fathers” thus set in stone that the new 
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Federal Republic of Germany would not recognise the authority of any East 
German state and assumed its right to represent the German people alone 
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch). This policy resulted in West Germany refusing 
to develop any diplomatic ties to any country, which itself had diplomatic 
relations to East Germany. According to this Hallstein Doctrine – named 
after the then State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Walter Hallstein – any 
diplomatic relation to East Berlin would be regarded an unfriendly act 
towards Bonn, which would then use the threat of sanctions to support the 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch. The quick economic recovery of West Germany 
helped considerably to maintain this policy (Schöllgen, 2001: 46). However, 
the Hallstein Doctrine was slowly abandoned as the status quo of a divided 
Europe became more widely accepted. In general it can be said that during 
the Cold War, West Germany pursued a policy of balancing its freedom, 
social welfare and economic growth against an increasingly difficult to 
obtain unification. Settling in this scenario West Germany more and more 
perceived itself as a “bulwark against the East, a refuge for freedom and 
prosperity, and a self-conscious successor state to past German regimes” 
(Hancock and Kirsch, 2009: 43). This idea of a bulwark can also be found in 
the West German defence policy and armed forces structure, which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3. This idea of West Germany as a 
bulwark was further supported by the United States who soon projected its 
power to provide additional security to Western Europe and West Germany 
in particular. In summary, West German security depended on both its own 
military and the close co-operation with West Germany’s allies, most 
notably the U.S. to contain the clearly defined threat in the East. 
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The East German state by contrast, perceived itself as a completely 
different kind of German state which had denounced any connections to 
previous German regimes. Under the overall rule of the Social Unity Party 
of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED) the state 
institutions were set up to mimic their Soviet antetype. It was the primary 
goal of East German politics to transform Germany into a socialist 
democracy with a centrally planned economy and very close military, 
diplomatic and trade co-operation with the Soviet Union (Hancock and 
Kirsch, 2009: 44). It goes without saying that this close link with the USSR 
and its dedication to socialism caused East Germany to label its western 
capitalist neighbour a threat to its national sovereignty, thus effectively 
setting the mutual distrust of both German states in stone. 
Both German states were therefore deeply embedded in their 
respective alliances up to the point that conducting their own foreign policy 
was only partially possible. In the case of West Germany almost any 
decision in foreign policy depended on Washington’s approval; any dealings 
amongst the two German states would also need Moscow’s consent 
(Pulzer, 1999: 110). Germany was therefore not a sovereign nation, like the 
United States, France or the United Kingdom, but rather a semi-sovereign 
state that needed the close co-operation of its partners. 
Germany and the international community post 1990  
The need for co-operation was highlighted during the events of 
1989/90 which lead to the unification of East and West Germany. The 
negotiations for German unification, the 2+4 talks, centred primarily around 
four main questions. 
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1. How should German unification be achieved with reference to the 
international community? 
2. How could the approval of all four Allies for German full 
sovereignty be obtained? 
3. How could the reservations within the international community 
regarding a re-unified Germany be overcome? 
4. How could questions, that had been left unanswered since the 
end of Wold War II, be solved? (Auswärtiges Amt, 2011: Articles 
1-8) 
The nature of these questions demonstrate clearly the importance, 
foreign powers had for an essentially inner-German process (Hacke, 1997: 
369). Especially the question three and four were – and still to some extent 
are – difficult to answer, since, as it will be shown in this thesis, Germany is 
just becoming accustomed to its sovereignty some 20 years after obtaining 
it.  
Even prior to unification it had been made clear by U.S. President 
Bush’s offer of a ‘partnership in leadership’, that Germany was expected to 
take on a more active role in international affairs, an expectation that was 
further increased after 1990 due to Germany’s generally changed domestic 
and international situation.  
Unification as such had numerous effects on Germany as a nation, 
especially in relation to its partners in Europe. First and foremost, 
Germany’s size increased drastically with unification with borders now 
stretching to Poland, thus raising questions about whether Polish territories 
formerly belonging to Germany – Eastern Prussia in particular – would soon 
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follow the territories of the former GDR into the enlarged Germany.  Closely 
linked with the territorial gain, the growth of Germany’s population in 
conjunction with the differing sizes of the eastern and western economies 
meant that the Federal Republic was facing a dilemma. Although – in realist 
terms – a larger population translates into more power, this was counter-
weighed by the financial costs of attempting to reform the new Länder 
economically. Finally, the eventual move of the capital from Bonn to Berlin 
conjured up old memories of Germany amongst its allies since Berlin had 
remained a synonym for previous German ambitions. 
From a purely realist point of view these developments – growth in 
territory, population – combined with the return to the old German capital 
and the re-acquired full sovereignty gave rise to reservations regarding this 
arguably new, more powerful Germany’s future foreign policy. 
However, the 1990s only saw a very reluctant move to a more active 
foreign policy, therefore expelling most of Germany’s neighbours’ fears. 
German policy makers took great care to maintain a certain continuity in 
their foreign policy, i.e. close co-operation with their partners and 
multilateral operations if needed. Germany did in fact play a significant role 
in resolving the major crises of the 1990s, like the wars in former 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo, however demands on Germany voiced by its 
partners to step up its efforts were a constant critique. This can be seen 
plainly in the military operations in both Kosovo and Afghanistan – both of 
which will be discussed in more detail in their respective case studies later 
on in this thesis. 
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From an outside view it seems clear that the last two questions 
posed during the 2+4 talks have not been resolved for German policy 
makers, since they still seem to be very much concerned with distancing 
themselves from Germany’s highly troubled past. Debates about whether 
Germany should get involved militarily in a certain conflict have in the past 
been centred on questions about how German troops would be received by 
the local population and more importantly how the international community 
would react to German military contribution. The discussion of the political 
debates surrounding out-of-area deployment in chapters 4 and 5 will 
concentrate on this particular point. 
By contrast, Germany’s partners appear to be very comfortable with 
Germany assuming a more assertive foreign policy, in fact, as the case 
studies on the military operations will show. It is therefore safe to assume 
that Germany’s reluctance to conduct a more active foreign policy is based 
on domestic factors rather than external ones 
Although one might argue that the Gulf War of 1991 needs to be 
included in an analysis of Germany’s post-unification foreign and security 
policy, it will not be discussed here. The reason for this is that German 
behaviour then was still very much influenced by the Cold War attitude, 
which called for a more passive German foreign and security policy towards 
international crises and more crucially by alleged constitutional restraints.  
In 1994, however, the Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled that the Grundgesetz did not prohibit out-
of-area deployment of German troops. This ruling therefore marked the end 
of legal quarrels concerning the interpretation of the Grundgesetz and made 
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future Bundeswehr out-of-area deployments possible 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1994: Paragraphs 1-6). As the case of the 
former Yugoslavia eventually saw the first full-scale deployment of German 
troops in peace-making and peace-keeping missions (the missions in 
Cambodia and Somalia were more of a humanitarian nature) it is a good 
starting point for the analysis of the German rationale behind engaging in 
peace-making and peace-keeping missions. 
Peace-keeping in Former Yugoslavia  
It is interesting to note that Tito, the long-time dictator of Yugoslavia, 
was convinced as early as 1953 that only a strong dictatorship could keep 
the different ethnic groups from “cutting each others’ throats” (Hacke, 1997: 
399). Keeping this in mind, the outbreak of conflicts in this region is hardly 
surprising, considering that at the time, although Tito had already died in 
1980, the last authority of Eastern Europe in the guise of the Soviet Union 
was developing a less authoritarian attitude towards its satellite states. 
The conflict and eventual break-up of Yugoslavia had already begun 
in 1990 with the European Community, and later its successor the 
European Union, attempting to put an end to the hostilities exclusively 
through diplomatic means. The tensions among the Yugoslavian republics 
were all the more surprising to them, as Yugoslavia had always been 
considered to be a model of a multi-ethnical state. The West, therefore, did 
not seem to share Tito’s view that it was only a strong authority, which 
would keep the different groups in line. Not surprisingly, the EC announced 
on 23. June 1990 that it would not recognise any declaration of 
independence coming from any of the different Yugoslavian republics in an 
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attempt to maintain the multi-ethnical status quo. This appears to run 
against the notion that after the demise of communist rule in Central and 
Eastern Europe the establishment of self-determination throughout this 
region should be supported as well as possible. The creation of new states 
by this process was not an option. The West favoured a united Yugoslavia 
under the political leadership of Serbia (Hacke, 1997: 399-400). From this 
brief outline of the situation one can already see, that solving the 
Yugoslavian problem would not be an easy task. For the first time after the 
end of World War II, armed conflict had returned to the European continent 
taking the governments of the European Community by surprise. The 
subsequent attempts to find a solution sometimes appearing to be put 
forward by confused decision-makers are proof of the helplessness in which 
Europe found herself with the Federal Republic being no exception.  
True to its preference for diplomacy Germany and the EC mainly 
engaged in a policy of strongly worded statements advocating the status-
quo in Yugoslavia and interestingly enough, rejecting the notion of 
transforming the multi-ethical state into a confederation of the different 
provinces which would have granted them the self-determination they 
wanted without the actual break-up of the Yugoslavian state. When war did 
break out in June 1991 it became clear that this strategy was not sufficient 
to keep the problem under control (Hoffmann, 2000: 258). 
The EC, and Germany in particular, strongly believed that Belgrade 
could be stopped in pursuing its aggressive behaviour by using the recently 
developed crisis mechanisms of the CSCE, which, at first, took the form of 
financial and economic measures. Germany’s threat to cut all its aid to 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
46 
 
Belgrade was substantial, considering the amount of financial aid 
Yugoslavia had received in 1990 from the German Government totalled 
around $550 million. The continuing diplomatic efforts undertaken by the 
EC had very little effect on the fighting and by the autumn of 1991, fourteen 
cease-fires negotiated by the EC had been broken (Haar, 2001: 71). With 
this rather poor record a new strategy needed to be found. It became more 
and more apparent that the EC would not be able to stop the fighting in the 
Balkans on its own.  
Both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher soon began to 
push for international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in an attempt to 
bring other, more powerful institutions into the game. International 
recognition would turn that the civil war into an international war, which 
would be in breach with international law thus resulting in the engagement 
of the United Nations. What followed was the beginning of the first 
international controversy concerning Germany’s new ‘unilateralism’. After 
having discussed the issue with their European partners, a date, 15th 
January 1992, for formal recognition of the two republics was agreed on. 
Germany, however, appears to have rushed ahead of its partners allegedly 
recognising Croatia and Slovenia on 23rd December 1991. It is, however, 
interesting to see that Genscher rejects this outright. He argues that the 
German Government only informed the two republics in question about the 
EC’s intention to recognise them on the agreed date. Actual diplomatic 
relations were not started until the 15th January 1992 and therefore 
Germany was not in any breach with the EC agreement (Genscher, 1997: 
962-963). 
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This interpretation of proceedings was, however, not shared by many 
contemporaries, thus giving rise to the claim of new German unilateralism. 
What was more damaging is the fact that Germany would not be willing to 
defend the two new nations it had helped to create. This is not to say that 
Germany ceased all efforts to end the conflict but rather to assume the role 
of the trustworthy but somewhat restricted ally and partner. Having realised 
that a diplomatic solution to the crisis could not be found, the EC continued 
its regime of economic sanctions but also started including humanitarian 
intervention and selective military actions against Serbia. Unclear about the 
how the Grundgesetz should be interpreted with regards to out-of-area 
deployment of German troops, the Kohl-Government nevertheless decided 
that it should participate in the UN missions. In July 1992 Germany assisted 
in the air transports to Sarajevo, in the naval enforcement of the embargo 
against Serbia and later in the AWACS missions to monitor the no-fly zones 
over Bosnia (Haar, 2001: 72). Bonn, however, expressed its reluctance to 
participate in any military intervention should these measures not be 
sufficient to stop the fighting. The decision to participate in the UN missions 
resulted in a heated domestic debate, as the dispute over the 
Grundgesetz’s interpretation was still not solved.  
Each Bundeswehr assignment was heavily challenged by the 
opposition claiming that each violated the Grundgesetz. To solve the 
disagreement the Government saw no other possibility than to have a ruling 
from the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The junior coalition partner, the FDP, 
together with the opposition therefore challenged the Chancellor in the 
Court, which on 12th July 1994 ruled in Chancellor’s favour although also 
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stating that the Government had violated the rights of the Bundestag by not 
consulting it, which would need to be done in the future (Gros & Glaab, 
1999: 268-269). This ruling ended the legal debate over the legality of 
German out-of-area involvement and made into a political consideration. 
Although the question of legality was now resolved, Germany did not 
contribute to the missions over Yugoslavia without much controversy. When 
in 1995 the UN requested Bundeswehr personnel to support and protect the 
already in Yugoslavia stationed UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) Bonn 
had immense difficulties to win the support of the opposition. Eventually it 
was agreed on to contribute medical personnel, surveillance aircraft, air 
transport, fourteen Tornados and various other troops of which none were 
ground troops. When, in late 1995, it came to contributing to IFOR 
(Implementation Force), which was to enforce the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, a similarly strong opposition voiced its concerns. Eventually, 
however, the Bundestag did support the mission and some 4,000 logistical, 
medical and airborne troops became part of IFOR (Haar, 2001: 75). 
When wanting to attempt to understand the measures taken by the 
German Government over the Yugoslavia Crisis, one has to confront 
complex issues of German security traditions. As with the Gulf War, the 
time factor cannot be ignored either. The measures taken by Germany over 
Yugoslavia, at times, appear to lack a sense of continuity or even the notion 
of a grand strategy. As has been shown above, Germany firstly tried to 
calm the situation diplomatically in accordance with the EC (the 
misunderstanding over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia shall be 
considered the exception to the rule). When it became clear, that this would 
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not diffuse the situation, Germany retreated slightly and the EC’s 
embargoes and economic sanctions were implemented. Finally, the need to 
use military force in order to pacify the region was recognised by the EC 
governments with Germany being the reluctant partner referencing 
historical and constitutional constraints. Even when the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled in favour of out-of-area deployments 
German contributions were subject of heated parliamentary debates. 
As already pointed out, the time factor is important when trying to 
understand Germany’s behaviour. In 1991, Germany had only recently 
been unified and most efforts were directed in that direction. The dissolution 
of the multi-ethnical Yugoslavia was not on the public’s mind, as the New 
Länder (formerly East Germany) needed urgent economic restructuring 
(Calic, 1996: 52-53). In addition to that, Germany had just regained its full 
sovereignty and given the historical fears of its neighbours it seems only 
logical that the Kohl-government did not want show a drastic change in 
foreign and security policy. The desire of wanting to be seen as a reliable 
partner in Europe is one of the major factors behind Germany’s policy 
towards Yugoslavia. Therefore, Germany first embarked on the diplomatic 
path, which had always been a safe path for German governments. After 
the recognition debacle it is interesting to see the retreat of Germany not 
taking another chance of having to confront claims of stepping out of EC 
policy line. However, this phase of the crisis sees German decision makers 
torn between two possible courses of action. Politicians were still in the 
process of formulating the foreign and security policy for the newly unified 
Germany, which would naturally lead to uncoordinated actions. 
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When it comes to the actual UN and later NATO missions over 
Yugoslavia, one can see an incremental shift within the German population 
to accept and shoulder more responsibility. Although this is to be greeted 
one has to ask the question of why this shift occurred. The primary reason 
for this would be the increased international pressure for Germany to take 
on a more active part. Although especially France was still slightly 
uncomfortable with the notion of having an active Germany at the heart of 
Europe again, both Paris and London made clear demands to Bonn. Given 
Germany’s ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ during the 1991 Gulf War its allies did 
not want to see a repetition of that policy. Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit 
(ability to contribute to the alliance) was on the line. In addition to this the 
public’s attitude towards Bundeswehr out-of-area changed considerably 
over that crisis. During the Gulf War the public was against getting the 
Bundeswehr involved in the conflict. By 1995, 78% of the German public 
supported the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia (Haar, 2001: 79). This 
shows that the Germans in general, and therefore by extension politicians, 
started to come to terms with the idea of deploying troops to maintain peace 
elsewhere. Yet, differing interpretations of the Grundgesetz made it 
increasingly difficult to prove Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit. It was only after 
the 1994 ruling that the question of out-of-area missions became a purely 
political one.  
As a summary it is possible to say that Germany was taken by 
surprise by the events in Yugoslavia at a time when it was still formulating 
its new foreign and security policy. The German emphasis on diplomacy at 
the beginning of the crisis can be interpreted as a means to ensure its 
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partners of its continuing diplomatic and political reliability. After the failure 
of its diplomatic efforts, Germany saw itself pushed to contribute to peace-
enforcing and peace-keeping missions. It would have to get in line in order 
to protect its Bündnisfähigkeit. This pressure was even intensified by the 
desire to put an end to the aggressions and thus restore stability in the 
Balkans. Whereas Germany could keep out of the Gulf War in 1991 it 
proved much harder, and eventually impossible, to ignore the process in 
Yugoslavia due to decreasing domestic constraints (growing public support) 
and increased multinational attention (increasing efforts from the EC and 
NATO). 
Overview of the Kosovo Crisis 
Although a more detailed account of the Bundeswehr mission in 
Kosovo and Germany’s contribution to KFOR will be given in chapter 4, it is 
necessary to have an overview of the crisis and Germany’s role in it to be 
able to demonstrate its growing commitment to European security. Chapter 
4 will concentrate on the actual mission, its objectives and the means with 
which these objectives were meant to be achieved. It will also highlight the 
political debate as well as the public’s take on the mission. Here, this thesis 
will merely give an introduction to the international community’s efforts to 
solve this crisis diplomatically and Germany’s role in it.  
The Kosovo Crisis had its origins in 1989, when the then 
autonomous province, mainly inhabited by Albanians, was stripped of that 
status by the Serbs. Being literally ignored by the West during the Dayton 
Peace negotiations, it remained under Serbian rule after the initial 
Yugoslavian Crisis had been resolved. With tensions mounting between the 
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Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians (especially the Kosovo Liberation Army, 
KLA) the Balkans erupted in violence once more in late-1997. Being unable 
to secure the support of the UN Security Council, NATO eventually took 
charge of diffusing the Balkans by threatening Belgrade, which had moved 
into Kosovo with heavy weapons, with air strikes (Maull, 2000a: 2-3). 
At the close of 1998, Germany was domestically pre-occupied with 
the federal elections, which would end the sixteen-year period of the Kohl 
Government, replacing it with the left-of-the-centre ‘Red-Green’ Coalition of 
Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fischer (Greens). The new 
Government was in the middle of having to decide whether to participate in 
the military operation for which NATO was already preparing before it was 
formally installed by the Federal President. The decision to contribute 14 
ECR Tornados to the operation was therefore still taken by the old 
Government with the Red-Green Coalition agreeing reluctantly (Rudolf, 
2000: 134). 
After several attempts to solve this crisis diplomatically with the 
Serbian President Milosevic, one last effort was made in Rambouillet. 
These peace talks were characterised by the Serbs signalling their 
disinterest only leaving three Albanian delegations for the West to negotiate 
the eventual comprise with. Kosovo would remain autonomous under 
Yugoslav sovereignty with NATO troops, which would be allowed to enter 
any part of Yugoslavia should this prove to be necessary, supervising 
compliance (Ramet & Lyon, 2001: 87). As Belgrade rejected this agreement 
the only possibility left to the West was to resort to NATO military means in 
April 1999.  
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Although the NATO air campaign achieved its goals to stop the 
Serbs in Kosovo admittedly causing civilian casualties and taking longer 
than it had been anticipated, Germany encountered an intense domestic 
debate on whether to deploy ground troops under the NATO-lead KFOR 
contingent which was to enforce the Rambouillet agreement. The 
opposition voiced their concern about how German troops could be sent to 
Kosovo remembering the atrocious behaviour of the German troops during 
World War II in that region. The Bundesregierung, however, was convinced 
that Germany had an obligation to end the “systematic violation of human 
rights ...[and ...attempt to prevent the looming] humanitarian catastrophe” in 
Kosovo (Schröder) and to help stabilise the whole region by giving it a 
“European perspective” (Scharping). These justifications, supported by the 
on-going flow of refugees from Kosovo, created a situation, in which the 
opposition had difficulties criticising the Government’s decisions with only 
the PDS defending its anti-war stance vigorously (Ramet and Lyon, 2001: 
88-91). Again, a more detail account on the political debate will be 
presented in chapter 4. 
Considering Germany’s rather minor role in the actual military 
operation in attempting to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and its moral 
obligation highlighted by the government, it is only logical that Germany 
would seek another way to contribute more heavily to the resolution of this 
crisis. The government’s twin-track approach to the situation saw the 
support and participation of NATO actions on the one hand and intensive 
diplomatic efforts to stabilise the region permanently on the other. In order 
to get UN support for any future operations in the Balkans, Russia needed 
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to be incorporated in any peace-process by limiting fears of NATO 
enlargement and emphasising Russia’s importance in “shaping a co-
operative European security system” (Hyde-Price, 2003: 9).  
Germany’s twin-track diplomacy also involved a number of 
multilateral institutions such as the EU, OSCE, G-8 and the UN to name but 
a few. Germany’s new Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer soon came to 
realise that long-term stabilisation of the region could only be achieved 
through multilateral channels, something that the ‘Fischer Plan’ 
incorporated. This plan aimed at stabilising the region not merely by military 
means but also saw the importance of political and economic support for 
the countries in question (Die Bundesregierung, 2011: Pragraphs 1-6). The 
prospect of future membership in the EU and G-8 support were the major 
aspects of this plan, which would not exclude the initial Serbian aggressor. 
By supporting and, indeed participating, in the NATO campaign, Germany 
did not only prove its Bündnisfähigkeit, but also ensured that its diplomatic 
effort was supported by the credentials connected to being a fully accepted 
ally (Maull, 2000b: 72). When the KFOR contingent, to which Germany 
contributed considerably, did eventually enter Kosovo, it did so with the 
clearly set aims set by the ‘Fischer Plan’ and the consensus of the 
international community.  
Although some scholars have argued that the Kosovo Crisis did 
mark a change in German foreign and security policy, this is not entirely the 
case. In order to see the relatively high degree of continuity in the German 
policy, even after a change of government, one needs to examine the three 
major motives that lay behind Germany’s actions. Having done that, it will 
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be possible to see that the discontinuity was not as severe as claimed by 
some commentators.  
The first underlying motive was clearly Germany’s concern about the 
stability in south-eastern Europe closely linked with the continuing credibility 
of the established international organisations, such as the UN, EU and 
NATO. Germany, more than other countries depends on international 
institutions due to its close integration in them. As pointed out in Chapter 1, 
Germany traditionally depended on these institutions and their corrosion 
would deprive the Federal Republic of the basis of its foreign policy. It is 
therefore only logical that Germany would seek to get the institutions 
involved as deeply as possible to solve this conflict. It can therefore be 
argued that by supporting both NATO and EU solutions, Germany was in 
fact protecting its traditional means to conduct foreign policy and to assert 
influence within a wider Europe. 
The second major factor is also connected to the notion of 
multilateralism. Considering the reliance on international institutions, 
Germany would not want to be perceived as an unreliable partner, which in 
turn would undermine its significance on the international stage. The issues 
of Bündnistreue, Bündnisfähigkeit and the doctrine of ‘never alone’ were of 
immense importance, especially to a newly elected left-wing government, 
which did not want to irritate its allies by adopting a perceived German 
‘Sonderweg’ (special path).  
Although these factors are important when trying to understand 
Germany’s policies during the Kosovo Crisis, they are not entirely sufficient. 
In the case of international institutions it is surprising that the Bundeswehr 
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participated in NATO air strikes against Belgrade (after all, the capital of a 
sovereign country) without a UN mandate. The lack of international 
permission is striking as it could have served as a precedent case for NATO 
(or other international actors) to act outside international law in the future, 
thus diminishing the UN’s influence. Furthermore, Berlin’s twin-track 
approach to the crisis was a delicate balancing act, which could have easily 
gone wrong. By assuming some independence from the United States (and 
from NATO), Germany became vulnerable to cynical criticism from its allies 
of pursuing a Sonderweg and not complying with NATO policies (Rudolf, 
2000: 139).  
The desire to demonstrate Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit cannot 
explain the policies sufficiently either. Although Germany contributed to the 
NATO air campaign, it was not willing to participate in any ground invasion, 
thus causing doubts within the alliance about its true commitment. In 
addition, the ‘never alone’ doctrine can hardly explain the overall cross-
party consensus in the Bundestag and in the German public more 
generally. One can, therefore, say that neither ‘peer pressure’ nor the 
reliance on functioning international institutions help sufficiently to 
understand German policies during the Kosovo Crisis (Maull, 2000a: 11-
12). 
The third major factor underlying motive therefore needs to contain 
elements that go beyond rational calculations. During the intense political 
debates about the Kosovo Crisis Germany’s special obligations resulting 
from its troubled past especially in the Balkans had been referred to by a 
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number of parliamentarians4. The humanitarian aspect of the crisis was the 
factor, which, together with the previous ones, tipped the scales towards 
military action. As Maull points out, “the memories of Dachau and 
Auschwitz [...] against the background of ethnic cleansing and genocide in 
the former Yugoslavia pulled Germany towards a desire to help end the 
slaughter and the terror in the Balkans.” (Maull, 2000a: 12). This together 
with the need to enforce the rule of law in the region formed the basis of 
German interests and policy choices. 
These three major factors ‘peer pressure’, functioning international 
institutions and a set of norms and beliefs were factors which could be 
described as ‘international interests’ rather than speaking of but also 
encompassing ‘German interests’. Each country in the international 
community would share these interests with varying priorities. Each 
member of an alliance would want to be part of a stable system and would 
also want to be perceived as a reliable partner. Although in the case of 
Germany the desire to stop ethnic cleansing is comparatively strong, it is 
hard to see other countries remaining indifferent to such an event. There 
are, however, two elements of the crisis, in which Germany had 
considerable interest.  
The first element was the concern about the potential flow of 
refugees into Germany. Considering the amount of potential refugees with 
relatives in Germany, it would become their primary destination. However, 
Germany could not afford another influx of refugees as the system was 
already stretched by the need to accommodate refugees from other 
                                                 
4
 For a more detailed account of these debates, see chapter 4 
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theatres. The second concern for German policy makers was that Germany 
would risk self-isolation and loss of influence within the alliance would it not 
contribute to the NATO campaign. A loss of influence could not have been 
in the German interest considering that NATO would potentially play a big 
role in European security and stability (Maull, 2000a: 13).  
German policy choices during the Kosovo Crisis were therefore 
defined by ‘peer pressure’, reliance on stable international institutions and a 
set of deeply held beliefs in combination with purely German interests to 
keep the number of refugees as small as possible and the maintenance of 
influence within NATO and the EU. 
Peacekeeping in Afghanistan & “Operation Enduring 
Freedom”5 
Before September 11, 2001 it would be safe to say that nobody 
could have anticipated the events that were to shock the world. By making 
use of commercial airliners a terrorist group succeeded in attacking the 
United States of America. The targets hit were also very well chosen. The 
World Trade Center was the symbol of Western commercial might whereas 
the Pentagon is the centre of US military power. For the first time the West 
was confronted with a new kind of situation, one in which the aggression did 
not originate from a state but rather from an elusive and fanatical terrorist 
organisation, which made immediate retaliation impossible. Furthermore, 
America’s system of insulation, which ensured that any conflict took place 
well away from US soil, was shattered with very simple means (Hamilton, 
2003: 2). 
                                                 
5
 Similarly to the Kosovo Crisis, a more in-depth account of the mission in Afghanistan will be given in Chapter 5 
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Following the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. the 
amount of solidarity towards the United States was felt deeply throughout 
most parts of the world. In Germany, in particular, the public showed its 
solidarity in large gatherings, a notion which was recognised and 
appreciated in the United States. This atmosphere was summarised by 
Chancellor Schröder when he offered “unlimited solidarity” and argued that 
this was not only an attack on the US, but also rather an attack on the 
“civilised world, an attack on us all” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001e: 18293). 
With this statement Schröder expressed a view, which was also 
shared by NATO members, and especially Secretary General Lord 
Robertson, as the fact that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked 
for the first time in NATO’s history after an astonishingly short period of 
debate. This was clearly helped by NATO having included terrorist acts in 
the types of aggression, which could trigger Article 5 at the Washington 
Summit in 1999. In short, a terrorist act was now seen as a “threat to the 
alliance members’ territorial integrity and equated with an armed attack.” 
(Katzenstein, 2002: 7). The invocation of Article 5 also gave NATO a say in 
the US anti-terror fight. 
Although one might think that having NATO’s unlimited support in the 
quickly advancing war on terrorism in Afghanistan would be welcomed by 
the US administration, Washington had clear reservations of including 
NATO fully in this campaign. Initially President Bush was merely interested 
in the sharing of intelligence and limited over-fly and basing rights. NATO 
resources were only used to free more US troops from their surveillance 
tasks by deploying NATO naval forces to the Mediterranean and sending 
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AWACS to cover US airspace (Haftendorn, 2002: 3). The US favoured its 
“floating coalitions” with the countries around Afghanistan.  
The war in Afghanistan was therefore primarily a US operation with 
some British and German Special Forces involved. It was not until the task 
of securing Afghanistan became relevant that NATO, and with it Germany, 
could take on a more active role in the war against terrorism. It was NATO’s 
task to supply the military capacities for the operation “Enduring Freedom” 
which had UN backing and was intended to support America’s war on 
terrorism. The German government was keen on contributing to this 
operation heavily thus backing Chancellor Schröder’s claim that there would 
be an “irrevocable” change in Germany’s position on defending human 
rights, freedom and the restoration of stability and security (Schröder, 2002: 
8). Although the Chancellor seemed to be determined to prove this claim, 
the Bundestag and, more importantly, a small group of Red-Green MPs 
opposed the deployment of 3,900 German troops to Kabul thus threatening 
the breakup of the coalition (Katzenstein, 2002: 6). Schröder linked the 
question of deployment to a vote of no confidence, which he very narrowly 
won. Considering the rarity of such votes in Germany it can be said that 
Schröder was indeed very highly committed to contributing to “Enduring 
Freedom” and willing to punch the decision through regardless of the costs.  
Germany’s behaviour in this first phase of the war on terrorism can 
be explained through a number of considerations. The first one would be 
that Germans have always seen the US as the nation that helped Germany 
regain its status in the world after 1945. It is therefore only logical that 
Germany wanted to repay its moral dept. Although this was surely one 
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argument it is by far not the most important one. The second consideration 
has much more weight. Having contributed to the NATO campaign over 
Kosovo and to KFOR earlier Germany had shed the notion of using military 
force in order to defend the state at home once and for all. Germans had 
come to terms with the idea that threats sometimes had to be tackled 
abroad. Not contributing to the anti-terror campaign would have caused 
bewilderment, to say the least, in several capitals. Germany is, after all, 
also in danger of being the target of a terrorist attack. 
Another important consideration is also the fact that the attacks on 
New York and Washington, D.C. had been planned in Hamburg. Germany’s 
liberal legislation on immigration allowed the terrorists to easily misuse 
Germany as a planning platform not only for the 9/11 attacks but also for 
others. In the words of Klaus Jansen, Germany is a “Ruheraum” (place of 
rest) for terrorists (Katzenstein, 2002: 11). It is therefore safe to say that the 
government wanted to be seen to do everything possible to rectify the 
situation, a move that is mirrored domestically by the passing of the two 
counter-terrorism laws.  
‘Between Iraq and a Hard Place’6 
As already discussed in above, Germany has apparently become 
more accustomed to the idea of using force in order to tackle instabilities, 
which might in the future turn into clear threats for Germany and/or Europe. 
German involvement in the Balkans and, since late 2001, in Afghanistan 
seemed to suggest that Germany was indeed preparing to leave its troubled 
past behind and begin to play an active role in Europe’s security. Yet, by 
                                                 
6
 Title of a 2003 programme for Channel 4 by impressionist Rory Bremner and the comedians John Bird and John 
Fortune portraying the West’s involvement with Iraq from the 1920s to the US invasion of 2003 
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the summer of 2002 it appeared that Germany would again assume its 
more traditional role of a passive bystander as others prepared to maintain 
European and Western security. Whereas the United States and Great 
Britain were convinced that Saddam Hussein’s regime threatened the West 
especially with its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its links to 
Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist network Al-Qaeda, Germany, among others, 
did not come to the same conclusion. The following diplomatic row over the 
disarmament of Iraq would soon result in a deep division of the United 
Nations, NATO and the EU, testing the transatlantic relationship to its very 
limits. 
In opposing the forceful disarmament of Iraq the German 
Government took on a position popular with European public opinion, but 
highly unpopular with a number of allied governments, most notably those 
of the United States and Britain. The question of why Germany established 
its position the way it did will help to understand whether or not the German 
Government left the path it had followed during the crises in the Balkans 
and Afghanistan and was now pursuing a new “Sonderweg”, or if the criteria 
developed during those conflicts simply did not allow for a military 
intervention in the case of Iraq.  
Straining the Transatlantic Relationship 
Following the relatively quick dismantling of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and the subsequent establishment of ISAF marked the end of 
the first phase of the U.S. lead war on terrorism. Yet, whereas considerable 
unity among Western democracies could be observed in the case of the 
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Taliban, the second phase proved to be much more controversial. By early 
2002 U.S. President George W. Bush identified his “axis of evil” in his State 
of the Union address, thus marking Iraq, Iran and North Korea as likely 
targets in the war on terrorism (Bush, 2002: 1). Although Iraq had been 
within America’s sights for some time, this was one of the clearest signs 
that the U.S. would no longer allow Saddam Hussein’s regime to continue 
their reign and harbouring international terrorists, posing a danger to the 
West. This bellicose rhetoric from Washington sat uncomfortably with some 
European governments, especially those of France and Germany, who 
would form the core of the war opposition. Though nobody doubted the 
inhumane nature of the Iraqi leadership, a pre-emptive military strike on a 
sovereign nation, as clearly favoured by the U.S. Administration was 
considered counterproductive. The forceful disarmament of Iraq would 
result in consequences, which the German government was unwilling to 
contribute to.  
It was primarily argued that a war in the Middle East might result in 
an “uncontrollable escalation and mass casualties, as well as further 
estrangement between the Arab world and the West”. In the case of Iraq, 
there was an additional risk in invading it as “a cornered Iraqi dictator was 
unlikely to display any restraint in using hid chemical and biological 
weapons and would almost certainly strike out against Israel, attempting to 
turn the conflict into a war between the West and the Muslim world” 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2003: 100). 
In addition to these concerns, a more substantial difference between 
the two camps began to show. While the United States saw the Iraq 
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question as a vital element in the war on terrorism due to its arsenal of 
WMDs, which could end up in the hands of terrorist networks given the links 
between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda the Bush Administration claimed 
existed, the war opposition did not follow this train of thought. In fact, it was 
widely argued that the war on terrorism would be at best side-tracked by an 
invasion of Iraq, at worst causing the feared escalation mentioned above, 
making it even harder to tackle terrorism effectively. From the European 
point of view terrorism cannot be halted by military means alone, although 
the case of Afghanistan seems to suggest just that. Yet, the defeat of the 
Taliban regime was merely the first aspect of the war, the second being the 
nation-building exercise undertaken by ISAF, attempting to establish a 
society, which could no longer be exploited by terrorist networks. Generally, 
Europeans focus their efforts at ridding terrorism of its roots whereas it 
appears that the United States concentrate on the present danger at hand, 
dealing with it as quickly as possible and leaving the long process of 
engaging the social and economic causes of terrorism for later. President 
Bush brought this clearly to the point stating that the United States would 
take decisive actions against states, which either harbour terrorist groups or 
allow them to plan attacks (May & Lingel, 2002: 3).  
By the middle of 2002 the German government found itself in a 
difficult position. Although Chancellor Schröder had proclaimed his 
unconditional support for the United States shortly after the terrorist attacks 
on New York and Washington, little of this could be found in his rhetoric a 
few months later. His premature statement that the Federal Republic would 
not participate in a war against Iraq, even if a UN mandate could be 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
65 
 
obtained, caused a serious deterioration of the U.S.-German relations in 
effect cancelling out any influence Germany might have had on the U.S. 
decision-making process (Katzenstein, 2002: 2). Believing that holding the 
chair of the UN Security Council at the time could be used to alter the U.S. 
approach, Schröder’s government continued to advocate a peaceful 
solution to the crisis by the continuation of the containment policy, which 
had been in place ever since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, and a re-
implementation of weapons inspections carried out by the UN. A war 
against Iraq could only be legitimised, if WMDs could be found and if the 
Iraqi leadership refused to destroy them voluntarily. Without such evidence 
the regime’s alleged collaboration with terrorist networks or its involvement 
in the 9/11 attacks would by far not suffice for an invasion of a sovereign 
nation (Hamilton, 2003: 8). 
Considering these two very different approaches it is hardly 
surprising that transatlantic relations were going through extremely difficult 
times. The prevailing rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic did not help to 
defuse the situation. Schröder’s openly anti-American statements, branding 
the United States a nation of unilaterists who do not understand the 
dangers, which their approach could cause for the international community, 
only helped to further isolate the Federal Republic from the United States. 
As a consequence, the Bush Administration did nothing on their part to 
lessen the tensions between Washington and Berlin. Most controversially 
U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld first split the European 
continent into the “Old Europe” and the “New Europe”, the former consisting 
of the war opposition (e.g. Germany, France, Belgium and Russia), while 
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the latter, according to Rumsfeld, is mainly made up of former Eastern bloc 
countries, which tended to support Washington’s Iraq policy, thus implying 
that U.S. relations would in future concentrate on the “New Europe” and 
neglect traditional partners. Following this announcement, Rumsfeld 
continued to place Germany on the same level as Cuba and Libya, two 
countries, which had been at odds with America for some time. According 
to Rumsfeld, only these three countries would in no way support the United 
States, including the re-structuring of Iraq after the change of regime 
(Spiegel Online, 2003a: 1).  
The apparent lack of “Old European” co-operation was most clearly 
shown in the row of NATO protection for Turkey. Emphasising Turkey’s 
neighbouring position to Iraq, Washington and Ankara both called for NATO 
to officially prepare planning for possible defence from Iraqi aggression. 
Germany, France and Belgium on the other hand argued that such a move 
would only leave Baghdad to assume that a war was inevitable thus making 
a peaceful solution of the crisis impossible. The veto of the three nations 
directly contributed to a further deterioration of the transatlantic relationship, 
splitting NATO into two camps and causing debates about the future of the 
Alliance (Spiegel Online, 2003b: 1). 
It has to be said, however, that Schröder’s policy was by no means 
supported by all of Germany’s political elites. After having had taken a 
similar line to that of Schröder’s SPD/Greens Coalition during the election 
campaign the Bundestag opposition spoke of a reckless policy undermining 
the German-American partnership, which had worked considerably well for 
over fifty years. Most notably, Angela Merkel’s article in the Washington 
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Post making it absolutely clear that Schröder was not speaking for all 
Germans. The CDU’s party leader argues that although the use of force 
should remain the ultimate means of dealing with dictators, it should never 
be ruled out prematurely. Doing otherwise, as Schröder had done, would 
weaken the pressure, which is needed for successfully enforcing the will of 
the international community on the Iraqi regime (Merkel, 2003: 1). Although 
German newspapers featured regular criticism of Schröder’s Iraq policy by 
the opposition, Angela Merkel’s article represents a rare phenomenon in 
German politics. Internal differences are normally dealt with in parliament 
and within Germany, no matter how much the Opposition disagrees with the 
Government. The article in the Washington Post did therefore not only 
cause a domestic stir due to its contents, but also because it broke with a 
taboo in German politics. This, however, shows the discontent of 
Germany’s opposition with Schröder’s course, which jeopardised the 
transatlantic relationship.  
Continuing its opposition to an invasion of Iraq, the German 
government along its like-minded allies France and Russia was unable to 
dissuade the United States and the “Coalition of the Willing” to pursue their 
Iraq policy. Dismissing the military build-up in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein 
persisted to co-operate with the UN weapons inspectors thus missing his 
chance to disarm peacefully. When “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was 
launched in March 2003, the German government’s failure was all too clear. 
Considering the tensions that were created over Iraq the question of why 
the German Government acted the way it did comes to mind. Straining the 
transatlantic relations to such an extent can hardly be in Germany’s 
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interest, yet Chancellor Schröder seemed to think that the Federal Republic 
could not contribute to the war effort, though he must have been aware of 
the tensions his refusal to do so would cause. Other factors than purely 
maintaining good relations with the last superpower must therefore have 
entered his equation to follow a German “Sonderweg” from unconditional 
solidarity to open anti-Americanism. 
Violating the German Way?  
At first glance it may appear that the German policy during the Iraq 
Crisis had abandoned the path of actively contributing to European security, 
which Germans had become accustomed to during the 1990s. By rejecting 
military operations against Iraq Schröder positioned Germany very early on, 
even prematurely, in a way that made future policy adjustments almost 
impossible. Schröder’s position was certainly supported by the fact that a 
number of other European governments shared his beliefs, thus enabling 
him to discard allegations that he was isolating Germany in the international 
community. Whether Germany was indeed isolated or not is debatable, yet 
it is obvious that Schröder’s policy contributed to the deterioration of a 
much-valued relationship.  
It has been argued that Schröder’s sudden move from unconditional 
solidarity with the American people to open rejection of military operations 
against Iraq within only a few months was primarily caused by the 
uncomfortable fact that his party had lost considerable ground to the 
CDU/CSU, which is especially crucial if there is a federal election coming 
up. Although the government’s crisis management during the summer 
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flooding, which effected parts of Central Europe and Eastern Germany, 
helped to limit the damage, polls indicated that Schröder would probably not 
gain a second term in office. Tapping into German concerns about the 
bellicose US line, Schröder’s election campaign was characterised by anti-
American statements, promising that an SPD-led German government 
would attempt to restrain America’s “military adventurism” (Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2003: 100). From a domestic point of view this strategy was 
successful as it ensured that the Red-Green Coalition remained in power 
defeating the CDU/CSU by securing votes that would have been lost to the 
only true anti-war party in Germany, the PDS. Although Schröder’s 
simplistic tactics secured him and his party another term in office, it left him 
vulnerable to allegations claiming that he had sacrificed Germany’s 
standing and influence in the international community for his personal 
ambitions. Yet, it is exactly these allegations that imply that Germany has 
not returned to the almost unconditional pacifism of the early 1990s, but 
rather that the German electorate was concerned about other issues related 
to the Iraq question.  
As discussed earlier, the 1990s have seen a gradual change in 
German security policy away from pure national defence of German and 
NATO territory to taking on responsibilities in the wider spectrum of 
peacekeeping and most recently peace enforcing. It has also been shown 
that German contribution to such operations has always been subject to a 
number of criteria, ensuring that Germany could never again be accused of 
repeating its troubled history. Germany’s past contributions can all be 
explained by a certain amount of external pressure to get involved, moral 
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obligations to aid in stabilising a region and/or ending ethnic cleansing 
combined with the national interest of minimising the risk of refugees 
straining the German welfare system. Germany would also only contribute 
to an international effort by the UN or NATO, emphasising the need for 
multilateralism, thus ensuring that Germany would never take actions 
unilaterally again.  
Taking the allegations put forward against Schröder after his narrow 
electoral victory into account it appears that by 2003 Germans have come 
to terms with the notion that force needs at times be deployed as the last 
resort to solve a problem. Yet in the case of Iraq it seems that Germans 
were reluctant to accept that the use of force was indeed justifiable 
considering that only one of the criteria outlined above, that of moral 
obligations, was met. It could be argued that Germany had an obligation of 
going against Saddam Hussein’s villainous regime in the same way it had 
contributed to tackling the regime of Milosevic in the Balkans. However, an 
unscrupulous dictator would not be sufficient for the justification of German 
contribution to a war against Iraq. With France and Russia Schröder was in 
the company of two relatively powerful and influential nations in the UN 
Security Council, which in turn limited the pressure of having to donate to 
the war effort. Most importantly the United States and their allies could not 
prove that Germany’s interests, most notably that of national security, were 
endangered by the Iraqi regime. In spite of the United States’ certainty that 
Iraq had developed WMDs and links to terrorist networks, thus arguably 
representing a threat to Germany, Schröder was unwilling to contribute to 
military actions, as the evidence offered by the U.S. Administration was 
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unconvincing at best. He argued that it would have to be the UN’s task to 
determine the existence of WMDs in Iraq through the means of the 
weapons inspectors and if the Iraqi regime was co-operating in the process, 
thus following the UN Resolution 1441. Although this resolution demanded 
that Iraq was to co-operate fully with the weapons inspectors or face 
serious consequences, this did not automatically imply military actions. In 
his five points on Iraq Schröder clearly states that the UN Security Council 
could be the only authority to legitimise military operations against Iraq 
(BMVg, 2003a: 1). 
This declaration brings to the point the last concern many Germans 
had during the Iraq crisis. International organisations, such as the UN, 
appeared to be pushed aside by the United States, robbing Germany of its 
traditional platform for formulating foreign and security policy. During the 
Iraq crisis the United States continued the trend, which had already been 
observed during the conflict in Afghanistan. Although NATO had evoked 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty shortly after 9/11, the Alliance did not 
play a significant role in the Afghanistan campaign. Instead of making use 
of their traditional allies, the Bush Administration preferred to rely on ad-hoc 
alliances or “floating coalitions” in the region primarily for basing rights and 
the establishment of staging grounds (Haftendorn, 2002: 3). Most 
importantly, Washington declined almost any help from NATO, effectively 
labelling this conflict the “don’t-call-us-we’ll-call-you-war” (Hamilton, 2003: 
9). It has become clear that the Atlantic Alliance has lost credibility in 
Washington due to the immense difference in military capabilities within 
NATO. Whereas the U.S. is able to tackle a conflict on their own, this 
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cannot be said about Europe, as the crises in the Balkans have shown 
vividly. Though this reality is not new, it appears that Washington grows 
increasingly impatient with its European allies lacking sufficient military 
capabilities, believing that they are more hindrance than help, becoming an 
optional factor in U.S. strategy rather than a necessity. Neo-conservative 
elements are already talking about letting the Europeans “hold their coats, 
but not tie their hands” highlighting that multilateralism slows the United 
States down in following their national interest (May and Lingel, 2002: 9).  
This trend has now clearly been extended to the United Nations, as 
continued discussions in the Security Council mean further political 
obstacles in the strategy of the last remaining superpower. For a country, 
such as Germany, which has rather successfully adopted a tradition of 
negotiations and dialogue, the apparent undermining of one of its major 
platforms must seem a daunting vision of losing influence in the 
international community. Although it may be tempting to place the entire 
blame for the troubles in the UN Security Council on Washington’s 
doorstep, the German government has to accept its fair share of the guilt. 
Neglecting the tradition of dialogue, Schröder apparently preferred to 
directly confront the U.S. Administration making negotiations extremely 
difficult for both sides. A more diplomatic approach to the American 
approach might have solved the problem without jeopardising the 
transatlantic relationship. Rather than relying on a few likeminded European 
governments for backing, Schröder could have attempted to work for a 
common European stance, thus collectively gaining more weight vis-à-vis 
the Bush Administration. Germany’s anti-war position could have easily 
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been explained with reference to Article 26 of the Grundgesetz, which 
clearly states that Germany may not contribute to a war of aggression, 
which an invasion of Iraq would be without convincing proof of WMDs 
and/or link to terrorist networks. Yet, “President Bush’s approach to the Iraq 
question made tempting and easy for Chancellor Schröder to evade 
Germany’s responsibilities” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2003: 111). It is indeed 
telling that upon his first visit to Germany after the end of “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom” Colin Powell remarked that the serious row between Washington 
and Berlin were not only due to the different position the Germany had 
taken. Powell was surprised and disappointed at the way that the German 
government had done everything to work against the United States (Die 
Welt Online, 2003: 1). This had made a critical dialogue impossible robbing 
Germany of one of its most successful tools in international politics.  
In addition to that, Germany appeared to have taken on an irritating 
character from the allied point of view. Considering how important a good 
working relationship with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance has 
consistently been for German decision, Schröder’s position during the Iraq 
Crisis gains another dimension. It appears that Schröder was prepared to 
jeopardise Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit, causing concern as to how reliable 
Germany would be in the future. This clearly represents a departure from 
the traditional German desire to be perceived as a highly reliable partner 
within NATO, a desire, which used to be of utmost importance to other 
German decision makers in the past, including Chancellor Schröder 
himself, as the Kosovo Crisis has unmistakably shown. 
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Summary 
Over the 1990s Germany’s involvement in multilateral peace-making 
missions grew steadily, as did the complexity of the missions. One can see 
that the decisions to send German troops in harm’s way were never taken 
easily, yet both the Kohl and the Schröder governments followed this trend. 
However, German involvement intensified due to two major factors. First, 
internal convictions pushed German decision makers into action. A morally 
felt obligation to stop conflicts in former Yugoslavia surpassed doubts about 
sending German soldiers into an area which has had very bad experience 
with their counterparts during WWII. The desire to secure Europe’s 
periphery, and with that Europe itself including Germany, also was a strong 
motivation, as was the fear of waves of refugees pouring into Germany and 
straining the social system. In the case of Afghanistan, it has been argued 
that Germany’s security threatened by a terrorist network that was provably 
supported by the Taliban. 
External pressure from Germany’s allies to contribute to the military 
campaigns helped the proponents of military action considerably. Both the 
EU and NATO repeatedly called for greater German intervention, using 
Germany’s Bündnistreue to draw in more German commitment. They also 
provided the multilateral framework in which Germany could more easily 
accommodate its own interests without appearing to embark on a new 
German Sonderweg. It is interesting to note that in the case of Iraq, 
Bündnistreue was not enough to persuade Germany to contribute to the 
invasion. This clearly shows, that commitment to the alliance needs be 
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accompanied by the conviction of “doing the right thing” before Germany 
contributes to military interventions. 
The cases of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Afghanistan show the 
rationale behind the German behaviour in those three cases. It is interesting 
to note that the considerations in each case are not all that dissimilar. In all 
three cases the external pressure on Germany from the international 
community to act was considerable. The nature of this pressure, however, 
changed slightly over the 1990s. In the Yugoslavia Crisis Germany 
confronted explicit pressure from abroad to get involved, whereas during 
Kosovo the explicitness lessened somewhat. Then the pressure was more 
applied from within by the desire to be seen as a reliable ally. 
Bündnisfähigkeit was also a very important factor during the Afghanistan 
campaign.  
The second factor is less tangible. All three cases were approached 
with the notion that Germany had some moral obligation to get involved. On 
the Balkans, Germany was confronted with the dilemma of wanting to stop 
the aggressions and atrocities and at the same time having reservations 
about sending German troops into a region, which had already experienced 
German intervention. The moral obligation to put an end to the aggression 
was in the end stronger, thus giving another reason for German intervention 
in peace-keeping. Afghanistan, in contrast, was a conflict in which German 
troops would be used to pacify a nation outside Europe and in which the 
debates were conducted without any reference to World War II. The aim, 
however, was again to end instability which could be used by terrorists to 
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launch attacks on the West and to promote the liberal democratic values so 
important to Germany.  
The final consideration for Germany to get involved in those theatres 
is national interests. On the Balkans, German interests were endangered 
due to the flow of refugees, which would have easily reached Germany had 
the international community not intervened. Afghanistan and its Taliban 
regime posed a threat to Germany due to the terrorist training grounds and 
the overall connection to terrorist networks. It is safe to say that the US is 
not the only target for terrorists and therefore Germany has an obligation to 
fight terrorism for its own safety.  
The differences over the Iraq question caused a serious deterioration 
of the transatlantic relations. President Bush’s “axis of evil” set the U.S. 
agenda in the continuation of the war on terrorism, clearly marking Iraq, Iran 
and North Korea as very likely targets for American attention. The bellicose 
rhetoric coming from Washington caused considerable concern among the 
European population, which was especially crucial in Germany. Tapping 
into traditional German fears of instability and conflict, Chancellor Schröder 
managed to win a narrow victory in the federal elections. Although 
Schröder’s election strategy has been widely criticised for selling out 
German international influence for personal ambitions, the success implies 
that Germans indeed feared the U.S. approach to Iraq.  
Over the 1990s Germany has gradually extended its contribution to 
peace-keeping and peace-enforcing efforts in a number of theatres. Yet, it 
has always done so under the preconditions of some international pressure, 
of the assumption that Germans had moral obligations to interfere with 
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ethnic cleansing or similar atrocities and of defending German interests. 
The case of Iraq only fulfilled one of these preconditions, that of the moral 
obligation to change a dictatorial regime, a precondition, which can be 
employed in several countries. International pressure was at a minimum as 
influential nations, such as France and Russia, shared Germany’s policy. 
Finally, the United States and their allies were unable to prove that 
Germany’s security was endangered by Saddam Hussein’s WMDs and/or 
links to terrorist networks thus failing to bring national interests into the 
equation. The most important factor, however, was that the United States 
grew increasingly impatient with their European allies perceiving them no 
longer as help but rather as hindrance allowing for allegations of 
unilateralism to surface. American unilateralism undermining international 
institutions would have meant a German loss of influence in the 
international community as Germany has traditionally utilised multilateral 
organisations for pursuing its foreign and security policy. Considering that 
almost none of the preconditions that justified German contributions to 
conflict management in the past were met during the Iraq crisis it shows 
that it does not represent an exception from the rule.  
However, the diplomacy of the Iraq crisis does represent an 
exception as the German Government left the path of critical dialogue and 
negotiations and resolved to simple anti-Americanism. Chancellor Schröder 
made almost no effort to utilise means to gather diplomatic support from the 
EU. A common EU position in this particular crisis could have helped to limit 
the damage in the transatlantic relations. By not employing this means 
Schröder failed his own agenda as not all means were used to solve this 
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conflict peacefully. It was not Germany’s actual position that was surprising, 
as has been shown above. The surprising element in Germany’s policy was 
the lack of dialogue, which has always been an essential part in German 
foreign policy. This, combined with the endangering of Germany’s 
Bündnisfähigkeit, which has always played a vital part in German security 
policy, especially during the engagements in the Balkans and Afghanistan, 
represents a worrying departure from the traditional path. Although this 
policy was successful in helping Schröder securing a second term in office, 
its continuation fuelled by both Schröder’s need to act on his election 
promises and the U.S. Administration’s reluctance to co-operate more 
closely with other states resulted in the deterioration of the transatlantic 
relationship. Although both nations have by now undergone a change in 
government – Angela Merkel succeeded Gerhard Schröder and Barack 
Obama is the new man in the White House – the relationship remains 
strained. This is mainly accredited to the fact that Obama is much more 
supportive to the idea of multilateralism than his predecessor, which in turn 
represents a problem for Germany to live up to the growing multilateral 
expectations, thus posing a different problem for the German government.  
As has been shown, Germany has become a more active player 
over the last twenty years, meaning that Germany would have to reform its 
armed forces to make them more compatible with the new challenges as 
well as being able to support Germany’s more active foreign policy in the 
case that diplomacy should fail. The crises discussed here clearly showed 
that if Germany wanted to play the role of a major European power that 
entailed contributing to European security in more ways than diplomatic 
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efforts and financial donations. The importance of Bündnistreue and 
Bündnisfähigkeit, i.e. the importance of being regarded as a good and 
reliable ally, demanded more military contributions and a move away from 
cheque-book-diplomacy.  
Although Germany had rather readily contributed to IFOR, KFOR 
and later ISAF, in the case of the US led invasion of Iraq, Germany did not 
follow suit. This episode demonstrated the need for the Schröder 
Government to be able to clearly justify the need for intervention to the 
electorate, which was the case both in former Yugoslavia and in 
Afghanistan. This episode also demonstrated Schröder’s increased self-
confidence to openly criticise the US administration, something previous 
German governments would not have done in such an aggressive manner. 
Although previous German governments had their disagreements with the 
USA, the level of antagonism the Schröder Government helped to create 
was unprecedented. Germany therefore not only managed to get 
accustomed to the idea of having to contribute its armed forces to peace-
enforcing missions, the German government in particular felt confident 
enough to challenge one of its most important partner. 
With this new confidence the traditional purely defensive purpose of 
the Bundeswehr during the Cold War was no longer compatible and was 
therefore in need of substantial reform. The following chapter will discuss 
the extent of these reforms, thus showing that great effort has been put into 
the reforms in order to satisfy the multilateral expectations but also showing 
the shortcomings of the reform efforts. It will show the core of this thesis’s 
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hypothesis of ineffective reform due to the lack of a clear cut definition of 
purpose for the Bundeswehr.  
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Chapter 3: Reforming the Bundeswehr 
“The unified and sovereign Germany must live up to its 
increased international responsibility if we want to make use of this 
opportunity to shape peaceful relations. […] After 40 years a culture of 
constraints has developed in the Federal Republic which has defined 
the rationale, the feelings and the instincts of the people profoundly. 
[…] The process of getting used to this bigger international 
responsibility will have to be an organic process, which will take time 
to complete”7. – Volker Rühe (Rühe, 1993: 24-29) 
The summary of German foreign policy decisions since 1990 given in 
chapter 2 demonstrates that since unification Germany has indeed stepped 
up its contribution to multilateral military operations as part of a generally 
more assertive foreign policy. However, in order to be able to contribute at 
all the Bundeswehr had to be made compatible with allied militaries and 
thus the shift to a more pro-active foreign policy inevitably affected the 
underlying purpose of Germany’s armed forces as well in as much as 
having to be able to fulfil an ever growing catalogue of tasks other than the 
traditional homeland defence. This chapter will therefore discuss the actual 
structural reform of the Bundeswehr with the purpose to highlight the extent 
to which the armed forces have changed in the last twenty years.  
In order to be able to fulfil its Bündnistreue in the post-Cold War 
environment and to actively engage in multilateral military operations, one 
needs armed forces that can perform numerous tasks, ranging from 
intervention to humanitarian relief. As Chapter 2 already briefly mentioned, 
German foreign and security policy has been under scrutiny ever since the 
                                                 
7
 „Das vereinte und souveräne Deutschland muß seiner gewachsenen außenpolitischen Verantwortung gerecht 
werden, wenn wir die Chance zur Friedensgestaltung nutzen wollen. […] In der Bundesrepublik ist jedoch nach 40 
Jahren eine Kultur der Zurückhaltung entstanden, die das Denken, Fühlen und die Instinkte der Menschen tief 
geprägt hat. […] Das Hineinwachsen in eine größere internationale Verantwortung des wiedervereinten 
Deutschlands muß ein organischer Prozeß sein, der Zeit braucht“. – Volker Rühe 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
82 
 
collapse of the bi-polar system during the years 1989/90 and with this the 
reform of the Bundeswehr was a constant feature on the agenda. The 
following years saw a considerable shift in the primary tasks of the 
Bundeswehr towards an army, capable of conducting peace-keeping and 
peace-enforcing missions outside the traditional NATO territory.  
In order to be able to discuss the extent of the reform one needs to 
familiarise oneself with the Bundeswehr of old, i.e. the Bundeswehr aimed 
at defending West Germany from a Eastern Bloc aggression. This chapter 
will therefore start with analysing the old underlying organisational structure 
of the armed forces since this will make it possible to determine the 
capabilities the Bundeswehr possessed during the Cold War. By continuing 
with the analysis of the current structure the scope of change can be more 
easily ascertain. It will be shown that the Bundeswehr has undergone 
considerable change to be a more flexible and more easily deployable force 
by having endured the numerous reforms. 
However interesting it would be, this chapter will not discuss the 
prelude of the creation of German armed forces merely ten years after the 
close of World War II in much detail, since this would imply entering fields 
as diverse as the Korean War, the Franco-German relationship and the 
political tensions throughout Europe during the early 1950s. 
The Bundeswehr during the Cold War 
The process of re-arming West Germany shortly after the end of 
WWII must be seen in the context of an increasingly difficult relationship 
between East and West and the beginning of the Cold War fuelled by the 
outbreak of the Korean War. This forced the US and its allies (mainly the 
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UK) to transfer troops from Europe to Korea leaving Western Europe 
vulnerable to Soviet expansionism. Additionally, the German government 
under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer saw the opportunity to further their 
policy of Westintegration. Re-arming Germany therefore served several 
purposes. Firstly, the re-armed German state would add to NATO’s military 
capabilities, thus contributing to the security of Western Europe in general 
and West Germany in particular through NATO’s system of collective 
security. Secondly, the new German armed forces would be under NATO 
control, thus limiting the threat of German militarism in the future. Thirdly, it 
granted additional sovereignty to the still young Federal Republic (Thoß, 
2007: 13). 
Although there were considerable advantages in re-arming Germany 
there was still much scepticism towards the German military, both abroad 
and at home. To counter this scepticism the new armed forces had to be 
very different from previous German armed forces like the Reichswehr and 
the Wehrmacht8. The planning process for the new armed forces was 
therefore lengthy as compromises had to be found on numerous subjects. 
The Bundeswehr needed the military expertise of experienced officers to be 
as effective as possible, yet a large part of the old officers’ corps could 
hardly be described a supporters of democracy. The new armed forces 
should therefore be under strict parliamentary control to ensure the 
military’s loyalty towards the new democracy and the values it represents 
(Kutz, 2007: 76).  
                                                 
8
 Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht were the names given to the German military during the Wilhelminian Empire 
and WWII respectively.  
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This close scrutiny was imbedded within the new German 
constitution – the Grundgesetz – in order to ensure it would be at the core 
of any defence policy in the years to follow. Article 115 of the Grundgesetz 
outlines this very specifically, detailing that only the Bundestag can deploy 
the Bundeswehr under very specific circumstances (Parlamentarischer Rat, 
2002: Article 115). This in conjunction with the Parliamentary ombudsman 
for the Bundeswehr and the usual financial oversight places the German 
armed forces under more scrutiny than its other counterparts. 
With this compromise the German government managed to defuse 
the debate as this would provide the necessary expertise while at the same 
time preventing a return to German militarism. On 12th November 1955 the 
first 101 soldiers were sworn in to form the basis of the newly founded 
Bundeswehr. Although the first units as such were not commissioned for 
another two months the actual date provided the perfect symbolic 
background to the occasion, since it was the 200th birthday of Gerhard von 
Scharnhorst, the Prussian military reformer who rebuilt the Prussian army 
after the debacle of the Napoleonic Wars and whose principles of 
responsibility of the citizen within the state – and more importantly the 
military – were to form the foundation of the Bundeswehr’s creed 
(Feldmayer, 2005: 70). 
With the commissioning of the first units the Bundeswehr needed its 
organisational structure as does any larger organisation. When talking 
about the German armed forces one needs emphasise one thing. The 
Bundeswehr did not have its own command structure but was completely 
integrated into NATO’s command hierarchy. This was a considerable yet 
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deliberate limitation to the Bundeswehr since it did not have the capabilities 
to plan operation on its own, but rather relied on plans made elsewhere. 
This had two major effects. First, the German armed forces have always 
been dependent on international co-operation regarding planning and 
conducting operations, which also limited the political decision makers in 
Bonn, thus setting in stone the now traditional multi-lateral approach in 
international politics. Second, key posts within the organisational structures 
of the German armed forces were filled with Anglo-American personnel thus 
strengthening NATO’s control over this new German army (Bald, 2005: 41). 
The role of the Bundeswehr within the Atlantic Alliance was clear, i.e. 
to deter an attack by the Warsaw Pact with conventional means. In order to 
fulfil this major task a number of assumptions had to be considered when 
setting up the new armed forces. First and foremost was West Germany’s 
exposed geographical location vis-à-vis the Soviet area of influence. 
Combining this with the relatively small width of the West Germany and the 
close proximity of major cities to the German – German border resulted in 
the adaptation of Vorneverteidigung (forward defence) since the armed 
forces would not have much space to retreat to. To be successful with this 
strategy the Bundeswehr needed to be deployed broadly and en masse, 
with a high level of readiness. Some units, those stationed farther away 
from the border, could afford to lower their states of readiness, however 
they, too, had to be combat ready within short notice (Bundesminister der 
Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 8-9). Now that the basic 
Bundeswehr strategy during the Cold War has been set out, it is now 
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possible to analyse the means with which this strategy was meant to be 
supported, which leads directly to the underlying organisational structure. 
As already pointed out, the Bundeswehr was deployed widely in 
order to deter a conventional attack all along the West German border. This 
however meant that the armed forces needed more personnel than it would 
with a concentrated deployment. To maintain a consistently high number of 
troops there was no alternative to the practice of conscription. A purely 
voluntary force would most likely be better trained and more experienced, 
however it would be highly unlikely that West Germany could come up with 
enough volunteers, even taking into account that the overall number 
necessary would be smaller, due to their higher professionalism. 
Furthermore, a volunteer would be more costly, which would leave fewer 
resources for modern equipment (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - 
Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 3-4).  
Conscription had one additional major advantage. It allowed for a 
relatively fast reinforcement of active units with citizens who had already 
completed their national service. It was planned that during uncertain times 
they would be called up again, possibly re-trained and then be capable to 
perform alongside their active counterparts. 
The practice of ‘cadred’ units was widely used in units with, either 
equipment which could be easily stored and maintained, or charged with 
tasks which did not need intense training. The case of as light infantry 
battalion shall serve as an example here.  
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Figure 1: Structure of a light infantry battalion 
 
This battalion featured some 550 posts of which only 200 were 
occupied constantly. These 200 posts formed the cadre of the battalion and 
was responsible maintaining the equipment (mostly small arms) and 
conducting the basic training for new recruits. This practice was also 
applied to units whose primary tasks did not include combat operations 
such as logistic and transport battalions. 
Other units could not be organised in this way since intensive 
training and/or complicated equipment did not allow for it. A tank battalion 
shows this perfectly since tanks are complicated to operate (at least more 
complicated than lorries or rifles) the crews need to be trained thoroughly. 
The same applies to the maintenance crews. The structure of a tank 
battalion reflects this; however, certain posts are, again, not occupied 
permanently. Their tasks can be summarised as being in the field of combat 
support (signalling personnel and medics) and logistics (drivers), therefore 
the aspect of difficult training does not apply; hence they are not part of the 
cadre.  
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Figure 2: Structure of a tank battalion 
 
Although a small part of the tank battalion is not permanently on site, 
it is not considered a cadred unit. The practice of cadred units enabled the 
Bundeswehr to maintain a large number of modern weapon systems and to 
man them with reservists should the need arise, thus reducing the 
personnel costs considerably (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - 
Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 12). 
The drawback of this system was that in order to uphold the general 
readiness of the armed forces the reservists needed to be called up on a 
regular basis for up to 14 days to keep them trained. Although this process 
concentrated on former conscripts who had finished their national service 
only 12 months earlier, it nevertheless represented a massive intrusion into 
the civilian lives of (young) men, since the Bundeswehr’s call could come at 
any time. Since this procedure was not defined as part of a mobilising 
process it was considered a legitimate burden comparable to interrupting a 
holiday because of problems at the civilian workplace (Bundesminister der 
Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 12). From a strategic 
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point of view, however, this was the only way to ensure that the total 
number of troops the Bundeswehr could bring up to fulfil its tasks could be 
maintained at 1.2 million (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab 
der Streitkräfte, 1974: 14).  
Now that the underling strategy of the Bundeswehr as a whole during 
the Cold War has been introduced one needs to analyse the structures of 
the individual branches of the armed forces, i.e. the army, navy and air 
force. Although the primary task of deterrence was common to all, they did 
have separate tasks which also defined the way they were structured and 
dictated the equipment they used.  
The Army 
The Army was in charge of conducting the forward territorial defence 
(Vorneverteidigung) of West Germany in conjunction with the allies. 
Whereas combat operations were a major part of this, the army was also 
responsible for maintaining operational freedom of NATO forces within 
West Germany; i.e. supporting the allies with equipment maintenance and 
supply (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 
1974: 19).  
Much like the whole of the Bundeswehr, the Army needed to be 
deployed widely and en masse in order to force a possible aggressor to 
undertake intensive preparations for the attack. This in turn would leave 
ample time for West Germans to mobilise their defensive forces and 
complete their preparations.  
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Once the conflict has started, the Army had to be able to defend 
against superior, mostly armoured forces. In order to do so, great emphasis 
was placed on armoured combat troops and forward reconnaissance as 
well as protection of weapon systems against low-flying aircrafts.  
The Army as such was headed by the Army Office (Führungsstab 
des Heeres) which managed the two territorial commands 
(Territorialkommandos), three general commands (Generalkommandos) 
and the Command Hamburg / Schleswig-Holstein. Their primary task 
involved co-operating with the governments of the Länder in issues 
regarding defence, since the Länder would have been responsible in areas 
such as supporting the mobilisation or the evacuation of civilians. The 
commanding officers of the territorial commands and the Command 
Hamburg / Schleswig-Holstein were direct subordinates of NATO 
commanders and were mainly charged with logistical support of NATO 
troops (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 
1974: 19-20).  
The four commands managed eleven divisions, which in turn were 
made up of 36 brigades (16 tank brigades, 17 infantry brigades and 3 
paratrooper brigades). All in all these brigades featured 82 tank battalions 
with some 2,700 tanks, 50 infantry battalions with 1,800 armoured 
personnel carriers and 33 artillery battalions with 594 self-propelled 
howitzer and more than 3,000 anti-tank missile systems (Bundesminister 
der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 20-30).  
These forces were to be supported by the individual homeland 
defence commands which were integrated within each general command. 
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Their primary task was to secure the area behind the actual combat troops 
and to counteract any enemy activity in the guise of paratrooper or naval / 
marine operations. These troops would remain under national command 
since they would not be part of the actual defensive operations 
(Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 
29). The emphasis on anti-tank abilities combined with strong armoured 
forces clearly shows how important the strategy of conventional deterrence 
was to West Germans. As shown above the battalions with complicated 
equipment (i.e. tanks and artillery) were combat ready with little prior notice 
and even the cadred units were to be deployable soon thereafter.  
 
Figure 3: Structure of the Army 
The Air Force 
The Air Force was assigned to supporting the Army in the defence of 
West Germany by conducting air reconnaissance, air lifts, air to air combat 
and air support for ground troops. Its sphere of operation was limited to 
Central Europe and parts of Northern Europe, emphasising the defensive 
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character of the West German armed forces. In order to meet these 
demands the Bundesluftwaffe would have to be constantly kept technically 
up-to-date to optimise its conventional combat capabilities. It would also 
have to remain in a constantly high level of readiness to be ready to support 
the Army combat troops, which, as already pointed out, were also on 
standby.  
The Air Fleet Command (Luftflottenkommando) headed the four Air 
Force Divisions which incorporated most of West Germany’s air combat 
squadrons. It was under direct NATO command which left West German 
commanders with little air force capabilities for themselves, highlighting 
again NATO’s control over the West German armed forces. Of the four 
divisions, two were trained reconnaissance and tactical bombing missions, 
supported by missile units, whereas the other two were responsible for anti-
aircraft assignments, mostly with surface-to-air missiles. 
The Department of the Air Force (Luftwaffenamt) was primarily 
responsible air force logistics, officer and NCO training and medical 
support. Its squadrons consisted of transport aircrafts and school planes. 
The Air Force Support Command (Luftwaffenunterstützungskommando) 
organised the supplies and equipment the Air Force needed. The 
Department of Air Force Equipment (Materialamt der Luftwaffe) was 
probably the most important department in this branch of the armed forces 
(aside from the actual combat units) since it determined the future 
equipment of the Air Force, ranging from aircrafts to tools.  
In contrast to the Army, the Air Force hardly made any use of the 
practice of cadred units, since the equipment was too complicated and 
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therefore training needed to be much more intensive. Only few posts 
charged with forward air space reconnaissance were cadred, not 
comparable to the scale the Army used it (Bundesminister der Verteidigung 
- Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 31-39). 
Generally speaking, the Air Force was more clearly organised than 
the Army, which is quite understandable since it was also much smaller. All 
units necessary for combat operations were concentrated under the Air 
Fleet Command which in turn was under direct NATO command. This made 
the planning of combat operations easier and more efficient. The other two 
branches of the Air Force could concentrate on combat support, whereas 
one dealt with everything concerning training and the other worked on 
acquiring the equipment.  
 
 
Figure 4: Structure of the Air Force 
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The Navy 
The task of the Navy was comparable to that of the Air Force in that 
it supported the Army in its primary task. Although the Navy’s support was 
less direct than that of the Air Force, it aimed at hindering the Warsaw Pact 
from launching an attack behind the frontlines. The Navy therefore kept the 
Army’s back clear. In combination with allied navies the Bundesmarine was 
to defend and secure the Baltic and the North Sea as well as the 
connection to the Atlantic Ocean. Just like the Air Force the Navy was 
limited to this relatively small yet strategically important area, again 
underlining the Bundeswehr’s defensive orientation. This means that the 
Navy needed to be operational at very short notice, maintain operational at 
high seas and be capable to conduct naval reconnaissance and 
surveillance missions. In order to do so it needed modern weapon systems, 
which were on par with those the Warsaw Pact used. The Navy placed a lot 
of emphasis on far-reaching on-board missile systems installed on 
destroyers and speedboats which made the Navy highly mobile and at the 
same time effective. 
Similar to the air Force, the Navy featured three branches of which 
one, the Fleet Command (Flottenkommando), encompassed the majority of 
operational forces. Again, this branch remained under direct NATO 
command, whereas the other two branches, the Department of the Navy 
(Marineamt) and the Naval Support Command 
(Marineunterstützungskommando), which were not part of defensive 
operations, remained under national command. 
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The Fleet Command headed nine divisions, each responsible for one 
specific part of naval operations, i.e. submarine division, destroyer division 
or logistical division. The Department of the Navy was responsible for 
organising naval training and analysing the need for new or different 
equipment. It also included the naval medical services. The Naval Support 
Command was primarily responsible for the logistics of supplying the Navy 
with ammunition and other supplies as well as maintaining and repairing 
weapon systems. 
Even more so than the Air Force, the Navy had no use for cadred 
units, since this would have implied maintaining large and complicated 
weapon systems and needing a large number of former conscripts to man 
them. Only units responsible for guard duties had elements which could be 
cadred (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 
1974: 40-47).  
The organisational structure of the Navy was very similar to that of 
the Air Force. All combat units were placed under one commanding entity 
which in turn was under direct NATO command. Planning and conducting 
naval operations was therefore in one hand, thus streamlining the whole 
process. The other two branches of the Navy concentrated on their 
respective tasks which minimised overcutting to a great extent. 
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Figure 5: Structure of the Navy 
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The Bundeswehr today 
The collapse of the bi-polar system of the Cold War left Western 
armed forces – and the Bundeswehr in particular – in a difficult situation in 
which they had to re-define their raison d’être. Over the 1990s, the 
Bundeswehr adopted numerous changes to better cope with the new 
situation, most importantly the out-of-area deployments. These changes, 
however, concentrated on the reduction of the total number of troops and 
the division of the Bundeswehr into the Krisenreaktionskräfte (quick 
reaction forces), which were better equipped and trained and the 
Hauptverteidugungskräfte (defensive forces) which consisted mainly of 
conscripts. 
The reform of the Bundeswehr during the 1990s 
As already pointed out, with the end of the bi-polar system German 
decision makers and the armed forces in particular had to adjust to a 
completely new scenario. During the 1990s the Bundeswehr reform 
concentrated on adjusting the overall number of troops to the new tasks of 
the armed forces. These consisted of collective defence within the 
framework of NATO, crisis-management and supplying aid during natural 
disasters (such as the flood of the river Oder in 1998). The two major tasks 
of collective defence and crisis management lead to the division of the 
armed forces into two categories: the main defence force 
(Hauptverteidigungskräfte – HVK) and the crisis reaction force 
(Krisenreaktionskräfte – KRK). Whereas the HVK mainly consisted of 
conscripts who were trained for the classical defensive scenario, the KRK 
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featured a much higher concentration of professional soldiers trained for 
quick crisis reaction on the European continent (Fleckenstein, 2000: 14).  
Apart from creating the two categories within the Bundeswehr, the 
reform during the 1990s centred around the overall reduction of roughly 
32,000 troops and the closure of 19 barracks. Much attention was paid to 
acquiring new and modifying old equipment according to the new security 
scenario. The emphasis was placed on acquiring the combat helicopter 
“Tiger”, the self-propelled howitzer “Panzerhaubitze 2000” as well as an 
armoured transport vehicle for the army whereas the air force was to be 
equipped with a new fighter aircraft and a new heavy cargo plane. The 
heavy battle tank “Leopard II” was to be improved just as the “Patriot” 
missile system (von Krause, 1997: 19-22). Although investing in new 
equipment is a necessary step in reforming armed forces to adjust them to 
a completely changed scenario, the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 
(BMVg) had not yet made the appropriate conclusions. Weapon systems 
such as the ones mentioned above are very helpful in a traditional conflict, 
yet can hardly be used in peace-keeping or peace-making operations 
during out-of-area missions. Their sheer size and weight makes them 
difficult to transport and to operate in difficult terrain (such as the Balkans 
or, more recently, in Afghanistan). Overall it is fair to say that the 1990s saw 
a slight adjustment of the armed forces rather than a profound reform. By 
2003, however, Germany was ready to accept a more far-reaching reform. 
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The Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien 2003 
In 1998 the red-green government of Chancellor Schröder took office 
and the new Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping set out to overhaul the 
armed forces. Although he headed the BMVg for only a short time – he 
resigned shortly after the Kosovo crisis due to a series of public blunders – 
his successor Peter Struck continued the new course. The 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (Security Political Guidelines) which 
Struck issued in 2003 represent a stark deviation from previous guidelines.  
Struck identifies core tasks that the Federal Republic and with it the 
Bundeswehr will most likely face in future. These core tasks no longer 
include the classical territorial defence but rather concentrate on peace-
keeping and peace-enforcing interventions outside NATO territory. His 
definition of defence is wider than that of his predecessors but by arguing 
that those deployments abroad contribute to Germany’s security he 
prevents a constitutional discussion, since according to Article 87 of the 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) the Federal Republic may only maintain armed 
forces for defensive purposes. He famously confirmed this wide definition 
with his statement that Germany was defended at the Hindu Kusch, thus 
justifying the Bundeswehr contingent in Afghanistan.  
The threat of a conventional attack is no longer the most likely 
scenario in which the armed forces will find themselves. Capabilities 
needed to take on such a scenario (e.g. large armoured forces) are no 
longer needed but should be able to be re-activated in a short time should 
the need arise (BMVg, 2003b: 4-5). In his view conscription remains a vital 
part of this and will therefore be continued.  
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Although the conventional attack is highly unlikely, this does not 
mean that Germany and its allies no longer face any threats. The guidelines 
identify numerous dangers of which international terrorism is only one. 
Tensions in south-east Europe will not disappear any time soon and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains on the agenda. 
Although proliferation is not a classical task for armed forces, the protection 
of citizens and the neutralisation of such weapons is.  
Alongside terrorism, ethnic conflicts and weapons of mass 
destruction Struck identifies risks not commonly associated with the military. 
Germany’s export-orientated economy relies on safe sea routes and in a 
society reliant on information, this information needs to be protected from 
IT-attacks.  
These threats differ considerably from the traditional danger thus 
imposing very different requirements on the armed forces. Today’s 
Bundeswehr needs to be able to react quickly to any of the threats outlined 
above in conjunction with Germany’s allies and along Struck’s wider 
definition of defence in any part of the world (BMVg, 2003b: 16-20). The 
Bundeswehr needs to acquire capabilities, such as large air-cargo capacity 
to ensure deployment and supply of troops once they are deployed. Other 
capabilities which are no longer necessary will need to be reduced or 
adapted to fit the new challenges by altering and modernising the 
equipment and weapon systems.  
Since this is very cost intensive, Struck aims at making spending 
more effective by minimising ‘double capacities’, i.e. specialising in certain 
abilities that the Bundeswehr can contribute to NATO operations. Why 
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should the Bundeswehr spend resources in a field of expertise in which 
another ally is much more experienced? This aspect of streamlining 
spending within the Bundeswehr can be found throughout the guidelines. 
Struck places great emphasis on co-operation, be it amongst the allies but 
also between the Bundeswehr and the civilian economy (BMVg, 2003b: 15). 
This co-operation ranges from armament contracts to the daily supply of the 
armed forces with food and uniforms. Most support tasks today are no 
longer conducted by the Bundeswehr administration but rather civilian 
companies which, due to their nature, are interested in performing as cost-
efficient as possibly.  
The Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien are general guidelines 
which do not go into much detail on how to achieve the set goals. They are 
important since they define a new scenario for the armed forces and identify 
a status quo which the Bundeswehr is supposed to take on at some point in 
the future. It is therefore now necessary to analyse the condition the 
Bundeswehr is in today to see how far it still has to go. 
The reform of the Bundeswehr since 2003 
The Vertreidigungspolitische Richtlinien released by Peter Struck 
represented a clear departure from the traditional German defence policy 
as outlined above. In 2006 the German Government issued the White 
Paper 2006 on Germany’s security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr, 
which gave a more specific account on the future tasks and the structure of 
the German armed forces. In accordance with the guidelines, the White 
Paper identifies six core tasks for the Bundeswehr.  
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• international conflict prevention and crisis management including 
fighting international terrorism, 
• supporting NATO and EU partners, 
• defence of Germany and the welfare of its population, 
• rescue and evacuation, 
• partnership and co-operation and 
• substantial aid operations (BMVg, 2006: 67) 
Although territorial defence remains a core task, it no longer enjoys 
priority as it did during the Cold War. Conflict prevention and crisis 
management have been identified as the main tasks of a new and reformed 
Bundeswehr meaning that equipment, training and structure need to follow 
suit. As outlined above most of the Bundeswehr’s equipment was aimed at 
territorial defence and not international crisis management. The battle tank 
“Leopard II” might be a very good tank, yet it is unsuitable for use in patrols 
in urban or mountainous environments. However, crisis management 
operations most of the time take place in these surroundings. The White 
Paper therefore demands a substantial shift in the procurement of new 
equipment. It sets its priorities in acquiring sufficient protection of the troops 
during operations, worldwide reconnaissance, troop control during multi-
national operations, anti-missile capabilities as well as strategic 
deployability (BMVg, 2006: 82). This way the Bundeswehr could perform 
more effectively in asymmetrical conflicts, since the troops were better 
protected in urban environments, would have more information due to 
better reconnaissance and would be less prone to missile attacks inside the 
bases. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr would no longer be dependent on 
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leasing large enough cargo planes and could better co-ordinate with other 
alliance contingents.  
 It has to be said, however, that acquiring these capabilities is an 
expensive undertaking which means that projects which do not contribute to 
this transformation process, such as modernising the infrastructure in the 
barracks, will not be high on the Ministry’s to-do-list, a fact the White Paper 
emphasis as well (BMVg, 2006: 82). The need to spend the limited 
resources more effectively has become greater ever since the end of the 
Cold War, which led to a number of economic measures within the 
Bundeswehr which will be outlined later. 
In the case of troop training the White Paper acknowledges the need 
to familiarise the troops with the complex tasks set before them. In addition 
to the obvious skills today’s soldiers will need additional skills ranging from 
intercultural training to get familiarised with the cultural and religious 
traditions in a specific country to analytical skills needed as mediator, guard 
or helper. Although the Bundeswehr has a long tradition of political 
education as a result of the horrors committed be German soldiers during 
World War II, it has become more important today. Every soldier needs to 
be aware of the political situation in the specific crisis scenario in order to 
make the right decisions (BMVg, 2006: 75). The Bundeswehr not only 
needs to equip its troops with the proper gear but also with more skills 
beyond the traditional “soldier skills”.  
Based on the new prioritisation of the tasks the White Paper sets out 
the new structure of the Bundeswehr. As pointed out different capabilities 
are needed and some have become out-dated. The following part will 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
104 
 
therefore analyse the structure the Bundeswehr is to take on and see, in 
how far the structure follows the altered capacities. 
The new Army 
During the Cold War the Army was aimed at deterring a large 
conventional attack from the east. In order to fulfil its primary task, it relied 
heavily on two key characteristics; man power, mostly covered by 
conscripts, and a large number of tanks. As already pointed out, the new 
tasks set on the Bundeswehr require new capabilities and therefore a new 
structure.  
The Army remains the predominant branch when it comes to land 
operations, also in conjunction with other allied forces. In contrast to the 
days of the Cold War, the army needs to be very mobile since it is no longer 
restricted to territorial defence but is rather meant to be deployed globally. 
Territorial defence has lost importance to such an extent that the original 
two territorial commands have been merged in one Army Central Command 
(Heeresführungskommando). This central command is responsible for the 
readiness of all army divisions as well as the German contingents to the 
German-Franco Brigade and multi-national Corps headquarters (BMVg, 
2006: 108). This way all operational decisions are taken in one central 
place. The Central Command also heads the Division Special Operations 
(Division Spezielle Operationen) which are charged with high intensity 
combat missions such as hostage rescue, but also reconnaissance 
missions behind enemy lines. The second specialised division under 
Central Command’s responsibility is the Division Airborne Operations 
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(Division Luftbewegliche Operationen). This division encompasses all army 
capabilities needed for operations such as helicopter support or transport. 
The Central Command can thus react more effectively to new situations by 
quickly sending reinforcements should the need arise. For the less intensive 
operations, Central Command can utilise its two tank divisions and one 
armoured infantry division (BMVg, 2006: 108).  
Beside Central Command, the Department of the Army (Heeresamt) 
provides all the necessary training to the troops. All the army schools and 
academies are headed by the office, which ensures a consistent set of 
teaching standards. It also makes changes to training a lot easier since, 
again, only one institution is responsible.  
 
Figure 6: Reformed Structure of the Army 
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transport have become more important in out-of-area scenarios. More 
controversially, the Air Force has also been assigned the task of protecting 
the population from airborne terrorist attacks. The controversial 
Luftsicherungsgesetz (Air Security Law) aims at legitimising eliminating 
hijacked civilian planes before they can be crashed into the terrorists’ 
targets, thus prohibiting a German 9/11.  
In order to carry out these tasks (primarily the one of providing air 
support and air transport for the Bundeswehr and allied forces), it needs to 
be able to react quickly and flexibly to any scenario over long distances. 
From a structural point of view the Air Force today is not that different from 
the Army. Generally speaking the Air Force is divided into one branch 
dealing with operational issues, i.e. the Air Force Central Command 
(Luftwaffenführungskommando) and one branch responsible for training 
and logistics, i.e. the Department of the Air Force (Luftwaffenamt).  
The Luftwaffenführungskommando heads all three operational air 
force divisions with one SAM squadron each as well as the Air Transport 
Command, which in the near future will be integrated in a European Air 
Transport Command (BMVg, 2006: 109). Today, the Air Force features 
seven combat squadrons (both fighters and bombers) in accordance with 
the new less defensive tasks of the Air Force.  
The Luftwaffenamt heads all of the training facilities, the 
maintenance and logistics units as well as specialised medical personnel. 
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Figure 7: Reformed Structure of the Air Force 
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enforcing embargos over humanitarian aid and evacuations to securing 
maritime trade routes (which are highly important for Germany as an export 
nation) and combating terrorists. This also means that the Navy needs to be 
able to work very closely with allies, which makes a streamlined chain of 
command even more important.  
Similarly to the Army and the Air Force, the Navy features two main 
branches, the Navy Central Command (Flottenkommando) and the 
Department of the Navy (Marineamt). The Central Command is responsible 
for all current naval operations and is therefore the commanding institution 
for all operational naval forces. These consist of two operational fleets, the 
two naval air squadrons and a specialised naval medical service. 
The Office of the Navy is primarily responsible for all training and 
maintenance tasks (BMVg, 2006: 113).  
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Figure 8: Reformed Structure of the Navy 
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• Liaison tasks for out-of-area missions as well as for dealing with 
natural disasters 
• Co-ordinating operations both at home and abroad 
• Logistical support, disposal of explosives as well as NBC material 
• Military intelligence 
• Military policing 
• Personnel management for officers and NCOs (including 
reservists) 
• Support for elite sport 
All of these tasks used to be taken on by the respective branch of the 
armed forces. However, combining them in one branch made them more 
efficient, since effects of synergy were used more widely thus allowing the 
traditional branches to concentrate on their more difficult tasks. 
Generally speaking, the Streitkräftebasis follows the same structural 
pattern as the other branches, with one department coordinating all the 
training and the other responsible for actual operations. The Central 
Command (Streitkräfteunterstützungskommando) heads the four Regional 
Defence Commands (Wehrbereichskommando) which in turn head all 
logistical, military police and NBC units.  
The Department of the Armed Forces (Streitkräfteamt) is responsible 
for the academies and schools that train the troops, but also for the military 
side of the transformation of the Bundeswehr as a whole. 
Yet, since the tasks are so far reaching, and the Streitkräftebasis is 
the branch that coordinates the other branches during operations, the 
Streitkräftebasis features more institutions. The Armed Forces Central 
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Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr), the Operational 
Command for Task Forces (Kommando Operative Führung Eingreifkräfte) 
and the Operational Special Forces Command (Kommando Führung 
Operationen von Spezialkräften) are all charged with the co-ordination of 
out-of-area missions, with varying levels of combat intensity, ranging from 
peace-keeping missions over peace-enforcing-missions to special 
operations. 
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Figure 9: The Structure of the Armed Forces Support 
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which would be under the command of the battalion’s commanding officer. 
Although this arrangement had its benefits for the battalion in question, it 
did not allow for a consistent quality of medical services throughout the 
Bundeswehr. With out-of-area missions having become the norm rather 
than the exception, a high quality medical service is vital to assure 
servicemen and women (BMVg, 2006: 118). By concentrating all of the 
medical expertise in one branch of the armed forces (with the exception of 
the two specialised medical services for the Air Force and the Navy), the 
aim is to streamline the medical service and thus make it more efficient. 
With regards to its structure, the Medical Service follows the already 
familiar pattern of being divided into two sections, responsible for the 
operational issues as well as training and research respectively. The 
Medical Service’s Central Command (Sanitätsführungskommando) heads 
four medical commands, each responsible for their armed forces hospitals, 
medical centres and mobile surgery regiments. The Department of the 
Central Medical Service (Sanitätsamt der Bundesswehr) is in charge of 
training medical staff both for deployments and for professional 
development, but also of conducting medical research. 
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Figure 10: The Structure of the Central Medical Services 
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The economical restructuring of the Bundeswehr 
The economic restructuring of the Bundeswehr was introduced by 
the Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien in 2003. One aspect of these 
guidelines is to make the Bundeswehr as a whole more cost efficient in 
order to free resources which in turn can then be invested more effectively 
(e.g. new equipment, as noted above). Struck’s guidelines continue the 
process which was initiated by Rudolph Scharping, Struck’s predecessor. 
On the basis of the Weizsäcker Commission, a commission installed to 
make sound recommendations on the reform of the armed forces headed 
by former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, Scharping presented 
his plans of reform in 2000. At the core of his plans was yet another 
reduction of both overall troops and number of bases. Scharping also 
introduced the new branch of the Streitkräftebasis – SKB (Joint Support 
Service). This branch was responsible for all tasks concerning logistics, 
training and reconnaissance. Traditionally each branch of the armed forces 
maintained units charged with those tasks (see illustrations 3-5). These 
capabilities were thus “outsourced” into the SKB therefore making 
maintaining the Bundeswehr more cost-efficient. Scharping also founded 
the Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb – g.e.b.b. 
(Corporation for Development, Procurement and Operation) which was 
responsible for “revamping the Bundeswehr’s service sector” (Riecke, 2002: 
50-51). This goal was to be achieved by outsourcing the services like the 
civilian vehicle pool (BundeswehrFuhrparkService GmbH – BwFPS GmbH), 
clothing and personal equipment into separate companies (LH Bundeswehr 
Bekleidungsgesellschaft mbH – LHBw mbH). With the presentation of his 
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Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, Struck built on this basis and expanded 
them. 
The guidelines clearly state that available resources are the basis, 
on which future planning rests. It therefore of utmost importance that in the 
light of decreasing budgets resources are spent efficiently. Struck criticises 
the fact that the defence budget is characterised by a high spending on 
personnel costs and equipment maintenance and a negligence in the field 
of investment. The Bundeswehr therefore does not have the budgetary 
prerequisites to start the profound reform process that is needed in order to 
take on the tasks set out, since the budget is designed to secure the status 
quo, rather than allowing for reform. 
In order to free resources, Struck allocates available funds to 
maintaining and improving core military capabilities, thus emphasising the 
need to co-operate more closely with the civilian economy. Civilian 
businesses, such as the LHBw or the BwFPS take over (or in their case 
intensify) duties traditionally associated with the armed forces, such as 
motor pool and clothing. It has to be noted however, that this arrangement 
puts the German economy in a difficult position, since it will have to adapt to 
the new tasks as well. Struck also stresses the importance of international 
arms co-operation, since Germany is not the only country that faces similar 
problems (BMVg, 2003b).  
The White Paper 2006 touches on the budgetary aspect of the 
reform only very briefly, yet it too acknowledges the need to continue on the 
way Rudolf Scharping and Peter Struck set out on. Since the overall 
budgetary situation has not changed since 2003 (i.e. insufficient funds for 
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the planned reforms), the White Paper adds the reduction of bureaucracy 
as well as a revised concept for new equipment to the close co-operation 
with civilian companies already in place. This way the Bundeswehr is meant 
to be able to concentrate on its core tasks and that the civilian economy is 
to take over the service sector, especially in those parts where companies 
were able to offer the same services much more cost-efficiently (BMVg, 
2006: 73-74).  
Although the basic idea behind that move seems to be good, one 
needs to ask the question, whether it can possibly work. The next section 
will therefore analyse how successful the public private partnership (PPP) 
has been over the last couple of years. Since PPP has now been 
introduced in many administrative tasks within the Bundeswehr, this 
analysis will concentrate on the companies mentioned above, i.e. the LHBw 
and the BwFPS. 
At this point one should point out that making use of civilian expertise 
is not at all a new idea to the Bundeswehr. Local craftsmen and businesses 
have had contracts with the local barracks to supply services from 
construction works and repairs to catering, which is why the closure of 
barracks is always accompanied by local authorities fighting to keep “their” 
base running. 
The Bundeswehr Fuhrpark Service GmbH, a joint venture of the 
Ministry of Defence and German Rail (Deutsche Bahn – DB), for example 
has co-ordinated and maintained all commercially available vehicles such 
as cars, people-carriers, vans and HGVs since 2002. Within only two years 
this private partner was able to acquire some 15,000 new vehicles with an 
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overall value of ca. 300 million Euros, an investment the Bundeswehr could 
have never afforded with its decreasing budget. Before it was established, 
the average age of civilian vehicles in the Bundeswehr was 9.2 years. One 
might argue that older cars are simply not as comfortable as newer ones 
and that age is insignificant factor in running the armed forces more 
efficiently. Yet older cars tend to use more fuel, are less environmentally 
friendly and, most importantly, need more maintenance, which again costs 
money and man power. Surveys showed that before 2002 cars could not be 
used for up to 36 days every year because they were undergoing repairs; 
the situation for HGVs was even worse. BwFPS managed to reduce the 
average age of civilian cars and HGVs to around one year with the result 
that cars are unavailable only for up to two days every year. On top of that 
fuel costs were reduced from 0.38 Euros to 0.31 Euros, which constitutes a 
cut of almost 20% (Rüttler, 2007: 162).  
In addition to that, BwFPS re-organised the general use of cars 
within the Bundeswehr. Whereas each unit used to have their own vehicles 
they BwFPS introduced a system by which units lease their civilian vehicles 
either for a short period or on long term. The idea is that vehicles are used 
more efficiently thus avoiding long periods of stand-still. If any unit requires 
more vehicles because they are on an extended exercise, they can lease 
further vehicles from any of the 130 service centres throughout Germany. 
Although this system seems overly complicated to any soldier who is used 
to the old system of just getting into the vehicle parked outside, there are 
large benefits to be had. By 2007 it had become clear that vehicles were 
being used much more efficiently and much more economically, since each 
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lease comes out of the unit’s allowance. This in turn has led to a higher 
level of economical awareness throughout the Bundeswehr, since soldiers 
are directly confronted with the costs of their actions. This awareness does 
not stop with requesting a vehicle but also extends into other day-to-day 
situations. 
The second example of PPP in this analysis shall be the LH 
Bundeswehr Bekleidungsgesellschaft mbH (LHBw), which has taken on the 
difficult task of supplying around 20,000 new recruits with some 130 items 
of personal equipment every three months. When it started it took over the 
equipment stocked in the Bundeswehr’s own stores and re-distributed the 
gear, so that it can be more easily issued when and where it is needed. It 
then set on reducing the purchase price of equipment as well as setting up 
an easily accessible replacement service for the soldiers, so that broken or 
lost kit can be replaced relatively quickly. 
When comparing expenditures from before 2002, LHBw managed to 
reduce the purchasing price of new equipment by around 16%. It also 
managed to reduce storage capacities considerably due to the re-
organisation of how gear is being issued, i.e. move the gear to where it is 
needed instead of storing it at one place in the case that kit needs to be 
issued just there. This process also made a reduction among the work force 
possible, thus freeing money from maintaining less real estate 
(warehouses) and from lower personnel costs (Rüttler, 2007: 164).  
These two joint ventures, the BwFPS and the LHBw, managed to re-
structure cost- intensive areas within the organisation of the Bundeswehr, 
thus reducing the strain these fields have on the defence budget. 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
120 
 
Resources saved here can then be used elsewhere. Since investment has 
been identified by both the Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien 2003 and 
the White Paper 2006 as having been neglected in past years, it remains to 
be seen, if this aspect of the budget has indeed seen some improvement. 
Ending Conscription 
Conscription has been an integral part of the Bundeswehr ever since 
its creation in 1955. As has been pointed out, the purpose of conscription 
was primarily to ensure West Germany’s capability to defend against a 
large-scale attack with conventional means, i.e. conscription guaranteed a 
sufficient supply of manpower for the cadred units predominantly found in 
the Army. With this in mind conscription should have come to an end after 
the collapse of the bi-polar system in 1989/90 and in fact many European 
armed forces did turn their backs on this particular practice. Germany, 
however, was not one of them.  
Since security considerations could no longer convincingly sustain 
conscription – after all Germany was now surrounded by friends and allies – 
other reasons for the continuation of conscription than the need to maintain 
high numbers of troops would have to play a role. Firstly, strategically it was 
argued that given Germany’s Zentrallage (central position) within Europe 
called for German armed forces capable of “national and collective defence 
of the alliance” (Longhurst, 2003: 159). Just because Germany’s and 
Europe’s security was not under threat for the foreseeable future did not 
convince Germans that the need for a large defensive force would not arise 
at all. Conscription could therefore be seen as insurance against a possible, 
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albeit unlikely deterioration of relations with Eastern Europe (Weizsäcker-
Kommission, 2000: 15).  
The second reason behind the continuation can be found in 
Germany’s history. It was argued that by linking the Bundeswehr closely to 
society through drafting young men, the Bundeswehr would be under 
constant public scrutiny, thus preventing a situation of the armed forces 
becoming alienated from society as ‘a state within the state’ as the 
Wehrmacht had been. Conscription was therefore a means to control the 
Bundeswehr to avoid undemocratic tendencies within the armed forces 
(Longhurst, 2003: 159).  
The close link between Bundeswehr and German society also 
ensured that Germany would maintain its culture of restraint when it came 
to the military. Conscription would force decision makers to refrain from 
deploying the Bundeswehr too readily, since any deployment that included 
conscripts would affect a wider part of society, thus making decision makers 
more accountable (Longhurst, 2003: 160). Considering that conscripts have 
been barred from out-of-area deployment, most significantly Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, this argument has become less compelling. 
The final argument put forward by proponents of conscription is that 
conscription is in fact a very good tool of recruitment. Conscription 
introduces men from all parts of society to the Bundeswehr, from which a 
sizeable number would choose to volunteer after their service. Conscription 
therefore ensured that soldiers would not just be recruited from the less 
well-educated or unemployed but would also attract 
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citizens. In essence, conscription maintained an ‘intelligent armed force’ 
(BMVg, 2009a: 71).  
In addition to these mainly militarily orientated arguments one has to 
keep in mind that although conscription ensured a steady flow of new 
personnel for the Bundeswehr it also supplied Germany’s social services 
with relatively cheap labour in the form of Zivildienstleistende (conscientious 
objectors). The end of conscription would therefore affect the social 
services as well in that they would have to make do without some 70,000 
‘Zivis’ every year (Longhurst, 2003: 162).  
Ending the practice of conscription has therefore always been a very 
contentious subject since the end of the Cold War. Although the security 
argument was no longer as persuasive, the other arguments seemed to 
ensure an indefinite continuation of conscription. This changed, however, 
shortly after the Bundestag election of 2009. After having reduced the 
length of the national service from 9 to 6 months – a length of time which 
hardly allowed for any meaningful training – the new defence minister Karl-
Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU) openly discussed the discontinuation of 
conscription from June 2011 onwards. It is important to note that the 
practice will only be discontinued and not abolished. The discontinuation 
could be more easily reversed should the future need for conscription arise 
(Spiegel Online, 2010: 1). Abolition would also mean constitutional change, 
which is traditionally very hard to achieve in Germany. 
This relatively surprising turn was part of Guttenberg’s approach to 
make the Bundeswehr more efficient to ensure Germany’s continuous 
capabilities to contribute to on-going multilateral operations. In his view it 
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was unacceptable that the Bundeswehr was over-stretched with only some 
8,000 troops deployed (zu Guttenberg, 2010b: 13). In short, the 
Bundeswehr did not have the appropriate personnel structures to guarantee 
sufficient troops for the operations. Considering the number of instructors 
necessary to train drafted recruits – none of which would be deployed 
abroad making them unusable in the Bundeswehr’s primary tasks – 
discontinuing conscription would free more personnel. Zu Guttenberg’s 
reform would therefore centre on optimising the personnel management.  
If conscription was discontinued, a drop in recruits would naturally 
follow, which in turn would lead to new personnel shortages. To prevent this 
zu Guttenberg aimed at making the service in the armed forces more 
attractive. This would not be limited to better pay, but would also include 
fewer transfers to minimise negative impacts on the families and better 
compensations for killed or wounded soldiers (zu Guttenberg, 2010a: 24).  
Although zu Guttenberg’s proposals caused a controversial debate 
amongst Germany’s politicians the practice of conscription was 
discontinued from the 01.01.2011, meaning that six months later the 
Bundeswehr would become an all-volunteer armed force. However, this 
process left the Bundeswehr with the problem, of how to attract young 
people to join up as the surrounding conditions had not been finalised by 
January 2011. The result of this was that even if someone had been 
interested in joining the Bundeswehr, the recruiting offices were unable to 
provide proper information as the new framework had not been decided 
upon (Witte, 2011: 2).  
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The transition to an all-volunteer force would most likely been easier 
for the Bundeswehr, had zu Guttenberg not been forced to resign over 
allegations of plagiarism in his PhD thesis. As it was, he left the 
Bundeswehr in the middle of its most significant transformation in its history 
with the actual reform still in its planning stage. Considering it took 
Germany 20 years to come to terms with the idea that conscription was an 
out-dated practice, its discontinuation came too suddenly, without proper 
preparation and effectively left the Bundeswehr struggling for new recruits.  
Summary 
The reform of the Bundeswehr has been a long process and it is still 
on-going. During the Cold War, West Germany’s armed forces were strictly 
aimed at deterring any conventional attack from the Soviet Union and its 
allies. The Bundeswehr relied heavily on large numbers of battle tanks and 
other heavy equipment as well as on a large number of troops made 
available by conscription. In the case of an attack on West Germany, most 
army units were capable to grow considerably in numbers because many 
posts within the units would then have been occupied by cadred personnel, 
i.e. reservists who had already completed their national service. Since their 
training might have years in the past, cadred units were primarily found in 
army units which needed no or only little specialised training (such as the 
infantry).  
The end of the Cold War changed this doctrine, since now Germany 
became more and more involved in out-of-area missions for which the old 
structure and strategic concept proved to be inappropriate. By 2006 the 
Bundeswehr had undergone considerable change in both structure and the 
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accompanying strategic concept; away from strict territorial defence 
towards an expeditionary force. Today’s structure of the Bundeswehr is 
more streamlined to enable faster decision-making as well as integrating it 
better into international missions. With the establishment of two new 
branches of the armed forces, the Central Medical Service and the SKB, all 
of the supporting tasks, i.e. logistics, administration and medical service, 
the Army, Navy and Air Force can now concentrate on their core tasks. 
However, the Bundeswehr, as other European armed forces, is still 
battling financial problems in the light of continuously decreasing defence 
budgets. The economic restructuring has proven to be quite successful in 
saving resources and has helped to make the Bundeswehr more efficient. 
However, the emphasis on public private partnership also has its 
drawbacks in the day-to-day business within the units. It also raises some 
questions when it comes to out-of-area missions. Will a business, which 
runs the barrack’s canteen at home, also do this in places like Afghanistan? 
If not, how can the Bundeswehr keep its soldiers trained in these tasks, if 
they never perform them at home? The same can be asked about vehicle 
maintenance and transportation. 
In summary, whereas the Bundeswehr used to be a highly territorial 
defence force, it has been transformed into a more mobile and ultimately a 
more professional force. German decision-makers therefore have a much 
more diverse tool at their disposal which they can use to contribute more 
actively in multilateral operations.  
However, although the discontinuation of conscription is a logical 
step if the Bundeswehr is meant to effectively contribute to out-of-area 
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operations there are still some problems with this. The decision to 
discontinue conscription by January 2011 is open for criticism as the likely 
drop in numbers of recruits has not been addressed accordingly. It will 
remain to be seen if Germany can maintain its commitment to multilateral 
operations should the Bundeswehr fail to recruit the 16,000 volunteers per 
year necessary to maintain the overall troop numbers. Should this scenario 
become reality, Germany will have to re-think its concept for its reservists in 
order to close the resulting gaps. 
In the following two chapters, this thesis will examine as to how well 
the Bundeswehr can make use of this structural reform. They will also 
discuss the strategies adopted to tackle the respective crises which will in 
turn enable this thesis to test its core hypothesis that the lack of a clearly 
defined purpose makes the Bundeswehr less effective in its missions. The 
out-of-area missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan have been difficult from the 
very start and are therefore well suited as case studies to test the 
Bundeswehr’s capabilities as a mobile task force. 
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Chapter 4 – The Bundeswehr in Kosovo 
“But I have two principles: Never again war, never again 
Auschwitz; never again genocide, never again fascism. For me, both 
belong together, my friends, and that is why I joined the Green Party. 
[…] You may think that everything this government has done and 
everything NATO is doing is wrong. But I would like to know what you 
– from a political left perspective – would call the ethnic warfare in 
Yugoslavia since 1992 and the current racial policies. I’m telling you, 
with the end of the Cold War, ethnic warfare and racism have 
returned, which Europe must not tolerate.”9 – Joschka Fischer 
(Fischer, 2011: 3) 
Having discussed the reform of the Bundeswehr in the last chapter, 
one now needs to see how well Germany has used its armed forces in 
conjunction with its allies. The Bundeswehr has been used in some 
incidents, yet mostly as peace-keeping force in places like Bosnia or 
Somalia. Although these missions put strain on the armed forces in fields 
such as logistics, the troops conducted their missions in relatively safe 
environments or were pulled out at the first sign of trouble. 
The Kosovo war and the peace-keeping mission in the subsequent 
years added a new quality in German security policy. As already pointed 
out in chapter 2, for the first time German troops were sent into combat 
after 1945, accompanied by a heated debate about whether or not this was 
in fact a justifiable course of action.  
Although the already deployed NATO contingents brought an end to 
the hostilities of the early 1990s in the Balkans, the region would soon be 
                                                 
9
 „Aber ich stehe auf zwei Grundsätzen: Nie wieder Krieg, nie wieder Auschwitz; nie wieder Völkermord, nie 
wieder Faschismus. Beides gehört bei mir zusammen, liebe Freundinnen und Freunde, und deswegen bin ich in 
die Grüne Partei gegangen. [...] Ihr mögt ja alles falsch finden, was diese Bundesregierung gemacht hat und die 
Nato macht, das mögt ihr alles falsch finden. Aber mich würde mal interessieren, wie denn von einem linken 
Standpunkt aus das, was in Jugoslawien seit 1992 an ethnischer Kriegsführung, an völkischer Politik betrieben 
wird, wie dieses von einem linken, von eurem Standpunkt aus tatsächlich zu bennen ist. [...] Ich sage euch, mit 
dem Ende des kalten Krieges ist eine ethnische Kriegsführung, ist eine völkische Politik zurückgekehrt, die 
Europa nicht aktzepieren darf.“ – Joschka Fischer. 
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back on the European security agenda. The Kosovo Crisis had its origins in 
1989, when the then autonomous province, mainly inhabited by Albanians, 
was stripped of that status by the Serbs. Being literally ignored by the West 
during the Dayton Peace negotiations, it remained under Serbian rule after 
the initial Yugoslavian Crisis had been resolved. With tensions mounting 
between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians (especially the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, KLA) the Balkans erupted in violence once more in late-
1997. Being unable to secure the support of the UN Security Council, 
NATO eventually took charge of diffusing the Balkans by threatening 
Belgrade, which had moved into Kosovo with heavy weapons, with air 
strikes (Maull, 2000a: 2-4).  
A good starting point to do just that is to determine KFOR’s 
objectives as set out by NATO. This will make it then possible to determine 
what kind of military personnel, equipment needed to be deployed in order 
to meet the objectives. This chapter will then move on to examine the 
situation in Kosovo, i.e. the location and duration of deployment, since this 
would affect the efficiency of peace-keeping in that isolated bases staffed 
with over-worked troops would make controlling the area much harder. 
Next, this chapter will study the financial commitment to the mission, since 
this also determines the capabilities of the peace-keeping force. The final 
part of this chapter will look at the developments in the actual mission as to 
how the priorities changed over the last ten years and how that affected 
German commitment. 
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The context of the Kosovo Crisis 
At the close of 1998, Germany was domestically pre-occupied with 
the federal elections, which would end the sixteen-year period of the Kohl 
Government, replacing it with the left-of-the-centre ‘Red-Green’ Coalition of 
Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fischer (Greens). The new 
Government was in the middle of having to decide whether to participate in 
the military operation for which NATO was already preparing before it was 
formally installed by the Federal President. The decision to contribute 14 
ECR Tornados to the operation was therefore still taken by the old 
Government with the Red-Green Coalition agreeing reluctantly (Rudolf, 
2000: 134).  
After several attempts to solve this crisis diplomatically with the 
Serbian President Milosevic, one last effort was made in Rambouillet in 
February 1999. These peace talks were characterised by the Serbs 
signalling their disinterest only leaving three Albanian delegations for the 
West to negotiate the eventual comprise with. Kosovo would remain 
autonomous under Yugoslav sovereignty with NATO troops, which would 
be allowed to enter any part of Yugoslavia should this prove to be 
necessary, supervising compliance (Ramet and Lyon, 2001: 87). As 
Belgrade rejected this agreement the only possibility left to the West was to 
resort to NATO military means in April 1999. 
Objectives and German military deployment in the 
Kosovo Crisis 
At the close of 1998 when the Kosovo Crisis became imminent, 
Germany was domestically pre-occupied with the federal elections, which 
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would end the sixteen-year period of the Kohl Government, replacing it with 
the left-of-the-centre ‘Red-Green’ Coalition of Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and 
Joschka Fischer (Greens). The new government was in the middle of 
having to decide whether to participate in the military operation for which 
NATO was already preparing before the new government was formally 
installed by the Federal President.  
NATO’s political and military objectives were clear cut. On the 
political front, NATO was committed to a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo 
Crisis and that the violence there was to be halted. The military aspect of 
NATO’s strategy was to complement the political goals. Therefore NATO’s 
military objective was to end the attacks against the population of Kosovo 
and to provide the basis of an interim political settlement (NATO, 2009f: 1). 
However, since diplomatic efforts failed, NATO made use of the final resort 
and enforced its commitment to ending the Serbian attacks by starting the 
air campaign “Allied Force” in March 1999. 
In the run-up to operation “Allied Force” the German Government 
decided relatively early, that it would contribute forces to this NATO 
campaign. On 12th October 1998 the Government – the Bundesregierung – 
put forward a motion to Parliament – the Bundestag – to assign 
Bundeswehr troops. Citing the decision of the North Atlantic Council of 10th 
October 1998, the government identified that Yugoslavia had not complied 
with the UN Resolution 1199, in that it continued its aggression towards the 
Kosovo population which in turn causes a severe threat to peace and 
security in this region (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998b: 1). 
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German troops were, however, not intended to participate in actual 
combat. This becomes very clear when analysing the type of deployments 
the Bundesregierung envisaged. The Air Force was to assign imagery 
intelligence (IMINT) and electronic combat reconnaissance (ECR) aircrafts, 
which would be responsible to identify targets for air strikes and radar 
emplacements respectively along with the necessary logistical support 
units. Similar forces were assigned by the Navy, which were to support the 
Air Force units. All together this amounted to some 500 soldiers (none of 
which were conscripts) and 14 aircrafts. Germany also included its Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) in the overall contribution. These 
forces were not to be stationed in Kosovo itself, but rather conducted their 
missions from bases in Italy. Forces stationed in the Balkans under SFOR 
command could also be called upon, should the need arise, as long as the 
SFOR mission was not endangered in any case. Since this was only meant 
as a temporary assignment, the Bundesregierung argued that the financial 
burden could be covered by provisions set aside in the defence budget for 
quick response operations. It is interesting to note at this point that these 
forces could be made use of by NATO in order to fulfil its objectives, even if 
the UN Security Council did not pass a resolution legitimising such a use of 
force (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a: 3-4). One should also note that the 
government clearly states that these forces were at the disposal of the 
North Atlantic Council, thus no longer under direct national command. 
On 16th October 1998, the Bundestag approved the government’s 
motion with a large majority (500 Yes, 62 No, 18 Abstentions). Although the 
debate was highly controversial – it shall be examined more closely at a 
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later time – the result shows a shift towards a more active interpretation of 
Bündnistreue, as discussed in chapter 2. One might argue at this point, 
however, considering the type of contribution Germany made during the 
first combat mission of the Bundeswehr, that its part in the operation was 
negligible. Germany contributed only 14 aircrafts equipped for 
reconnaissance and around 500 troops to operate and maintain them. 
Compared with the deployment of other NATO members (some 7,500 US 
troops and some 6,000 UK troops), the German deployment is dwarfed 
(Youngs et al., 1999: 69-70). Yet as the then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
(FDP) argued, these were the types of aircraft NATO had requested and 
relied on, due to the high level of expertise in this field present in the 
German Air Force. Germany’s contribution therefore increases the security 
of its allies by supplying vital intelligence (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998h: 
23129). Since the new Schröder Government had not yet been installed, 
the decision to contribute the 14 ECR Tornados to the operation was 
therefore still taken by the old Government with the Red-Green Coalition 
agreeing reluctantly (Rudolf, 2000: 134). 
Initially Operation Allied Force concentrated on air defences 
deployed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after which the campaign 
was intensified by targeting the infrastructure. Precision-guided weapons 
systems were meant to keep civilian casualties to a minimum and target 
selection was reviewed on multiple levels of command to ensure that they 
were militarily justified and complied with international law. After 78 days 
and some 38,000 sorties the Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo, bringing 
an end to the air campaign (NATO, 2009g: 1).  
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Beside Operation Allied Force, NATO also set up a military task 
force to assist and – in the case of danger extract – the OSCE Verification 
Mission in Kosovo. This unarmed 2,000 personnel strong mission (200 of 
which were German) was to verify Serbian compliance with the UN Security 
Council’s resolutions 1160/98 and 1199/98, each calling for a halt of 
aggression within Kosovo and a retreat of military and paramilitary 
personnel from the province. In addition to the forces necessary for the air 
campaign, NATO committed itself to the protection of the OSCE mission, 
which in turn put additional strain on NATO’s members. In the case of 
Germany, this meant that since it had already contributed to the OSCE 
mission, it also had to contribute to the relevant security force to be able to 
continue to emphasise its Bündnistreue. On 18th November 1998 the 
government motioned the Bundestag to assign some 250 troops to NATO’s 
“Extraction Force”. This contingent was to be comprised primarily by 
medical and logistical (air and sea logistics) professional – i.e. non-
conscript – personnel stationed in Macedonia. Similar to the forces 
assigned to Operation Allied Force, the Extraction Force would be able to 
make use of logistics and support already in place for the air campaign, as 
well as reinforcements from SFOR, should the need arise (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1998d: 3).  
On the financial side, the government estimated that this operation 
would cost around 22 million D-Marks, which was not yet covered by the 
defence budget (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998c: 3). On 19th November 1998 
the Bundestag agreed to the motion of the Government, again with a 
comfortable majority (553 Yes, 35 No, 7 Abstentions).  
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Considering Germany’s rather minor role in the actual military 
operation in attempting to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it is not 
surprising that Germany would utilise its diplomatic channels to seek 
another way to contribute more heavily to the resolution of this crisis. The 
government’s twin-track approach to the situation saw the support and 
participation of NATO actions on the one hand and intensive diplomatic 
efforts to stabilise the region permanently on the other. In order to get UN 
support for any future operations in the Balkans, Russia needed to be 
incorporated in any peace-process by limiting fears of NATO enlargement 
and emphasising Russia’s importance in “shaping a co-operative European 
security system” (Hyde-Price, 2003: 9).  
Germany’s twin-track diplomacy also involved a number of 
multilateral institutions such as the EU, OSCE (as noted above, Germany 
contributed to the emergency Extraction Force), G-8 and the UN to name 
but a few. Germany’s new Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer soon came to 
realise that long-term stabilisation of the region could only be achieved 
through multilateral channels, something that the ‘Fischer Plan’ 
incorporated. This plan aimed at stabilising the region not merely by military 
means but also saw the importance of political and economic support for 
the countries in question. The prospect of future membership in the EU and 
G-8 support were the major aspects of this plan, which would not exclude 
the initial Serbian aggressor. By supporting and, indeed participating, in the 
NATO campaign, Germany did not only prove its Bündnisfähigkeit, but also 
ensured that its diplomatic effort was supported by the credentials 
connected to being a fully accepted ally (Maull, 2000b: 72). When NATO’s 
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Kosovo Force (KFOR) eventually entered Kosovo, it did so with the clearly 
set aims set by the ‘Fischer Plan’ and the consensus of the international 
community.  
Whereas Operation Allied Force and the OSCE mission were aimed 
at stopping Serbian aggression in the Province of Kosovo, KFOR’s purpose 
was to enforce the Rambouillet Treaty, i.e. prohibit a humanitarian 
catastrophe, set the preconditions for a peaceful co-existence in the region, 
protect the human rights of the population and ease the return of refugees 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1999a: 1). Contrary to Operation Allied Force, which 
was a clear cut combat operation, KFOR’s emphasis was on peace-
keeping, which is not to say that KFOR would not be able to perform as a 
peace enforcer either.  
On 22nd February 1999 the Bundesregierung motioned to the 
Bundestag to contribute to NATO operations enforcing the Rambouillet 
Treaty, outlining the precise nature of the contribution. The Government 
proposed to initially deploy some 4,500 troops in Kosovo in addition to the 
troops already on the ground in the area (i.e. troops originally assigned to 
Operation Allied Force and the OSCE Extraction Force). Of these 4,500 
troops the majority would be army personnel responsible for the actual 
peace-enforcing on the ground. Considering the nature of the personnel 
devoted to KFOR, it becomes clear that the German government was not 
taking the Kosovo Crisis lightly. The Army was to contribute armoured 
forces as well as armoured infantry, armoured reconnaissance and light 
infantry units in addition to light aircraft groups, drone reconnaissance and 
logistics. The Air Force would continue to provide reconnaissance 
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(including AWACS coverage) and air transport, whereas the Navy provided 
for sea/air reconnaissance in support of the Air Force.  
Again, the government placed its troops (all non-conscripts) under 
NATO command for the duration of this mission. The costs of Germany’s 
initial KFOR commitment of some 620 million D-Marks for 12 months would 
not be covered by the defence budget, since its 400 million D-Marks 
reserved for unforeseeable defence expenditures had already been used 
up. In order to be able to pay for its contingent the reserves of the federal 
budget were made available (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999b: 3).  
KFOR’s mission, and that of the German contingent, would be to 
bring to an end hostilities and suppression within Kosovo, ensure the safety 
of the population and the returning refugees, support international 
organisations in their task to develop sustainable democratic structures, 
disarm the Kosovo and ensure unrestricted access for aid organisations. 
Comparing these rather complex objectives of KFOR to the German 
contingent, one can see that the Bundesregierung placed the emphasis on 
securing Kosovo, a task the assigned combat troops were suitable for. In 
accordance with the German reserved position towards the use of force, the 
troops were restricted in their armed intervention to incidences concerning 
themselves, personnel from allied contingents (including international police 
forces) as well as international aid organisations (Deutscher Bundestag, 
1999c: 2).  
As already pointed out, the initial financial burdens for the above 
mentioned missions were considerable. The costs for Germany’s contingent 
within the OSCE Extraction Force amounted to some 22 million D-Marks 
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per year, whereas KFOR initially was even more expensive with 620 million 
D-Marks per annum. Although one might argue that these numbers appear 
relatively low, one has to remember that the German defence budget of 
1999 only amounted to some 48 billion D-Marks. Out of those 48 billion, 
almost 50% were taken up by personnel costs, which only leave some 24 
billion for procurement, investment, development and other expenditures, 
such as peace-keeping mission (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006: 1). One 
also has to remember, that Germany was already heavily involved in 
Bosnia, which again depletes the already meagre budget.  
During the course of KFOR deployment, the initial 620 million D-
Marks shrank to some 158 million Euros (ca. 304 million D-Marks) in 2009 
due to a constant reduction in the total number of troops stationed in 
Kosovo (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008b: 2). Since KFOR’s mission to 
stabilise the province were proving to be bear fruit, there was no need to 
sustain the initial 5,000 troops. Currently, the German contingent to KFOR 
consists of some 2,100 soldiers (Bötel, 2009: 3). It has to be said, however, 
that the Kosovo Crisis was not resolved quickly, but rather took its time. It is 
therefore necessary to discuss the developments within Kosovo since 
KFOR took over, in order to come to an evaluation of KFOR’s overall 
success.  
KFOR Developments 
Although the fighting between Serbian militia and Kosovo Albanians 
ended with the arrival of KFOR, it is safe to say that Kosovo remained far 
from a peaceful and stable region. KFOR got off to a good start, securing 
the area and stabilising Kosovo, making it possible for the refugees to 
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return to their homes. Apart from the occasional skirmish between KFOR 
and Serbs, all seemed to be going well. Violence re-erupted across Kosovo 
in March 2004, however, as a result of a rumour that two Albanian boys had 
been drowned by Serbs in the town of Mitrovica. Although the civilian UN 
administration - Unmik - denied the accusations, the Albanian media used 
this incidence to foster hostilities amongst the Albanians. In addition to the 
considerable casualties (31 dead, 600 injured) the riots resulted in 
ransacked cemeteries, and hundreds of destroyed Serbian houses and 
churches within the course of one week (Spiegel Online, 2009e: 1).  
However damaging a blow this was to Serbian-Albanian co-
existence in Kosovo, it was even more damaging to the political process. 
Unmik was in the process of determining if Kosovo had indeed made 
enough progress to guarantee a peaceful co-existence between the 2 
million Albanians and the 100,000 Serbs. Depending on this, negotiations 
between Belgrade and the Kosovo’s capital Pristina were to commence 
deciding on the international status of Kosovo. Not surprisingly, this process 
was severely set back by the riots. 
What is more, KFOR’s credibility suffered severely as well. 
Considering the preceding calm, NATO had planned to reduce its presence 
from some 18,500 to 12,500 troops (the Bundeswehr contingent was to be 
reduced by 700 to 2,500 troops), because Kosovo had become much more 
peaceful (Beste and Szandar, 2004: 32). KFOR had considerable difficulties 
curtailing the violence; this was especially the case for the German 
contingent. The troops were restricted in using force – as pointed out before 
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- to stop the rioters. Instead they concentrated on securing vital installations 
within the German sector.  
This clearly showed both NATO and Unmik that a small spark could 
re-ignite the powder keg endangering the achievements of KFOR. Although 
eventually Kosovo calmed down afterwards, NATO had become much 
more careful in evaluating the situation in the region. However, KFOR 
continued to shrink in total numbers in spite of the events of early 2004. By 
late 2005 the Parliament in Pristina had decided that it would pursue its 
independence from Serbia, a motion supported by the UN Security Council 
(Spiegel Online, 2009f: 1). This declaration caused considerable tensions 
between Pristina and Belgrade, yet this situation did not erupt into open 
violence.  
Some two years later, on 17th February 2008, the Pristina Parliament 
declared its independence from Serbia. Surprisingly, this did not cause the 
long expected violence in Kosovo. However, in Serbia nationalists protested 
sometimes violently against Kosovo’s independence and attacked 
numerous western embassies. From the very start it transpired that Kosovo 
would not be recognised by a number of states, including Serbia – for 
obvious reasons –, Russia, but also countries with minorities striving for 
their own independence like Spain or Cyprus (Falksohn and Flottau, 2008: 
125).  
Although Kosovo has now achieved its independence, it still depends 
heavily on the West to provide any sort of state authority. Kosovo does not 
possess its own police force, armed forces or even its own judges. In effect, 
Kosovo remains a ‘protectorate’ of the West, since they provide for almost 
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every state institution (Kreiler, 2009: 1). Although it can be argued that the 
overall situation in Kosovo will improve from now on, it remains clear that 
KFOR, and indeed the Bundeswehr contingent, will still be in demand to 
support Kosovo in its newly found independence. 
The Political Debate on the Kosovo Crisis 
Considering that this crisis was the first to see German troops 
participate in actual armed conflict since the end of WWII, it is not surprising 
that the political debate was a heated one. When analysing the Bundestag 
debates on the subject it quickly becomes clear that it revolved around 
three major issues: obligation to both NATO and the EU, the lawfulness of 
the operations and Germany’s past in the Balkans.  
Analysing the debates surrounding the first combat deployment of 
German armed troops it has to be kept in mind that different from other 
armed forces, the Bundeswehr not only needs the government’s support 
but also the approval of the Bundestag (Parlamentarischer Rat, 2002: 
Article 115). Parliamentary debates therefore not only show the 
parliamentarians’ differing opinions which can then be largely ignored by 
the government, but are vital in the decision-making process of deploying 
troops abroad. Due to this central role these debates play in the process, it 
is important to analyse them. 
When analysing the Bundestag debates on Kosovo one has to keep 
in mind the developments during the Kosovo crisis. Therefore the three 
main developments – as outlined earlier on in this chapter – and the parties’ 
individual reactions to these developments will be focused on here; first the 
decision to contribute to a possible NATO air operation (Operation “Allied 
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Force”), second the contribution to the security force for the OCSE 
inspectors and finally the stationing armed forces for humanitarian purposes 
in the area.  
While discussing the contribution to a possible NATO aerial 
operation above Kosovo it becomes clear quickly that although German 
troops were already accustomed to peace-keeping – most notably as a 
contingent to SFOR – contributing to a possible combat operation was a 
different matter for parliament. Perhaps not surprisingly the right-of-the-
centre CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP were most prepared to send the 
troops into combat as shall be outlined below. 
The CDU/CSU argumentation 
From the very start, the CDU/CSU made it clear that they would 
support NATO in its military campaign against Milosevic’s regime. Speaking 
as the outgoing Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe outlined what became the 
core of their argumentation.  
Concentrating on the German Bündnistreue, i.e. Germany’s 
obligation to co-operate within the Alliance, he argued that Germany’s 
NATO partners were expecting the Bundestag to support the Alliance and 
form a unified front. This would also be “a clear sign of Germany’s 
solidarity”10 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998k: 23134). Furthermore, any of 
Milosevic’s concession to the West had been achieved through the threat of 
force and it was therefore necessary to maintain it in order to prevent a 
continuation of the humanitarian disaster.  
                                                 
10
“Dieser Beitrag ist militärisch notwendig und bedeutend. Er ist aber mehr als das: Er ist Ausdruck der Solidarität 
Deutschlands im Bündnis.“ 
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As the debate continued in the Bundestag further arguments were 
voiced in support of NATO. More often, references to history surfaced, 
however not to German history what might have been expected but rather 
to the history of the Balkans. Christian Schwarz-Schilling was most vocal in 
this part arguing that a second Srebrenica was not to be allowed in Kosovo 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1998v: 430).  
On more judicial note party chairman Wolfgang Schäuble took on the 
role of defending NATO operations against claims voiced in the Bundestag 
that they were against international law. Although a UN mandate would help 
to legitimise NATO operations greatly, it was not obligatory since the overall 
goal was to secure and stabilise the region, which again is in accordance 
with the UN Charta. And since the UN Secretary General himself had talked 
of genocide, Schäuble argued that this in itself gives NATO the UN’s 
approval for military action (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999m: 2626).  
As a final point in the CDU/CSU’s line of argument one needs to 
address the aspect of ‘ultima ratio’, i.e. the last resort. Throughout the 
debate members of the CDU/CSU argued that Milosevic was solely 
responsible for NATO having to resort to force since no other means would 
make him stop his campaign in Kosovo. After NATO had started its aerial 
campaign, Wolfgang Schäuble points out that the international community 
had no other option left than to apply the ‘ultima ratio’. This clear decision 
was necessary to maintain the West’s credibility in that “patience was not 
confused with fickleness”11 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999g: 2575-2576).  
                                                 
11
 „Aber es ist gut, notwendig und unausweichlich, daß am Ende Langmut nicht mit Wankelmut verwechselt 
werden durfte.“ 
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In summary, the CDU/CSU’s line of argument focused primarily on 
Germany’s Bündnistreue and the resulting obligations to support NATO. In 
wanting to prevent a second Srebrenica they placed great importance on 
Germany’s responsibility to make up for past mistakes, not out of 
Germany’s WWII history but out of the rationale of not wanting to allow new 
atrocities. Although NATO acted without a UN mandate the CDU/CSU 
placed greater importance on the ends rather on the means and stabilising 
and bringing peace to the Balkans was an end in accordance with the UN 
Charter. Finally, NATO operations were only the last resort, but when 
Milosevic did not react to any other approach military action was the only 
way to end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo with the West’s credibility 
intact.  
The FDP argumentation 
As the junior partner in the outgoing government at the beginning of 
the Kosovo crisis, the FDP’s position was very close to that of the 
CDU/CSU. In his opening statement the outgoing Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel (FDP) summarised the current situation. Arguing that Serbian 
President Milosevic would only be brought back to the negotiating table 
through the threat of force, he made a strong case for the combat 
operations. 
Referring to Germany’s history, Kinkel argued that not in the past 
Germany had been liberated from tyranny by the use of external force and 
that judging from experiences made during the war in Bosnia, force would 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
144 
 
be needed to bring an end to the Kosovo crisis (Deutscher Bundestag, 
1998n: 23129-23131).  
Taking another approach to legitimising contributing German 
personnel to NATO operations, party chairman Wolfgang Gerhardt pointed 
to the good reputation German soldiers enjoyed amongst their allies; this 
way he clearly aimed at weakening arguments that pointed to any atrocities 
German soldiers committed in the Balkans during WWII. Gerhardt also 
emphasised that for the FDP ending the current crisis – and with this 
protecting and upholding international law as well as human rights – was 
absolutely paramount, even if that meant doing it without a UN mandate 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1998q: 23143). 
In this debate Gerhardt took on a relatively tough stance regarding 
Milosevic’s regime which in turn made him a very clear supporter for NATO. 
Under no circumstances would he allow a “despot to ridicule Western 
democracies”12 and ignore the lessons learned from the 20th century 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1999f: 2426-2427).  
Although speaking as party chairman, Wolfgang Gerhardt did not 
represent his party’s views fully, since numerous FDP members took a 
slightly less aggressive stance. The party’s foreign policy spokesman Ulrich 
Irmer placed more emphasis on Germany’s responsibility to work for peace 
in Europe in close conjunction with both the EU and NATO. Germany would 
be well advised to co-operate with its allies and not follow a new 
Sonderweg (special path). However, at the same time this development is 
not meant to be regarded as a militarisation of German foreign policy and 
                                                 
12
 „Niemals dürfen sie [freiheitlich verfasste Gesellschaften] Despoten erlauben, sie lächerlich zu machen, weil sie 
Skrupel haben“ 
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that in fact a peaceful solution would be much preferred (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1998s: 363). On the discussion regarding the missing UN 
mandate for legitimate military action, Irmer argued that a closer co-
operation between NATO members and Russia would enable the UN 
Security Council to pass the much needed resolution, thus legitimising 
NATO operations (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999o: 3397).  
The FDP therefore supported NATO operations and with this 
German contributions since these operations would help end the crisis in 
Kosovo. Milosevic only reacted to the threat of force and therefore NATO 
had to maintain this threat. Since force would defend international law and 
human rights, a UN mandate would have been preferred but was not 
entirely necessary. In contrast to the CDU/CSU however, members of the 
FDP argued that by bringing Russia back the negotiating table, this 
mandate could still be obtained. Similarly to the CDU/CSU, the FDP made 
only few references to German history but rather concentrated on the 
highlighting the experiences the international community had made in the 
past with Milosevic. Their main arguments therefore centred on protecting 
human rights and international law, rather than Bündnistreue or Germany’s 
troubled past with regards to military operations.  
The SPD argumentation 
Considering that both the FDP and the CDU/CSU had been 
supporters of the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia and the German 
contribution to SFOR, their policies towards resolving the crisis are not 
entirely new. However, the SPD argued along very similar lines. 
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Considering the severe opposition the SPD posed against the set-up of 
SFOR and Germany’s contribution to this mission, this support for NATO 
operations in Kosovo constituted a serious shift in the party’s foreign policy 
outlook. Speaking still as the Prime Minister of Lower Saxony and not yet 
as Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder (SPD) emphasised the need to stop the 
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and to come to a political solution to 
the conflict. Supporting the preparation of NATO’s air operations was 
undisputable since the West could not stand by while human rights are 
being violated systematically, as it had done during Bosnia. Schröder 
therefore introduced a different obligation – not only to NATO but also to 
upholding democratic values – for Germany into the equation. He also 
highlighted Germany’s interest in a stable Balkans, pointing to the 
destabilising effect the refugees – some 300,000 at the time – had in the 
region (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998g: 23136).  
He refused the validity of the argument that German soldiers should 
not be allowed to operate in the Balkans out of historical reasons. On the 
contrary, history demands that a democratic Germany would not ignore 
violations in that part of Europe (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998j: 23137). 
Schröder also makes it very clear that the lack of a clear UN mandate 
legitimising a military operation in Kosovo does not make NATO actions 
illegal, since NATO clearly refers to the UN resolution 1199 and Milosevic’s 
failure to comply with it. Seeing that for Schröder the sole authority for 
legitimising the use of force remains with the United Nations, NATO’s 
reference to the UN resolution to legitimise air strikes acts as a sufficient 
legal framework (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998m: 23137).  
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Similar to Schröder, the new Defence Minister Rudolph Scharping 
argued vehemently for NATO support to end the humanitarian crisis in the 
Balkans. In contrast to Schröder, however, Scharping represented the more 
pragmatic members of his party by repeatedly pointing to the Serbian 
military build-up in the region and quoting the resulting refugee figures. This 
for Scharping clearly showed that Milosevic would not respect any treaty he 
might sign (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999j: 2608). In addition to that, 
Scharping was very much concerned with Germany’s Bündnistreue, 
especially towards NATO, highlighting the BMVg’s traditionally very pro 
NATO stance.  
Finally, the SPD’s then party chairman Peter Struck concentrated on 
the judicial questions regarding any NATO operations. He argued that such 
actions were legitimised, since they upheld international law and human 
rights. The missing UN mandate would have legitimised NATO actions 
further, but this would not prove to be necessary. Furthermore, the only 
reason that the UN Security Council had not been able to pass a resolution 
authorising NATO was that two UNSC members had chosen to veto it out 
of unrelated reasons (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999i: 2580). The respect for 
human rights would outweigh the respect for the veto of those two member 
states. 
Overall, the SPD changed its foreign policy outlook dramatically from 
the previous years, when it was strictly opposed to contributing German 
troops to peace-keeping efforts in the Balkans. During the Kosovo crisis, 
the Schröder SPD argued in support for NATO’s operations mostly on 
humanitarian grounds. Helping to stabilise the region became paramount, 
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with issues such as Bündnistreue playing their part in the equation as well. 
With regards to the legitimacy of military action, the SPD questioned the 
UNSC’s decision on the ground that the two vetoes did not outweigh the 
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. 
The Greens’ argumentation 
For the Greens the Kosovo Crisis was even more controversial 
considering their roots in the peace movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
question of military action in Kosovo tested the Green’s party cohesion, 
effectively splitting the party into two opposing camps: the “Realos” or 
realists led by Joschka Fischer who argued for intervention pointing to 
Germany’s international obligations and the “Fundis” or fundamentalists, 
mostly made up of the parties grass roots and traditionally green MPs such 
as Hans-Christian Ströbele, emphasising the pacifist tradition of the Green 
party and the anti-military tradition in German foreign policy. As it will 
become clear, both sides effectively used the same arguments but differed 
greatly in their interpretations.  
The in-coming Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens) argued 
along similar lines as his coalition partner the SPD placing emphasis on the 
moral and historical commitments, i.e. the need to halt the danger of an 
escalating war in Europe’s periphery and, referring to history – more the 
lessons learned from Bosnia, seldom Germany’s own past – Germany’s 
obligation to stop the genocide (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998p: 23142). 
Humanitarian considerations were at the very core of Fischer’s line of 
argument. However, in contrast to the previously discussed parties, from 
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the very start Fischer placed more importance on the role of non-military 
actors after the fighting had ended. NATO was necessary to end the crisis, 
but would have a limited role in its aftermath. Fischer much more preferred 
solutions centring on institutions such as the EU or the OSCE to perform 
this ‘civilian peace-keeping’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998r: 359).  
Only when NATO started its aerial campaign did Fischer talk of 
Germany’s Bündnistreue. Arguing that Western core principles were being 
violated, Germany was right to act in conjunction with the international 
community, even if that meant resorting to military means as the ‘ultima 
ratio’ to prevent a second Bosnia. However, since this conflict took place in 
Europe, it was upon Europe to solve it, which again showed Fischer’s 
preference for the EU and the OSCE (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999h: 2584-
2585).  
The Greens’ party chairman Rezzo Schlauch neatly summed up the 
‘Realo’ position during the Kosovo crisis when he argued that the traditional 
Green slogan of “No more war” should be changed into “No more 
genocide”, since that would leave the option for military intervention as a 
last resort to prevent genocide open (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999n: 2634). 
Changing that slogan – and acting accordingly – was, however, not 
an option for the ‘Fundies’. They concentrated on the lack of legitimacy for 
military intervention due to the missing UN mandate and the traditionally 
peaceful German foreign policy.  
Speaking for the fundamentalist wing of the party Ludger Volmer 
criticises his party chairman for confusing legitimacy and legality of any 
NATO action (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998e: 23151). Pointing to the lack of 
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a clear UN mandate for NATO to take action, he argues that NATO would 
create a precedent for others to ignore the United Nations as well, thus 
undermining its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Following the 
policy of deterrence would also close all diplomatic options, which were not 
explored to the last extent, since economic sanctions were not enforced 
rigorously enough and other option not even considered such as keeping 
Yugoslavia from participating in the 1998 Football World Cup since this 
would have been a very severe insult to the “megalomaniac dictator” 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1998f: 23152).  
Hans-Christian Ströbele argued along similar lines in that the NATO 
presence in the Balkans made it difficult for the Serbian leadership to agree 
to any peace treaty. A UN peace-keeping force would have been much 
more acceptable and would not have made a diplomatic solution more 
difficult (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999e: 1712).  
After the start of NATO’s campaign Ströbele argued that although 
ignoring the situation in Kosovo was unacceptable, bombs do not solve the 
problem either – in fact the situation only worsened considering that more 
people were being killed and more refugees fled the region. Germany in 
particular should not be part of the operations considering the German 
atrocities in the region during WWII (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999k: 2612). 
Ströbele had clearly come to different conclusion with regards to German 
history than the members of the previously discussed factions in that he did 
not see Germany’s historic obligation to oppose violations of human rights 
and international law but rather concluded that Germany’ historic obligation 
was to prevent any wars with any peaceful means. 
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In essence this difference in conclusion caused the split within the 
Greens. Whereas the ‘Realos’ argued for the necessity of NATO’s 
humanitarian intervention as a last resort with Europeans stepping in 
afterwards to secure the peace, the ‘Fundis’ rejected any use of force out of 
the historical context.  
The PDS argumentation 
In the PDS the Green ‘Fundis’ had a staunch supporter in their 
argumentation against German contribution for a NATO intervention. The 
PDS’s party chairman, Gregor Gysi, placed the blame for the situation in 
Kosovo not only on Milosevic but also on the international community, 
arguing that since the Kosovo had lost its autonomy in 1989 it had been left 
on its own to deal with this situation, thus resulting in a state similar to that 
in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country or indeed Chechnya in that a militia 
has taken up the fight for independence (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998i: 
23145).  
Pointing to the humanitarian arguments put forward by the 
proponents of military action Gysi argues that military action cannot help 
ease the situation, only make it worse, since even the threat of force cause 
humanitarian aid organisations to leave the country. NATO action would 
only exacerbate an already bad situation since it would hinder aid 
organisations to help the people in the region. Deploying the Bundeswehr 
abroad did therefore not only contribute to worsening the situation, the PDS 
also opposed this because of historical reasons and out of concern that 
German foreign policy would be – again as prior to WWII – militarised. As a 
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core concern however, Gysi points to the lack of a UN mandate, the most 
important issue in this debate for this qualified lawyer (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1998l: 23146).  
As NATO acted without a legitimising UN mandate, this self-
mandating process could cause a precedent for undermining the UN’s 
authority and with this the overall post-war world order. According to MP 
Uwe-Jens Heuer, the principle of “power before law” was irrevocably 
established in international relations (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998o: 23160).  
Whereas previously examined factions had also at times criticised 
NATO for acting without the UN’s backing, the PDS argued that since only 
the UN can legitimise the use of force under very strict circumstances – 
none of which were given in Kosovo – NATO was infringing on another 
nation’s sovereignty and was therefore conducting a war of aggression. In 
this case Germany would not be allowed to contribute any troops, as the 
Grundgesetz only allows for the Bundeswehr to be deployed for defensive 
purposes. The advocates of military action were therefore not only in 
breach of international law but also in breach of the constitution (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1998u: 364).  
Even if Milosevic were to sign a peace treaty, this treaty would not be 
legally binding. As had been pointed out by numerous MPs, the purpose of 
the NATO build-up and operations was to force Milosevic to sign a peace 
treaty. By referring to civil law, Gysi explains that contracts made under the 
threat of force lose their legality and the same is true for international law 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1999d: 1708).  
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On a less legal note, Gysi also addressed the humanitarian 
arguments put forward in the Bundestag debates. Since NATO actions had 
been justified by pointing to the on-going genocide in Kosovo, Gysi argued 
that NATO overlooked humanitarian violations within its own ranks – after 
all NATO member “Turkey had been organising a humanitarian catastrophe 
within its own borders for decades”13 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999l: 2588). 
NATO therefore lacked the credibility due to its perceived double standards 
in this matter. 
Also NATO would not contain this crisis, rather its involvement would 
destabilise the region as a whole. Countries such as Albania and 
Macedonia would be brought into the conflict since NATO would station its 
Extraction Force and other military personnel to help the OSCE verify the 
retreat of Serbian forces there, making those two countries vulnerable for 
Serbian attacks. Even though this verification mission was to be conducted 
with unarmed NATO aircrafts – a fact especially Joschka Fischer pointed 
out repeatedly – the PDS voiced severe concern about pulling the 
neighbouring countries into the essentially domestic conflict (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1998t: 364).  
In summary, the PDS’s position on the crisis in Kosovo centred very 
much on legal considerations, such as the missing UN backing as well as 
the Government’s breach of the Grundgesetz. The party did not follow the 
argument that NATO was acting out of humanitarian motives, since it had 
overlooked humanitarian violations within its own ranks for decades. For the 
PDS, NATO was therefore severely lacking credibility. As a final point they 
                                                 
13
 “Die Türkei ist Mitglied der NATO und macht jetzt bei der Abwendung einer humanitären Katastrophe mit, 
während sie seit Jahrzehnten eine schlimme humanitäre Katastrophe im eigenen Land organisiert.“ 
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were concerned with pulling in uninvolved countries such as Macedonia 
and Albania by stationing any military personnel there. 
It has to be said at this point that although the debates in the 
Bundestag were unusually heated and centred on political, moral, legal and 
historical considerations, the debate amongst the general public was less 
controversial.  
The public debate on Kosovo 
As has been shown at the beginning of this chapter NATO’s combat 
operation ‘Allied Force’, was primarily an aerial campaign which took 
advantage of NATO’s air supremacy over Yugoslavia. The benefit of 
restricting the combat missions to air strikes was that it entailed the smallest 
possible risk for NATO personnel, thus keeping the casualties in its ranks 
low, while at the same time be able to use the aircrafts’ laser-guided 
missiles to minimise civilian casualties. Therefore by trying to keep the 
overall numbers of casualties down, national governments aimed at 
keeping the public support for the operation high. 
This rationale also worked in Germany with the vast majority of the 
German population supporting the air campaign against Serbia in April 
1999 (61%) as well as NATO’s position to continue the campaign until 
Milosevic has agreed to a ceasefire (57%) – the support for NATO’s 
position was even higher in former West Germany (65%). However, the 
already debated extension of the operation Allied Force to include ground 
forces was very much rejected by the public (68%) (Hilmer et al., 2011a: 1-
3). German ground troops would most likely result in casualties which the 
German population is even less prepared for than other nationalities. The 
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zero-casualty objective issued by NATO (Boyer, 2002: 39) and the 
concentration on an air campaign was incremental for this relatively strong 
support. 
The drawback for NATO of restricting itself to this single strategy was 
that it was effectively perceived as not being completely committed to 
protecting the Kosovo-Albanians since it would refuse to put its own troops 
(especially ground troops) into harm’s way. As Boyer points out, this 
‘casualty-aversion syndrome’ reduced the overall effectiveness of Operation 
Allied Force as the desire to minimise losses ruled heavily protected 
Serbian military installations out as targets for air strikes (Boyer, 2002: 39). 
Although the figures of public support seem to be relatively surprising 
given the traditional anti-war stance in the German society, it can be 
explained with the same main point already highlighted in the parliamentary 
debates, i.e. the need to prevent genocide on Europe’s doorstep. This was 
further supported by the fact that 68% of the population blamed the Serbian 
government for the escalation of the conflict (Hilmer et al., 2011a: 4).  
The longer operation Allied Force went on, this support declined 
within only three months with only 51% supporting the campaign in May 
1999 (Hilmer et al., 2011c: 1) and in June support dropped to only 47% 
(Hilmer et al., 2011b: 10). One could argue that the traditional anti-war 
stance had taken hold again and that the German population was beginning 
to reject the bombing campaign out of pacifist motives. However, the 
continuous media broadcasts showing not only air strikes on military targets 
but also Serbian civilian casualties is a more persuasive reason for this 
change in support.  
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Although support for Operation Allied Force was diminishing 
amongst the population this does not mean that Germany saw many anti-
war demonstrations. Rather, the longer NATO’s operation went on the less 
interested did the German public become. Most Germans took on the role 
of spectators who followed the war from the comfort of their homes but did 
no longer get engaged in the matter. It can therefore be said that the 
German population developed a certain benign indifference towards the 
Bundeswehr. However difficult this is for the soldiers involved, the overall 
lack of a public debate shows that the German public too had come to 
realise the need for international intervention in Kosovo (Clement, 2010: 4-
5).  
Although this benign indifference is helpful in determining the 
acceptance of out-of-area operations amongst the general public, it has 
severe effects on the soldiers. Only around 10% of soldiers feel they are 
supported in their jobs by the public while only some 4% feel supported by 
the politicians who sent them on the operation in the first place (Strohmeier, 
2007: 47-51). This shows that although Germans seemed to have come to 
terms with the need for international interventions in general, they did not 
engage in a public debate about what the first combat operation of German 
troops post WWII actually meant. This lack of debate also had 
consequences for the military operation in Kosovo itself.  
In the case of Germany, the consequences for the military 
highlighted a factor which was almost irrelevant to its allies. The question 
was whether the Bundeswehr would be able to take on the following task of 
contributing to the peace-keeping force that would have to stabilise the 
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region after the aerial campaign had been concluded. Although the 
Bundeswehr had already gathered some experience in this field in Bosnia, 
the extremely tense situation in Kosovo would add another difficulty to the 
general mix of peace-keeping missions. 
In the light of preparing for KFOR and assessing its overall 
objectives it quickly became clear that the Bundeswehr lacked the training 
in some core elements. Peace-keeping missions would demand a different 
set of skills as the traditional territorial defence. In essence, troops now had 
to be able to prevent the use of force whereas they originally been trained 
to execute force in a defensive scenario (Clement, 2004: 2). In order to 
compensate for these missing skills, the Bundeswehr adopted new training 
courses to better prepare the troops for this new scenario they would 
encounter in Kosovo. These courses incorporated local cultural studies as 
well as local history and customs to provide a better understanding of the 
local population. The military part of these new training programs 
concentrated very much on de-escalating a tense situation and, should that 
prove impossible, resorting to the use of force. This was uncharted territory 
for the Bundeswehr and therefore the effectiveness of these training 
courses were untested and would have to be evaluated during the actual 
mission (Clement, 2010: 8). This situation can hardly be called ideal. 
Not only were the actual troops relatively unprepared for the mission, 
the Bundeswehr also faced considerable problems in organisational terms. 
As has been outlined in Chapter 3, the Bundeswehr had already undergone 
profound reform since 1990 and by 1999 it had been divided into two main 
components; the Krisenreaktionskräfte (KRK) and the 
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Hauptverteidigungskräfte (HVK), of which the first was specifically designed 
to tackle out-of-area missions whereas the latter would support the KRK 
logistically as well as maintain a defensive readiness (territorial defence 
was still the primary task of the Bundeswehr – see Chapter 3).  
In the case of the Kosovo, the KRK was the component that would 
be charged with contributing to KFOR as well as maintaining its presence in 
Germany’s other already running peace-keeping mission in Bosnia SFOR. 
Considering the KRK was only some 50,000 troops strong and the overall 
contingent for both missions in the Balkans totalled some 12,000, the KRK 
was very close to being overstretched. It has to be noted here, that the total 
number of troops for any mission needs to be multiplied by three, since 
while one contingent is involved with the current mission, another 
contingent is already preparing to take over and the last contingent is in the 
follow-up process or simply regenerating. In the case of specialist 
personnel, such as engineers and medical staff, the Bundeswehr was 
severely overstretched resulting in these specialists having to cope with the 
biggest strain. However, not only the KRK was experiencing difficulties but 
also the HVK was having problems supporting the contingents as the actual 
amount of support had been underestimated while setting up this structure. 
Needless to say that the HVK had to shift its priorities in order to keep up 
with the demand which resulted in neglect of other tasks, primarily in 
training (Clement, 2010: 8).  
Finally, the Bundeswehr displayed some shortcomings in organising 
the first contingents for KFOR. General Klaus Reinhardt, NATO’s 
commanding officer of the second KFOR contingent (KFOR II), made his 
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fair share of experiences when preparing for his takeover of KFOR 
command. KFOR I had set up its headquarter in temporary 
accommodations, which had served it well. But since KFOR II would 
operate during the winter, Reinhardt was very much concerned to acquire 
something sturdier. Also, Reinhardt had to cope with the fact that he would 
have to organise his own command and control equipment since the British 
troops responsible for this during KFOR I would return home and, more 
importantly, take their equipment with them (Reinhardt, 2002: 31).  
Although he succeeded in acquiring the above mentioned 
equipment, he still lacked much needed transportation, especially 
helicopters and a plane to travel to Germany or NATO for strategic 
meetings. He argues that this seriously damaged his effectiveness as a 
military commander as getting to these meetings took much longer than 
necessary, thus wasting time. And since both his predecessor and his 
successors were all provided with a plane by their respective governments, 
Reinhardt’s situation caused some irritation amongst the NATO partners 
(Reinhardt, 2002: 33). Considering this was the most senior officer in 
Kosovo, the situation for lower ranks was most likely even worse. 
However, this only highlights one of Reinhardt’s main points of 
criticism during the preparation of KFOR II, that he was not fully supported 
by the political decision-makers in Bonn. When consulting Rudolf Scharping 
regarding the political future of the Kosovo, he was told to concentrate on 
the military leadership of his troops and not get involved in politics. 
Considering the complex goals of KFOR (see beginning of this chapter), 
this piece of advice would be difficult at best to follow and more importantly 
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would keep KFOR II from supporting any long-time political developments, 
thus limiting its effectiveness (Reinhardt, 2002: 35). This episode, however, 
nurtures the feeling of many soldiers that the politicians send them on a 
mission without really offering the necessary support which would translate 
into adequate equipment and operational planning. 
In summary, it has become clear that NATO’s politically motivated 
strategy to keep casualties to a minimum though successful, diminished the 
effectiveness of the air strikes. However, the core military debate in 
Germany centred on the main question whether the Bundeswehr would be 
able to fulfil its tasks. The Bundeswehr had to overcome considerable 
difficulties in structure, equipment and organisation to be able to contribute 
to KFOR and, as can be seen in the changes made with the armed forces 
afterwards, has learned from these experiences. 
Summary 
KFOR’s mission was to stabilise and secure Kosovo, to allow 
refugees to return to their homes. Furthermore, it should help to establish a 
peaceful co-existence between the Albanian majority and the Serbian 
minority. Depending on the definition of ‘secure’ and ‘stable’ one can argue 
that KFOR succeeded. The Serbian attacks against the Kosovo Albanians 
were stopped by Operation Allied Force and KFOR’s presence has 
prohibited any further atrocities. In fact, in can be argued that Kosovo’s 
independence guarantees security and stability for future generations since 
it eliminates the cause of ethnic conflict within the single state of Serbia. In 
this light, KFOR will be able to reduce its numbers rather quickly. 
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However, the incidents during 2004 clearly show that Kosovo is still 
not a stable region. Considering the relatively small cause that lead to large 
scale riots, one can see that tensions still run deep amongst the population. 
Seeing it from this perspective, KFOR has not succeeded in securing 
Kosovo and more importantly has not been able to provide for a peaceful 
co-existence between Serbs and Albanians. However, as of 2010, pulling 
KFOR out of Kosovo has not appeared on any agenda, KFOR will remain in 
Kosovo giving it ample opportunity to complete its mission. 
The mission in Kosovo has shown that although parliamentarians in 
general have come to terms with the idea of Germany being a more 
assertive player in international relations, this change in attitude did not 
come easily with the reasons for this change differing amongst the 
individual parties, ranging from the importance of Bündnistreue to 
Germany’s special responsibilities to stop genocide in Europe. The different 
reasons for the parliamentary support of the mission thus resulted in a very 
strict Bundestag mandate compromising on the different politicians’ 
perceptions, limiting the Bundeswehr in its ability to react to unforeseen 
developments and thus inhibiting its efficiency. Furthermore, considering 
that the interpretations of the Bundeswehr tasks within KFOR differed 
amongst parliamentarians the Bundeswehr was lacking important 
equipment necessary to fulfil the eventual tasks, as exemplified by the 
shortage of command and control equipment.  
Similarly, the general public supported the government in this 
course, at least initially. Both operation Allied Force and NATO’s 
uncompromising position towards the Serbian leadership resonated well 
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amongst the German population. With the continuation of hostilities and the 
growing number of reports about civilian casualties in spite of high-tech 
missiles the mood shifted resulting in a loss of support for the mission. And 
although the air campaign was at first strongly supported, a possible 
deployment of ground forces was rejected from the start. This clearly shows 
that Germans saw the need for intervention yet at the same time were not 
prepared to take the risks that go hand in hand with military operations. This 
was not a purely ‘civilian’ point of view as NATO Command itself was very 
much interested to stick to aerial bombardment as long as possible to 
minimise the risk of NATO casualties. Although this was very 
understandable it limited the options for the military planners. 
What the mission in Kosovo also highlighted was that once the initial 
combat operations had been completed and the population had gotten 
accustomed to the idea of German planes contributing to a combat 
operation, the general public developed a benign indifference towards the 
operation and the Bundeswehr in general. Although this is rather alarming 
in itself it becomes worse as this benign indifference is also transferred to 
the public’s representatives in the Bundestag which then can have an 
impact on funding and adequate equipment. Since members of the armed 
forces openly criticise this lack of support it shows that this is of serious 
concern for them. 
Germany’s contribution to KFOR was thus inhibited in its 
effectiveness by a mandate which basically represented the lowest 
common denominator of the different positions on the subject. Added to this 
the benign indifference ensured that operational problems were not 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
163 
 
addressed adequately by decision makers in the Bundestag. The effect of 
this limited Bundeswehr efficiency was that although KFOR has been 
perceived as an overall success, Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit was in fact 
damaged. How reliable a partner is Germany if it inhibits its armed forces to 
conduct the mission as efficiently as possible? 
Whereas Kosovo was still a moderately unproblematic operation the 
Bundeswehr would soon be presented with a new mission, which since 
2002 has taken away some of the attention from KFOR. With the ousting of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and the international reconstruction effort the 
Bundeswehr has been sent to a more distant and also more dangerous 
area. The following chapter will therefore analyse Germany’s contribution to 
ISAF to see how the reformed Bundeswehr fares under more dangerous 
circumstances. 
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Chapter 5 – The Bundeswehr in Afghanistan 
“Some time ago I spoke of „Defence at the Hindu Kusch“. In 
fact, today defence does not only incorporate defending the national 
borders whereas territorial defence must remain possible. What we 
need is defence appropriate for these times, […] That is why our 
military commitment in Afghanistan is not only indispensable because 
we help the people in that oppressed country to have a perspective for 
their future after decades of war. Rather it is in our very own security 
interest to deprive international terrorism, which threatens all of us 
directly, of its important hiding places and training grounds”14. – Peter 
Struck (Struck, 2003: 5) 
The Kosovo Crisis was the first out-of-area mission for the 
Bundeswehr which featured actual combat operations. It was therefore a 
significant point in the development of the Bundeswehr from the traditionally 
defensive force to a tool for armed intervention. However, only three years 
after Kosovo, the Bundeswehr was sent outside the boundaries of Europe 
initially as support for the nation building of Afghanistan in 2002. 
This chapter will study the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan under 
the same criteria set out in the previous chapter, i.e. the actual mission 
objectives, the number and nature of troops deployed, the nature of the 
equipment deployed, the command structure of the mission and the 
financial commitment by the Federal Government. It will also give a 
summary of the developments during its already eight years of duration and 
conclude with a brief evaluation of the mission. In doing so, it will be 
                                                 
14
 „Ich habe vor einiger Zeit von der "Verteidigung am Hindukusch" gesprochen. Tatsächlich umfasst Verteidigung 
heute mehr als Verteidigung an den Landesgrenzen, wobei Landesverteidigung grundsätzlich auch weiterhin 
möglich bleiben muss. Was wir brauchen ist eine zeitgemäße Verteidigung, [...] So ist unser militärisches 
Engagement in Afghanistan nicht nur deshalb unverzichtbar, weil wir den Menschen in diesem geschundenen 
Land helfen, nach Jahrzehnten von Krieg und Bürgerkrieg wieder eine Perspektive für die Zukunft zu gewinnen. 
Vielmehr liegt es in unserem ureigensten sicherheitspolitischen Interesse, dem internationalen Terrorismus, der 
uns alle unmittelbar bedroht, sein wichtigstes Rückzugs- und Ausbildungsgebiet dauerhaft zu entziehen.“ – Peter 
Struck 
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possible to determine as to how well the Bundeswehr has been prepared 
for its first non-European intervention. 
It has to be noted at this point, that this chapter will concentrate on 
Germany’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), since the Bundeswehr’s involvement in the US-led Operation 
“Enduring Freedom” (OEF), which aims at combating international terrorism 
in general, is limited to naval patrols at the Horn of Africa. 
The Context of ISAF 
Any study of ISAF and Germany’s contribution to this mission will 
have to start with the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and 
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Islamic terrorists succeeded in taking 
over four commercial airplanes and crashed two of them into the Twin 
Towers, one into the Pentagon and one missed its target and crashed into a 
field in Maryland with a combined death toll of some 3,000. These attacks 
shocked the world and caused widespread support and solidarity with the 
United States, who immediately set out to identify those responsible for this 
attack. 
Not long thereafter, the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda and its head 
Osama Bin Laden were blamed for 9/11. Since both the organisation and its 
leader were harboured by in Afghanistan, preparations were made primarily 
by the United States to free this country from its Taliban regime. By late 
2001 US forces in conjunction with the Afghan Northern Alliance – a sizable 
group which had traditionally been opposed to the Taliban regime – 
succeeded in ousting the Taliban (NATO, 2009a: 1). This opened the path 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
166 
 
for the international community to engage in rebuilding Afghanistan with the 
overall goal to rid Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from this safe haven. 
During the Petersberg Conference of December 2001 – named after 
a hill near Bonn on which the German government maintains a conference 
centre – the largest ethnic groups of Afghanistan and representatives from 
Western states agreed on ‘provisional regulations in Afghanistan up to the 
re-establishment of a permanent government’ (Presse- und 
Informationszentrum Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, 2009b: 
2). This agreement forms the basis of the United Nations Resolution 1386, 
which authorises the establishment of an ‘International Security Assistance 
Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security 
in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as 
well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure 
environment’ (United Nations, 2001: 2). The Bundeswehr has been part of 
ISAF from the very start stationing some 1,200 troops in Kabul under ISAF 
command (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001c: 4). With the further development 
of ISAF, the German contingent took over responsibility for Northern 
Afghanistan (Regional Command North – RC North) and established its 
bases in Feyzabad, Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif. 
Objectives of ISAF 
As already pointed out, the UN Security Council’s resolution 1386 
defines the overall objective for ISAF, i.e. to assist the Afghan Interim 
Authority (later the Afghan government) in the establishment of a secure 
and stable environment. Although this appears to be a rather straight 
forward mission objective, it in fact breaks down to a series of objectives. In 
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order to achieve security in Afghanistan ISAF is tasked training and 
supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – comprised by 
both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP). Training in conducted using ISAF’s Operational Mentoring and 
Liaison Teams (OMLTs), which are embedded in ANA units. The OMLTs 
join those units once they have undergone basic training at the Kabul 
Military Training Centre (KMTC). This way, a large number of troops can be 
trained and brought to operational readiness in a relatively short period of 
time (NATO, 2009e: 2).  
Similarly, the ANP is supported by ISAF primarily on the tactical and 
planning level to better be suited for taking on policing tasks on its own. 
Most importantly, the ANP in conjunction with ISAF is involved in the 
disarming illegally armed groups (DIAGs) and in engaging in counter-
narcotics operations, thus attempting to make Afghanistan more secure.  
Security is also the main concern of ISAF’s Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs). These joint civilian and military teams provide much needed 
reconstruction and development (R&D) throughout their allocated areas, 
with the civilian part being responsible for the actual R&D, while the military 
secures the civilian effort (NATO, 2009e: 4). R&D however, encompasses 
more than just building schools and wells (although that is an important 
aspect of it); it also incorporates political / diplomatic, economic, 
humanitarian and social work thus assisting the central Afghan Government 
to address more readily the population’s needs. In summary, the PRTs 
overall tasks include but are not limited to the building of irrigation ditches, 
pipelines, reservoirs, building and repairing infrastructure to improve 
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mobility and communication and medical services for the local population 
(NATO, 2009e: 4). 
ISAF’s approach to achieving the overall objective of securing and 
stabilising Afghanistan is therefore a two track approach. On the one hand 
ISAF trains and assists the ANSF to provide security from remnant Taliban 
fighters or insurgents while at the same time attempting to win over the 
population by improving its overall situation. 
German Military Deployment in Afghanistan 
German deployment in Afghanistan has been subjected to 
considerable change since the first Bundeswehr troops set foot in Kabul in 
December 2001. The mandate has been widened over the years to account 
for the developments in Afghanistan but also to enable the Bundeswehr to 
shoulder new tasks in the region. 
Initially Germany sent 1,200 troops to Kabul to help the Afghan 
Interim Authority and UN personnel work in a safe environment. Their 
mandate clearly set out the tasks of the Bundeswehr in Kabul which 
encompassed the actual logistical effort to get to and out of Afghanistan 
(including preparations for self evacuation in case of an emergency), self 
protection as well as securing Kabul and its immediately surrounding area. 
For this, the initial contingent was made up from mostly infantry forces, 
supported by helicopters, logistical forces (including air transport) as well as 
liaison personnel for the international headquarters and regional 
organisations. The forces were authorised to make use of military force, to 
fulfil the mission set out in the UNSR’s resolution 1386. This did not infringe 
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on their right to act in self-defence or in conducting armed help for third 
parties (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001b: 3-4). 
German forces were restricted to the area in and around the city of 
Kabul. German forces were allowed into other areas only under very 
specific circumstances, including talks for co-ordinating efforts with locals 
and for logistical reasons. The overall financial burden for this operation 
was estimated to be some 340 million Euros for the first six months. 
Compared to the initial costs of the Kosovo Crisis, this is remarkably high, 
showing the greater difficulties of logistics, i.e getting everything to Kabul 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a: 4).  
In June 2002, the Federal Government pressed for a continuation of 
Germany’s contribution to ISAF. Although the actual framework of the first 
mandate was not changed considerably, it is interesting to note that the limit 
of troop numbers was to be put up by another 200, albeit be it only as a 
temporary measure. The Government needed those extra troops to secure 
the Afghan Emergency Loya Jirga, an assembly which would establish the 
interim government. The Federal Government had already sent an 
additional 80 troops for this purpose without the consent of the Bundestag, 
which was expected to approve at a later time (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2002a: 1). This clearly shows that firm security had not yet been 
established to such an extent that Afghan officials could gather without the 
fear of terrorist attacks. On the financial front, the overall costs were to be 
around 96 million Euros, a clear drop in costs once the troops and their 
equipment were in place (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002b: 1). 
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With the United Nations Security Council’s resolution 1510 (2003), 
ISAF was authorised to expand its area of influence to the whole of 
Afghanistan stressing “the importance of extending central government 
authority to all parts of Afghanistan, of comprehensive disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of all armed factions, and of security sector 
reform including reconstitution of the new Afghan National Army and Police” 
(United Nations, 2003: 1). In effect, ISAF was still charged with the same 
tasks as set out above, yet now the whole of Afghanistan was its 
responsibility.  
In line with this, the Federal Government secured the agreement of 
the Bundestag to take over the PRT Kunduz in Northern Afghanistan in 
addition to the on-going commitment in Kabul. This also meant that the 
Bundeswehr would need more personnel if it were to take on this new task. 
It is therefore not surprising that the Bundesregierung increased the overall 
number of troops to 2,250, almost twice as many as had been stationed 
initially in Kabul. Interestingly enough though only some 450 of those 2,250 
were assigned to the PRT Kunduz, which in turn means that the contingent 
in Kabul was strengthened by some 600 troops through the backdoor, a 
build-up that would cost some 233.6 million Euros for the next twelve 
months (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003b: 2).  
2003 also saw a change in command since NATO assumed 
leadership over ISAF and brought to an end the six-month national rotation 
of command. This way ISAF became more effective since the search for a 
new lead nation every six months, combined with setting up a new 
headquarter each time, was abandoned with NATO becoming responsible 
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for all issues related to command, co-ordination and planning. This also had 
another positive side effect since now smaller states which were less likely 
to assume the role of lead nation were enabled to play a more dominant 
role in the new multilateral headquarters (NATO, 2009e: 6).  
This change of command is also reflected in the Bundesregierung’s 
motion of 2003 to continue operations in Afghanistan. It clearly states that 
ISAF is now under the command of NATO, which in turn means that the 
Bundeswehr contingent is under NATO command as well, a situation the 
German military is very well accustomed to (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003a: 
3).  
In 2005 the Federal Government motioned to increase the overall 
number of troops, this time to a total of 3,000 to be stationed both in 
Kunduz and Kabul. Their mandate also included a clause which would allow 
the government to station them in other areas temporarily for the purpose of 
expanding ISAF’s area of influence. The Bundesregierung estimated the 
overall costs of the ISAF contribution to be some 318.8 million Euros, which 
were already covered in the budget (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005c: 3). The 
same motion also highlights Germany’s approach to the increasingly 
disturbing problem of drug production in Afghanistan. According to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) “Opium Survey” of 
2004, the continuation of excessive opium poppy cultivation posed a grave 
threat to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Although ISAF’s mission 
objectives include counter-narcotics (see above), the Bundesregierung 
emphasises that combating opium production in Afghanistan is not part of 
the Bundeswehr mandate. It is rather the Bundeswehr’s objective to provide 
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a secure environment in which Afghan counter-narcotic forces van be 
trained which will then engage this problem themselves (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2005a: 8). It can be argued that the Bundesregierung did not 
want to provoke repercussions from the drug producing parties in 
Afghanistan, which would have endangered the German troops on the 
ground. Although by helping in training the ANSF in counter-narcotics the 
Bundeswehr acted in accordance with the overall ISAF mandate, this issue 
caused a rift amongst the international community since some nations, like 
the Great Britain, took a much more active stance on this. 
By 2007, the Bundeswehr’s centre of operation was concentrated 
even further in Northern Afghanistan by assuming command over additional 
bases for new PRTs in Faisabad and Mazar-e Sharif, the latter also 
becoming the base for the six RECCE Tornado aircrafts and their 
maintenance crew of some 500. NATO had requested additional 
reconnaissance capacities for Afghanistan to improve the alliance’s overall 
picture of ongoing operations. Their task is to monitor ISAF patrols, 
operation areas of PRTs as well as identify enemy emplacements and 
movements (BMVg, 2008: 1-2). In 2007 these Tornados are therefore the 
only German units operating not only in the north, which lead to some 
heated discussions in the Bundestag, which will be examined in the 
following chapter.  
In addition to providing a base for the RECCE Tornados, Mazar-e 
Sharif is also home to the Deployment Squadron Mazar-e Sharif 
(Einsatzgeschwader – EinsG MeS). This unit has a number of 
responsibilities some which are logistical support for ISAF, medical 
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evacuation (MedEvac), handling passenger and cargo traffic, monitoring the 
11km air control zone around Mazar-e Sharif with German and Afghan air 
traffic controllers as well as providing runway emergency maintenance and 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) (BMVg, 2009b: 2).  
In order to be able to provide these additional capabilities, the 
German contingent would have to be enlarged yet again from 3000 by 500 
to 3,500 in total. Since those extra 500 troops are primarily assigned to the 
EinsG MeS in Mazar-e Sharif, the PRT in Kunduz was not re-enforced and 
the PRT in Faisabad was staffed with troops made available by limiting 
contributions to Kabul to a bare minimum. Again, this new build-up is also 
reflected in the financial costs of the contribution, which had arrived at some 
487 million Euros in 2007 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007: 1-3).  
However controversial the Bundesregierung’s decision to provide the 
RECCE Tornados to ISAF was, in 2008 the then Minister of Defence Dr. 
Franz Josef Jung announced that the Bundeswehr was to take over 
NATO’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from Norway. This special force was 
to be designed to take on operations all over Afghanistan – similar to the 
Tornados – including patrols, security operations, evacuations, combat 
search and rescue and combat operations in conjunction with the ANSF. It 
was also intended as a tactical reserve should they be needed during any 
ongoing ISAF operation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008c: 2). In effect, QRF is 
a highly mobile combat force for quick operation throughout Afghanistan. 
Again, the debates revolving around this topic were very controversial and 
shall be discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
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Considering the combat orientated nature of the QRF’s missions, it is 
hardly surprising that the Bundesregierung assigned troops from combat 
units to the force, namely making use of mechanised infantry, paratroopers 
and up to eight members of the special forces. Their equipment 
encompassed armoured vehicles of various types, depending on the actual 
mission parameters as well as access to the six helicopters stationed in 
Mazar-e Sharif (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008d: 2).  
Apart from assuming the responsibility of QRF, the 2008 Bundestag 
mandate featured another major change; that of overall troop numbers, 
which were again raised by a considerable figure. Whereas in 2007 some 
3,500 German soldiers served in Afghanistan, one year later that number 
was increased by another 1,000 to 4,500. This was deemed necessary due 
to the additional tasks taken on by the Bundeswehr, including QRF but 
more importantly because of an increased need to train more ANSF in the 
run-up to the 2009 presidential election. Again, the enlarged budgetary 
commitment to ISAF of some 688.1 million Euros reflect that troop build-up 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2008a: 4-6).  
ISAF’s Command Structure 
Since Germany’s contribution to ISAF is under the command of 
NATO, it is now necessary to analyse the structure the Alliance has set up 
for ISAF. It has to be said here, that the structure discussed here is not the 
original structure which was in place in 2003, when NATO assumed 
command over the mission. Originally NATO used a structure similar to its 
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Although this worked well at the beginning, 
this structure could no longer cope with a mission that has grown from an 
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initial strength of 19,600 to more than 60,000 troops today (NATO, 2009b: 
1).  
NATO directs ISAF from its Allied Command Operations (ACO), 
based within Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in 
Mons, Brussels, which provides the overall command for ISAF. Its 
subordinate office is the Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) in Brunssum, 
The Netherlands, which is responsible for the day-to-day operational 
planning as well as providing for force commanders and headquarters. The 
higher operational headquarters, ISAF HQ, situated in Kabul, is headed by 
a 4-star US general (COMISAF), who focuses on the strategic political-
military aspect of ISAF, co-ordinating ISAF operations with the Afghan 
authorities or other international organisations as well as also taking on the 
role of the Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan (NATO, 2009b: 1). This 
allows for a closer co-ordination between ISAF and the US-led “Operation: 
Enduring Freedom” (OEF). Although due to the double role of the 
COMISAF, this role will always be filled with an US commander, the 
headquarter as such draws its staff from both NATO members and nations 
contributing to ISAF (NATO, 2009c: 1).  
The COMISAF is a direct superior to the commander of the NATO 
Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), the Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) and the commander of ISAF Joint Command (IJC) 
It is IJC which is responsible for executing all the tactical operations 
throughout Afghanistan on a day-to-day basis. Its commander (COMIJC) is 
also responsible for the five individual Regional Commands (RCs), the 
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subordinate PRTs and for co-ordinating ISAF and ANSF operations (NATO, 
2009b: 1).  
The PRTs as such are structured to provide a command and control 
headquarter (C2) as well as a forward support base (FSB) to serve as a 
logistics and medical hub for the PRTs in the respective region (NATO, 
2009d. 1). This also means that apart from the actual forces necessary to 
fulfil ISAF’s core tasks, any lead nation of a PRT would also have to supply 
the troops to operate their FSB. 
 
Figure 11: ISAF Command Structure 
Although ISAF’s command structure is relatively straight forward 
considering the size of the operation, it does not explicitly show any national 
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how national considerations are incorporated. These considerations will on 
the most part not actually influence NATO’s ISAF policy, yet they will 
revolve around which units in particular to send and which commanders to 
use.  
In the case of Germany, these considerations are made within 
branch of the Armed Forces Support (SKB – see chapter 3). More 
specifically, the Bundeswehr set up its own ‘mission control’, the 
Einsatzführungskommando (EinsFüKdoBw) near the city of Potsdam in 
2001. This Mission Command Centre co-ordinates the planning with the 
units in question and other national headquarters and monitors the 
execution of all of the Bundeswehr’s missions. It processes all the requests 
from the individual contingents ranging from personnel to equipment 
questions (Presse- und Informationszentrum Einsatzführungskommando 
der Bundeswehr, 2009a: 6). Taking the chain of command illustrated below 
into account, it becomes clear that national military decisions only take 
influence on a relatively low level of the ISAF command structure. The 
national contingent receives its orders from both the EinsFüKdoBw and the 
multinational headquarters, in the case of ISAF, IJC, whereas the 
EinsFüKdoBw is primarily concerned with providing the contingent with 
what they need to fulfil the orders coming from IJC (Presse- und 
Informationszentrum Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, 2009a: 
7).  
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Figure 12: Germany’s national Mission Command Structure 
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attempting to disarm an old Russian missile. Although it had been claimed 
that this was an accident at first, evidence soon surfaced that Taliban 
insurgents had rigged the missile (Spiegel Online, 2009b: 1). In this 
incidence, ISAF in general and the German contribution to it in particular 
took a heavy blow in their public support after only a very short time, 
because it had become clear that Afghanistan would be far more dangerous 
than had been anticipated. 
The Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies would not surrender easily and 
continued attacking ISAF forces, without distinguishing between the 
contributing nations. This effectively meant that Bundeswehr troops were 
just as in danger as their US of British counterparts, a fact that was reported 
on widely (Spiegel Online, 2009d: 1). The Bundesregierung reassured the 
public regularly that the north of Afghanistan is comparatively safe, thus 
setting the whole Bundeswehr mission into perspective with what other 
nations were enduring. However, although between 2002 and 2007 the 21 
German soldiers killed in Afghanistan cannot be compared to the number of 
casualties from the United States or the UK, they were enough to raise 
questions regarding the ISAF contribution within Germany (Spiegel Online, 
2009c: 1).  
This inequality in carrying the burden of stabilising Afghanistan 
caused severe discontent amongst other ISAF nations, most notably those 
assigned to the much more violent south, where the Taliban had 
established a strong foothold. When ISAF HQ started planning to assign 
German troops to the south in 2006 – since German troops were by that 
time under direct NATO command, this was militarily possible – German 
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Minister of Defence Franz Josef Jung soon mirrored the general 
bewilderment in Berlin. The Bundeswehr had just taken responsibility for 
RC(N), surely NATO could not expect more. In addition to that, the 
Bundestag mandate passed in 2005 also stated that German Troops could 
be used temporarily in other areas than the north (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2005b: 3). Legally, NATO had all the rights to re-assign at least some of the 
German troops and still be in compliance with Berlin’s mandate. When 
information about these plans leaked to the opposition in the Bundestag the 
continuation of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan was endangered 
(Wittrock, 2009: 2). Interestingly, the Bundestag’s mandate for 2007 
included the deployment of the RECCE Tornado aircrafts which was later 
followed by Germany taking over NATO’s QRF from Norway. Since both 
the Tornados and the QRF are used across Afghanistan this can be 
interpreted as a bargain struck by the Bundesregierung to keep its troops in 
the comparatively safe north. 
These external factors helped to make the Bundeswehr’s 
commitment the most controversial one in its history, self-made scandals 
contributed to this considerably. In late 2006, photographs of soldiers taken 
in 2003 desecrating remains they had found while on patrol, caused 
widespread disgust and even more concern for the safety of the soldiers 
currently stationed in Afghanistan. These photos, which were also widely 
broadcast in the Arab world, severely damaged the image of the 
Bundeswehr as an organisation wanting to help the Afghan people (Spiegel 
Online, 2009h: 1-2).  
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This image was again damaged in 2009, when the commander of 
the PRT in Kunduz ordered an air strike against two tanker lorries which 
had been stolen by the Taliban. During this attack up to 140 people were 
killed, most of them civilians. The exact number of dead varied from no 
civilian casualties – claimed by the German government – to over 170 as 
claimed by Afghan locals. The following investigation soon showed that the 
commander had not followed NATO rules and ordered the air strike with 
insufficient intelligence (Gebauer, 2009: 1-2).  
More importantly however, the by then former Minister of Defence 
Jung – after the general election he had become Labour Minister – came 
under attack for having deceived the Bundestag and the public about the 
true number of casualties by withholding reports while still being in office. 
Even his successor in the BMVg, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was unaware 
of these procedures. Since he had claimed that the attack was militarily 
sound only days before, he was taken under attack just as well. By late 
November, Jung resigned from the Cabinet, but his ‘information blunder’ 
had already damaged the Bundeswehr both at home and abroad (Spiegel 
Online, 2009g: 1).  
The Political Debate on Afghanistan 
When taking into consideration the political debate on Afghanistan, 
one has to keep in mind that this mission is a direct result of the 9/11 
attacks on New York and Washington D.C. It is therefore necessary to not 
only look at the parliamentary debates on the actual ISAF mission, but also 
include the debates during the run-up. It is after all the reactions to 9/11 
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which set the stage for the following discourse and Germany’s role in 
Afghanistan as part of the war on terror.  
Similarly to the debates on Kosovo, the debates on the Bundeswehr 
deployment need to be examined due to their core importance within the 
decision-making process. However, with these debates are especially 
significant due to Chancellor Schröder’s decision to link the vote of 
Bundeswehr deployment to a parliamentary vote of no confidence 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001d: 1), in order to keep his traditionally anti-
militaristic Green coalition partner in line along with some of his own party 
members that did not support a Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan.  
The SPD’s argumentation 
Speaking on September 12, 2001, Chancellor Schröder lost no time 
in declaring Germany’s “unrestricted solidarity with the American people”, 
thus setting the tone for the up-coming debate on Germany’s role. Included 
in this declaration was the promise to grant the United States any help they 
would ask for. The reasoning behind these bold statements for Schröder 
was that the previous day terrorists had not only attacked the United States 
but rather the “whole civilised world” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001k: 18293).  
On a similar note, the SPD’s party whip Peter Struck saw the attacks 
as a “declaration of war on the civilised world” which had to be answered in 
unity with the Americans, since on that day we were, as he put it “all 
Americans” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001j: 18295). As a first reaction this 
shows that the SPD as the senior partner in the Red/Green Coalition 
emphasised the government’s strong commitment to the transatlantic 
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relationship, even though they did not know what future problems could 
result from these early strong statements. 
Following the arguments of being collectively attacked by a terrorist 
group, Schröder underlined the close relationship between Germany and 
the United States, pointing to America’s continuous solidarity with Europe 
and Germany in particular since 1945. After all, it was the Americans who 
had played a substantial role in defeating Nazi Germany, in protecting West 
Germany during the Cold War and finally during the re-unification process.  
Although this historic argument was important to Schröder he quickly 
continues to argue that gratitude cannot be the sole motivator for German 
policy after 9/11. More importantly, Germany would jeopardise its future 
standing in a free world by being isolated in not supporting the fight against 
terrorism (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001o: 18301-18302). Seeing that the 
United Nations had classified the attacks as threat to world peace and 
NATO had invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Germany s obliged 
to act in conjunction with the international community, especially since there 
would be no doubt about the lawfulness of international actions, as there 
had been during the Kosovo Crisis. 
Therefore, Schröder points out that any contribution Germany would 
be asked to make could include a military element, which he was willing to 
submit as long as it was in accordance with the Grundgesetz and the 
Bundestag. Germany would be willing to take risks, but not embark on 
adventures. However, to concentrate solely on military operations would fall 
short of combating the source of terrorism, a task that would require a 
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global concept depending on political, economic and cultural co-operation 
on international level (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001s: 18302).  
Peter Struck argued that Germany would need to act decisively and 
not just be a spectator in this up-coming fight. In fact, it would be in 
Germany’s own interest to take an active part, since terrorism would not 
pass Europe or indeed Germany. To act against terrorism would therefore 
be in Germany’s security interest (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001v: 18307). 
Since Article 5 had been invoked, Germany was bound to support its allies 
or risk becoming isolated in the future. Considering that the United Nations 
had already paved the way for lawful intervention, Struck called for a 
decisive strike against the terrorist networks, which would include but not be 
limited to military means with the United Nations in the centre (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001n: 18308).  
However important the fight abroad was, fighting terrorism would 
also have to take place at home, discovering terrorist cells in German cities 
while at the same time securing the large number of Muslims living in 
Germany from becoming a target of general suspicion. The fight on terror 
would therefore include elements of both foreign and domestic politics while 
keeping in mind the democratic values always careful not to bury “freedom 
and democracy, human rights and the respect for the opposite religion 
under the ruins of the World Trade Center”15 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001p: 
18309).  
This point is underlined by the SPD’s spokesman for foreign affairs 
Gernot Erler who pointed out that the new anti-terror alliance, which was 
                                                 
15
 “Freiheit und Demokratie, Menschenwürde und die Achtung vor der jeweils anderen Religion dürfen nicht unter 
den Trümmern des World Trade Centers begraben werden“ 
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forming on a global scale, would not become an alliance of war rather an 
alliance employing political, diplomatic, economic and cultural means. This 
would be very important and could not be emphasised enough since it 
would be imperative for the struggle against terrorism not to escalate. If the 
“triumph of violence” was to endure and to spread, new attacks would be 
inevitable. Distinctly from both Schröder and Struck, Erler was much more 
concerned with avoiding a war, placing more importance on diplomatic 
channels (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001r: 18317-18318).  
In contrast to Gernot Erler, the then Defence Minister Rudolph 
Scharping was again much more in line with the heads of the party. In the 
face of terrorism, Germany would not be able to restrict itself to verbal 
contributions but was rather expected to contribute actively. This would be 
in Germany’s best interest, otherwise its security and Bündnisfähigkeit 
would be at risk as well as 50 years of successful German foreign policy. 
During those 50 years, Germany also had the continuous support of the 
USA, giving Germany the chance to re-pay that debt (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001m: 18325).  
Although he acknowledged that fighting terrorism is predominantly a 
foreign and defence affairs issue, Home Secretary Otto Schily was from the 
start very much concerned with how to fight terrorists hiding amongst the 
many immigrants in Germany. A close co-operation of both the police and 
the military would help in this operation yet most importantly he refused to 
grant the Bundeswehr any more rights especially in terms of policing and 
guarding important installations. The Grundgesetz provided the armed 
forces with enough means, especially in the guise of administrative co-
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
186 
 
operation with the local authorities. The Bundeswehr would therefore not be 
posted throughout Germany, its role would rather be to help out if the local 
authorities needed its special abilities, such as decontamination (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001q: 18331).  
In the course of the developments in the autumn 2001, with the US 
military operation in conjunction with the Afghan Northern Alliance, the need 
for continuous involvement in Afghanistan became apparent. In the case of 
Germany, that would mean contributing troops as well as humanitarian aid 
to Afghanistan. In effect, the troops would secure the humanitarian relief 
effort, which as Gernot Erler pointed out could not be seriously objected. 
Also, considering that the Budeswehr had well trained and respected 
personnel especially in the field of NBC defence and special forces which 
had been specifically called for by the US, Germany could play a significant 
part in securing Afghanistan (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001ƒ: 19289-19290).  
In summary, the SPD’s position during the early stages of the 
Afghanistan mission was heavily influenced by solidarity towards the United 
States, out of historic reasons of gratitude but also because of Germany’s 
desire to maintain its Bündnisfähigkeit. Any military actions that Germany 
would have to contribute to were in accordance with international law, since 
the UN had declared 9/11 an attack on a sovereign state. And since this 
had not only been an attack on the United States but rather on Western 
culture as a whole, Germany itself could legally act in self-defence. The 
SPD placed a lot of importance on multilateral approaches and on the 
United Nations as a co-ordinating body, thus emphasising a continuation of 
traditional German foreign policy in order to deal with this new situation. 
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Since terrorism also affects domestic policy, especially in Germany with its 
large minority of Muslims, the Social Democrats took great care to distance 
themselves from the perceived clash of cultures which could have alienated 
a significant portion of the population. Finally, the SPD’s position on using 
the Bundeswehr for internal security was to keep internal security in the 
hands of the police and the security agencies and not grant the armed 
forces new rights to act within Germany. Any possible help the Bundeswehr 
could give to the police would be covered by the existing regulations on 
administrative assistance. 
The Greens’ argumentation 
Similarly to the Kosovo Crisis, the Greens saw themselves 
confronted with the possibility of having to use military force while at the 
same time keeping true to their party roots from the peace movement. 
However, since not only the United States but open societies and 
democracy in general were attacked they expressed their deep solidarity 
with the American people (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001f: 18296). 
This solidarity was not purely based on Germany’s responsibilities as 
an alliance partner but also from the historically close ties to the United 
States. Not only did the Greens recognise the need for limited military 
action from a very early state, but they also expressed the view that by not 
supporting the United States in their struggle, the newly found American 
preference for a multilateral approach in international affairs would be short 
lived. By having the United States take on multilateralism, international 
institutions such as NATO and the United Nations could be strengthened 
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significantly which had been an important aim at the core of German foreign 
policy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001u: 18313).  
However, even though a large majority of the Greens supported 
limited military operations to bring those responsible for 9/11 to justice, the 
fight against terrorism should not be limited to military means alone. In 
order to fight terrorism effectively party chairman Angelika Beer called for 
an integrated political approach in conjunction with the limited military 
operations. The reason for this was that military force alone would not be 
able to tackle terrorism at its source but only treat the symptoms. It would 
therefore be necessary to extend our understanding of security to include 
foreign aid policy as well as the proliferation of biological and chemical 
weapons (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001|: 18413).  
In accordance with their senior coalition partner, the Greens were 
also strongly opposed to granting the Bundeswehr more rights and make it 
part of the internal security apparatus. The only way the Bundeswehr could 
be deployed internally would be if it had specific capabilities which could not 
be found in other security agencies, such as aerial surveillance or the use 
of biological decontamination. Considering the limits set by the 
Grundgesetz to safeguard the Federal Republic from an overly powerful 
military Wolfgang Wieland argued that the Bundeswehr could only be 
deployed within Germany in a state of defence or a specific case of 
emergency ?(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001 : 19018-19019). Since neither 
case applied, the Bundeswehr could not be deployed within Germany 
without changing the constitution.  
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In the light of wanting to support the United States in their new 
multilateral approach and wanting to secure Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit 
the Greens also by large supported the initial deployment of troops to 
Kabul. Although they still favoured a humanitarian effort to help the 
population in post-Taliban Afghanistan, party whip Kerstin Müller 
acknowledged that this effort would have to be secured with military means 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001„: 19868). Since no German troops would at 
the time be part of any combat operation, this humanitarian approach made 
it easier to sell this deployment to the pacifist party base. Similar to the 
argumentation during the Kosovo Crisis the Greens were thus able to 
consolidate the uncomfortable choices of a government coalition partner 
with their original ideals. 
The Greens therefore took on a similar view on the initial stage of the 
war on terror and Germany’s role in it. Like the SPD they ensured the 
United States their support and considered the attacks of 9/11 an attack on 
democracy and western values in general. Not supporting the US would 
greatly damage Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit and its standing in the 
international community. Different from the SPD, however, the Greens saw 
a chance to help the United States come to appreciate the benefits of a 
multilateral approach and by doing so strengthen international institutions 
such as NATO and the United Nations. 
In order to sell possible military missions abroad to their party base, 
the Greens emphasised the humanitarian aspect of those missions and the 
need to secure them with the help of military personnel. Military missions 
within Germany, however, were out of the question, since that would mean 
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altering the Grundgesetz, something the Greens were not prepared to do 
since that would help to militarise German security policy. 
The CDU/CSU’s argumentation 
The 9/11 attacks caused the CDU/CSU to react in very much the 
same way as the Red/Green Coalition, in that those attacks constituted a 
direct attack on the basic values of democracy and freedom and would 
therefore require a decisive reaction. Since there was no doubt that the 
United States would take actions accordingly, Germany would be obligated 
to provide any support. Considering the historical ties to the United States 
and their help in the post-war reconstruction of Germany as well as their 
part in the re-unification process, party whip Friedrich Merz argued that no 
country was more strongly required to stand by the United States’ side than 
Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001h: 18294).  
Beside the historical gratitude towards the United States the 
CDU/CSU placed great emphasis on Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit and the 
obligations arising from Germany’s membership in NATO. Germany would 
therefore have to take an active part in the upcoming struggle against 
terrorism and to burden the fair share of the responsibility in conjunction 
with other European democracies. As Volker Rühe pointed out, this would 
include implementing the European Security Policy, which again would 
demand much on Germany given its central position and role in Europe 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001{: 18398).  
In order to effectively combat terrorism, Germany’s security policy 
would have to be revised to incorporate a greater emphasis on the 
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gathering of intelligence and the prevention of terrorist acts. In order to do 
this the intelligence service throughout Europe would need to co-operate 
more closely and have access to better funds, equipment and personnel. 
Considering that the 9/11 attacks were planned in Hamburg, Germany had 
a particular responsibility to eliminate the possibilities for terrorist cells to 
misuse open societies for their training, recruiting and preparation 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001t: 18306). This widened understanding of 
security would also have to include a revised development policy as part of 
a provident and effective security policy, by removing economical concern, 
social contrasts and unacceptable political circumstances as causes of 
terrorism (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001x: 18420).  
Although the CDU/CSU generally supported the government and its 
support for the United States as well as its concern for Germany’s 
Bündnisfähigkeit they were very much concerned with the state of the 
Bundeswehr, especially its equipment and funding. Since the Bundeswehr 
was grossly underfunded the CDU/CSU argued that Germany’s inability to 
contribute effectively to military operations undermined its Bündnisfähigkeit 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001 : 19009). The improvement of the 
Bundeswehr’s situation would also be necessary to enable it to take on an 
active part in providing internal security for Germany. Since the rise of 
terrorism had eroded the boundaries between internal and external security, 
the armed forces would help greatly in helping to safeguard Germany’s 
domestic security. It would therefore be necessary to change the 
Grundgesetz in order to clarify the legal questions of deploying the 
Bundeswehr internally. This is not to say that the CDU/CSU was planning to 
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substitute the police or border patrols but rather to compliment them with 
the Bundeswehr’s capabilities in handling very specific scenarios. Although 
the Grundgesetz allows for administrative assistance by the armed forces, 
the CDU/CSU was very much concerned with limiting the need for 
interpreting the legal gray area every time the Bundesländer ask for 
administrative affairs (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001}: 18686).  
Overall, the CDU/CSU’ argumentation centred on the question of 
Bündnisfähigkeit and Germany’s responsibility to support the United States 
out of historical considerations and alliance responsibilities. Although they 
acknowledge the need for a more diverse security policy which would 
include a more assertive development policy, they place the emphasis in 
the fight against terrorism on the military. Because of this, the state of the 
Bundeswehr and its ability to perform in conjunction with its allies in out-of-
area missions was central to the CDU/CSU’s line of argument.  
The FDP’s argumentation 
The FDP took on a similar view to the previously discussed parties 
regarding the nature of the 9/11 attacks, in that they constituted an attack 
on “the values, civilisation and lives of people living in free societies”16 of 
the western world (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001g: 18295). It was therefore 
logical for the FDP to offer the United States the necessary support in 
bringing the people responsible to justice. Closely related to this reasoning 
was the FDP’s argument that the Federal Republic owed its support to the 
USA due to their continuous support for the last forty years. Although the 
                                                 
16
 “Die heißt, dass der gestrige Anschlag auch ein Anschlag auf unsere Zivilisation, auf unsere Werte, auf unser 
Leben, auf alle Menschen war, die in freiheitlichen Gesellschaften leben.“ 
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FDP, like the other parties represented in the Bundestag, realised that 
military action would be inevitable in the fight against terrorism they placed 
much emphasis on political solutions to the problem. This would be a more 
suitable role for Germany considering the precarious situation of the armed 
forces which according to party whip Guido Westerwelle would be in no 
state to contribute effectively to an international operation in its current state 
of re-construction. The Bundeswehr’s abilities which were seen to be limited 
due to chronic underfunding would seriously impair its effectiveness within 
the alliance thus also limiting Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001y: 18401). By losing its ability to work effectively within the 
alliance, Germany would lose both its trusted means to conduct its foreign 
and security policy as well as lose its impact on the decision-making 
process, something the FDP has always felt very strongly about. This was a 
particularly relevant point since – as Westerwelle argued – the question 
was whether the Americans had taken on the lead role or if decisions were 
still being made within NATO (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001‚: 19293). If the 
first case were true that would prove that the United States’ new found 
multilateralism had been short lived and that Germany had already lost its 
say in the decision-making process. 
Considering the limits on the Bundeswehr’s capabilities it is therefore 
not surprising that the FDP argued for a rather limited role for the armed 
forces in that they would be needed to secure the political process in due 
time. Since diplomacy could potentially prove not to be enough when 
dealing with terrorists or their sympathisers, the military would need to play 
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a supporting role and back up the diplomatic effort (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2001l: 18323).  
Following the arguments of limiting the role of the Bundeswehr in 
counter-terrorism, the FDP was strongly opposed to deploying the armed 
forces within Germany as this would be highly unconstitutional as well as 
infringing on the roles of the traditional security agencies such as the police 
or the intelligence services. Even if the constitution allowed for such a 
decision, the Bundeswehr would not be capable to take on this additional 
task in its current situation of being in the middle of the re-structuring 
process while at the same time be notoriously underfunded (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001€: 19017).  
However, despite having pointed out the precarious situation of the 
armed forces and the resulting limits to their abilities in the fight against 
terrorism, the FDP envisaged a strong role for the Bundeswehr during the 
upcoming peace-keeping effort in Afghanistan with the emphasis on 
humanitarian relief with close co-operation with the Afghan people. This 
would mean that the Bundeswehr would have to support the newly 
established Afghan authorities, but also that the original area of 
deployment, i.e. the city of Kabul, would most likely not be enough 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001…: 20837). Thus, the FDP made it clear that 
future mandates would need to be widened to include more remote parts of 
Afghanistan and, more importantly, the financial situation of the armed 
forces would need to be improved considerably for Germany to be able to 
effectively contribute to the security of Afghanistan. 
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The FDP therefore took on a similar stance on the war on terror as 
the previously discussed parties. The 9/11 attacks were considered attacks 
also against Germany and German values and the United States deserved 
Germany’s support as a result of the continuous support they had 
demonstrated for the previous fifty years. However, the FDP argued that the 
role of the Bundeswehr would have to be a limited one, not because of 
moral or pacifist considerations, but because it was severely underfunded 
and undergoing a difficult re-structuring process. Therefore, it would not be 
well enough equipped and prepared for a wide military operation. The 
Bundeswehr could for the same reason also not be deployed domestically, 
since that would put another strain on the already strained institution, even 
if the Grundgesetz would allow for such a course of action. Seeing that 
refusing to contribute to any international operation would seriously damage 
Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit, the humanitarian and almost advisory 
emphasis of the Afghanistan operation in close co-operation with the local 
authorities would help secure Germany’s international status as well as take 
into consideration the limits placed on a the military by increasingly severe 
financial cut-backs.  
The PDS’ argumentation 
Similar to their arguments during the Kosovo Crisis, the PDS argued 
against any military action from the very start. Although they condemned 
the 9/11 attacks as attacks against civilian societies, culture and humanity 
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they argued for a more civilised approach by the so-called civilised world17 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001i: 18296).  
Dealing with the threat of terrorism would therefore require a much 
more sophisticated approach than a mere military operation. Any military 
reply would most certainly result civilian casualties or even the possibility of 
civilian casualties, which in turn would cause growing resentment of the 
West within the Muslim world. Military action would therefore play right into 
the terrorists’ hands and make recruitment considerably easier, thus 
actually decreasing Germany’s security instead of increasing it (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001w: 18404). The use of the Bundeswehr was therefore not 
an option for the PDS, neither abroad, and most certainly not at home.  
Although the rejection of military was very clear amongst the PDS, 
this is not to say that they would not want to fulfil Germany’s international 
obligations. However, the PDS’ emphasis was very early placed on the 
acting within the boundaries of international law and under the co-ordinating 
organisation of the United Nations. Aside from the legitimising effect this 
would have on proposed aid-efforts, a non-military UN operation would not 
infringe on the work of already active NGO aid organisations. In the event of 
military action, these NGOs would no longer be able to perform effectively, 
which would again increase the civilian population’s misery. An UN-lead 
police mission would be much better suited for providing security while the 
NGOs could help the population (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001~: 18696).  
However, in order to be successful that way, Germany would have to 
step up its diplomatic efforts as well as its foreign aid programmes 
                                                 
17
 „In diesen Tagen wird sich zeigen, wie zivilisiert die zivilisierte Welt wirklich ist.“ 
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significantly. Seeing that the Red/Green Government had lowered its 
spending in the field of foreign aid and had increased military spending, the 
PDS called for a change in policy towards aid and diplomacy and away 
from military adventures (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001z: 18404).  
The PDS therefore took on a very different point of view from the 
other Bundestag parties in that it severely opposed any military means in 
tackling the threat of terrorism. Although they condemned the 9/11 attacks, 
a military response would only result in violence spiralling out of control. As 
an alternative the PDS favoured a more diplomatic approach, increasing aid 
programmes which would be secured by an international police force in 
order to deal with the underlying causes of terrorism.  
The Public Debate on Afghanistan 
While the Kosovo deployment of the Bundeswehr was generally 
greeted with the general public’s benign indifference (as outlined in chapter 
4) the public’s attitude towards the up-coming operation witnessed a 
different development. Similarly to the Kosovo deployment, the initial 
support for a Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan was high, with an overall 
approval rate of 65%. Again, as with the initial support for KFOR, support 
was even higher in the Western parts of Germany with 71% whereas the 
majority of people in the east (57%) opposed the military intervention 
(Hilmer & Schlinkert, 2001: 14).  
Considering the relative secure area of deployment for the German 
troops – first Kabul, later the traditionally largely anti-Taliban Northern 
Afghanistan – it seemed that the Afghanistan mission would soon follow 
KFOR and drop under the general public’s radar. Although the Bundeswehr 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
198 
 
had to face serious problems – ranging from accidents with missiles to 
scandalous behaviour of individual soldiers (see above) – only when the 
security situation for the German troops deteriorated did the public mood 
change. By August 2007 64% of the population favoured a quick withdrawal 
from Afghanistan thus showing a clear shift in the support for the mission 
(Hilmer & Schlinkert, 2007: 2). These statistics have not changed much 
over the last three years as can be seen in the following graph. 
 
Figure 13: Poll of ISAF support 2009 (Infratest dimap, 2009: 6). 
Support continued to fall as by May 2010 over two thirds (70%) of the 
population rejected the ISAF mission outright (Hilmer & Schlinkert, 2010: 
19).  
The question to be asked here is what had happened to change the 
overall support from initially 71% to only some 30% in 2010. As has been 
already discussed in this chapter’s section on the developments in 
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Afghanistan, the mission became ever more costly, both purely financially 
but also the number of German casualties rose significantly.  
The latter point is a very important factor when attempting to 
understand the diminishing support for Germany’s involvement in ISAF. 
Since this mission in Afghanistan is the first prolonged ground combat 
operation for the Bundeswehr, German casualties become a very pressing 
issue. This is highlighted by the fact, that senior politicians (including often 
the Chancellor and the Defence Minister) attend every memorial service for 
soldiers killed during their deployment.  
Even more important than that has been a general lack of good 
communication about the mission in Afghanistan. As pointed out previously 
in this chapter, mission parameters changed from purely humanitarian 
mission to combat mission. This lead to a certain ambivalence towards the 
overall current ISAF goals. Karp’s example of soldiers asking for 
clarification about the mission not from the government but from think-tanks 
emphasises this point nicely (Karp, 2009: 22).  
The Bundesregierung takes great care to portrait this deployment as 
a humanitarian mission, as these are much easier to justify. It is therefore 
not surprising that its information policy has tended to be to provide as little 
information on actual combat operations as possible. Even members of the 
Bundestag’s defence committee have criticised that they have not debriefed 
adequately. Reports of German troops taking part in large combat 
operations damage the picture of a purely humanitarian mission (Weiland, 
2008: 1-2).  
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This refusal by the government to accept the true nature of the 
mission, i.e. a combat operation with humanitarian elements, could also be 
found in the official governmental language. Officials went to great lengths 
to coin the ISAF operation a war. Although Afghanistan is not a war in the 
traditional sense, i.e armed forces of sovereign nations facing each other, in 
the light of growing casualties it became more and more difficult to talk of 
just a ‘conflict’. Only by 2009, seven years into the mission, did senior 
politicians actually acknowledge that Afghanistan was experiencing a war 
(Spiegel Online, 2009a: 1).  
It can be argued that the lack of transparency regarding the 
Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan added to the growing overall public 
rejection of the mission. Not only did the Bundesregierung send troops into 
a mission without clearly stating the goals, but it also glossed over the true 
nature of it by highlighting the humanitarian aspect of ISAF over the combat 
element. One could argue that the desire to control the flow of information is 
not surprising, especially when dealing with an on-going military operation. 
However, as pointed out earlier this information policy has already ended 
Defence Minister Jung’s career.  
Trying to clarify the purpose of the mission, former Federal President 
Horst Köhler even indicated that German troops not only defended 
Germany’s freedom at the Hindu Kusch, but also Germany’s economic 
interests. Although one could argue that since according to the Weißbuch 
2006 the Bundeswehr also defends the welfare of the German people, 
economic interests are part of this welfare. And considering that Köhler 
emphasised the economic side effects of combatting terrorism – secure 
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trade routes and security to trade in general – (Fischer & Medick, 2010: 1), 
it is telling that the resulting public and political outcry forced him to 
eventually resign. Although Köhler’s remarks were provocative, they 
summarised points made in official governmental publications. However, 
they did not fit the government’s official depiction of the mission, leading to 
the growing pressure on Köhler. 
Overall it can be said that the public debate on Afghanistan centres 
on the lack of information. What exactly are the Bundeswehr’s tasks 
currently? How are they fulfilled? And why is Germany contributing to ISAF 
in the first place?  
Summary 
It has become clear that ISAF’s mission and that of the Bundeswehr 
is a very complex one, incorporating both military goals and civilian 
reconstruction efforts. For that ISAF has been structured into several PRTs. 
It is these PRTs which are primarily responsible for the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan’s infrastructure as well as training and equipping the ANSF, 
while at the same time providing a secure environment in which both ISAF 
and UN personnel can work. Taking all of these factors into account, it 
seems that the number of tasks is very high to begin with for a primarily 
militarily orientated intervention force. However, although numerous civilian 
organisations are currently involved in the reconstruction effort, their 
number decreases steadily due to the on-going and in some areas 
increasing level of violence. This suggests, that ISAF has taken too many 
responsibilities, none of which they fulfil entirely. Since security is the key to 
keeping additional organisations in the country, this would have to be 
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ISAF’s most paramount interest. However, it remains unlikely that 
contributing nations will deploy additional troops considering the waning 
support for the Afghanistan mission at home. 
This is not to say that ISAF is a complete failure. Its command 
structure allows for relatively quick decision making due to its clear cut 
allocation of responsibilities. What is more, national military considerations 
are kept outside the strategic decision making process on the ground and is 
limited to administrative aspects concerning the PRTs. This helps in 
formulating a consistent strategy for Afghanistan, without national 
interference from the side. Any national objections will have to go through 
NATO, which then in turn can take appropriate measures. 
In the case of the German contribution it has become clear that the 
contingent has grown in size of the last seven years. This can primarily be 
explained by the additional tasks the Bundeswehr has taken on. It is 
noteworthy however, that these tasks were almost forced upon the 
Bundeswehr by its partners, as ISAF’s call for German troops for the south 
of Afghanistan shows. Both the deployment of the RECCE Tornados and 
the responsibility of the QRF can be interpreted as a means to silence 
these calls from NATO. In the light of yet another US troop surge by the 
Obama administration it will be interesting to see how the German 
government reacts. 
More than Kosovo, Afghanistan has been and continues to be a 
great challenge for the Bundeswehr. It has taken on the responsibility for 
the Northern regions and at first succeeded in achieving a moderate 
amount of stability. However, the armed forces encountered difficulties with 
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the logistics and perhaps more importantly with the co-operation with other 
nations on the ground. 
The military also experienced difficulties when it comes to its 
dealings with the political establishment. While the major parties did 
acknowledge the need to use the Bundeswehr as one part of the War on 
Terror, complimented by political and economical assistance to the 
countries in question, politicians were hard pressed to formulate an 
appropriate strategy for the armed forces to follow. Although the 
Bundeswehr was to be deployed, financial constraints continued to limit its 
effectiveness. Also, the Bundestag’s emphasis on deploying the 
Bundeswehr solely for non-combat purpose with a very limited mandate did 
not contribute to Germany’s perceived Bündnisfähigkeit, since that again 
limited the troops’ scope of actions in the field.  
This limited mandate however, helped the government to portrait the 
mission as a purely humanitarian intervention, thus attempting to secure the 
public’s support. Considering Schröder linked the initial vote of Bundeswehr 
deployment to y vote of no confidence thus effectively forcing the coalition 
to vote his way if they did not want to face the risks of new Bundestag 
elections this clearly shows how unpopular this deployment was from the 
very start and, more importantly, how important Bündnistreue was for 
Schröder.  
Although the humanitarian approach to the mission worked initially, 
the lack of information both for the public and more junior politicians 
increased concerns that the Bundeswehr was out of its depth. In contrast to 
the Kosovo deployment – when support diminished out of benign 
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indifference – support for Afghanistan shrank because of a growing number 
of German casualties and an information policy that attempted to gloss over 
the fact that the mission in Afghanistan had turned from a humanitarian 
intervention into war.  
Again, similarly to KFOR, Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit was 
damaged. Whereas during Kosovo, the main problem was the very limiting 
mandate which inhibited the Bundeswehr’s abilities to react, Afghanistan 
saw the additional problem that the Bundesregierung appeared to be 
incapable to acknowledge the true nature of the operation. The 
humanitarian intervention had turned into a ‘war-like’ operation without 
decision-makers taking the appropriate steps to accommodate this 
development. Only recently has the government acknowledged the 
changing situation which has been too late as the Bundeswehr’s area of 
deployment no longer is the secure area it used to be. Furthermore, seeing 
that more and more US troops now operate in Northern Afghanistan it can 
be argued that Germany’s allies no longer trust the Bundeswehr to be 
capable to operating effectively thus dealing another blow to Germany’s 
Bündnisfähigkeit. 
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Chapter 6 – How normal is Germany? 
Concluding remarks 
German foreign and security policy has undergone some 
considerable changes over the last twenty years, giving substance to the 
assumption that Germany no longer behaves like an artificially constrained 
nation bound by the limitations of the bi-polar scenario. With unification in 
1990 Germany arguably regained its full sovereignty and was expected by 
its partners to contribute to stability and security, a development which was 
made clear by US President George Bush who almost immediately offered 
Germany the partnership in leadership. This clearly highlighted the allies’ 
expectations that now Germany would start to take on the responsibilities of 
a state of Germany’s size, power and international standing. When 
Germany did not step up to this expectation during the Operation Desert 
Storm, it was criticised for its cheque book diplomacy of financially aiding 
the coalition, yet not sending any troops to Kuwait. Whereas Germany had 
relied heavily on its allies – most notably the United States – to secure 
Europe during the Cold War, this would no longer be an option in the 
following years.  
From an academic point, this change in general circumstances 
posed one very important question. Would Germany continue to conduct its 
foreign and security policy in its almost pacifistic multilateral manner or 
would Germany shed itself of its restraints and become a ‘normal’ European 
power comfortable with the use of ‘hard power’? Proponents of both 
approaches make valid points with the proponents of continuation pointing 
towards Germany’s continued preference of using multilateral solutions and 
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institutions to further Germany’s interests. The importance of the UN, NATO 
and the EU for Germany as well as Germany’s traditionally close 
relationship with other major European powers – France especially – can 
be identified throughout the 1990s. These preferences appeared to be 
hard-wired into the ‘affected generation’, i.e. that generation which had 
been affected either directly or indirectly by WWII. Most notably in the area 
of defence policy, this generation was reluctant to play an active role – a 
mindset which only gradually changed. 
The collapse of this bi-polar system, therefore, changed the overall 
situation for Germany more than any other Western European state. Over 
the course of the 1990s a gradual shift in German foreign and security 
policy towards a more assertive and active policy, most notably in the field 
of contributions to multilateral military operations can be identified. 
However, although Germany was and still is a strong supporter of 
multilateralism, its allies and partners have found it difficult at best to get 
Germany to contribute to important missions, such as Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. Considering Germany’s on-going reluctance to contribute to 
these missions in spite of being aware that its allies expected a more 
assertive stance, Germans needed the external pressures to overcome this 
traditional objection to military means. 
The ‘confident generation’ took a slightly different approach to 
Germany’s history and in fact Germany’s responsibilities in the world. 
Whereas Germany’s history should under no circumstances be forgotten or 
ignored, it should not stand in the way of German interests. Both frequency 
and intensity of Bundeswehr deployments increased since Gerhard 
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Schröder’s Red-Green government took over in 1998. German troops were 
involved in combat operations during the Kosovo Crisis and have been 
deployed in peace-keeping missions for KFOR and later in Afghanistan for 
ISAF. With reference to these two missions, as well as Germany’s refusal to 
join the United States and their allies in the war in Iraq, proponents of the 
normalisation approach argue that at the beginning of the 21st century 
Germany has become a more normal state in that it has become more 
accustomed the idea of the use of force. However, to say that Germans are 
comfortable with the idea would be extremely exaggerated, considering the 
heated debates surrounding Bundeswehr deployments.  
These developments support this thesis’ core presumption that 
Germany has in fact become a more normal state with regards to its foreign 
and security policy. This ‘normality’, however differs from the traditional 
realist interpretation of a normal state in that it does not rely so heavily on 
hard politics or realpolitik. Rather this amended concept of normality 
incorporates characteristics – i.e. the dominant preference for 
multilateralism found throughout German foreign policy and the 
corresponding importance placed on international institutions such as the 
UN or the EU – normally not associated with the classical idea of normality. 
From a traditional realist point of view this would not be considered normal 
for a state as multilateralism and co-operation also entails reaching 
compromises on certain issues thus limiting a state’s sovereignty in that 
specific issue. 
In the case of Germany, however, multilateralism enabled the 
German government to pursue its foreign more effectively than had it 
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adopted traditional realist thinking. Through Westintegration and 
Bündnistreue West Germany managed to conduct its foreign policy and 
achieve its national interests (mostly security from the Soviet threat) while 
at the same time appeasing its partners in the West some of whom 
remained sceptical towards German ambitions and thus become re-
integrated into the international community. While the dependence on 
multilateralism outside NATO can be seen as abnormal during the Cold 
War the developments towards a globalised world and the growing 
integration within the EU infringed on the sovereignty of every nation. 
Although Germany is still a semi-sovereign nation this aspect of semi-
sovereignty has spread to other nations as well. Germany is therefore no 
different anymore.  
This normality regarding Germany’s foreign and security policy would 
then have implications on its armed forces in that they would have to follow 
this trend of normalisation. Looking at the numerous reform attempts 
undertaken in previous years it becomes clear that the 1990s’ reforms 
centred mainly on relatively superficial modifications such as overall 
numbers and the length of the compulsory service. As the 1990s saw new 
kinds of military operations – most importantly peace-keeping and peace-
enforcing operations – the Bundeswehr soon featured an out-dated 
catalogue of primary tasks. By continuing to concentrate on homeland 
defence the Bundeswehr was not capable to effectively contribute to 
multilateral operations (NATO) and was risking its overall Bündnisfähigkeit. 
Only when in 2003 the actual purpose of the Bundeswehr changed – 
homeland defence gave way to international interventions as the primary 
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purpose – did the German government address the need to adapt its armed 
forces to contemporary issues.  
At the core of this thesis was therefore the analysis of German 
military development since re-unification, including an analysis of 
Germany’s setup prior to this event to put the scope of the developments 
into perspective. Drawing on the already extensive literature on this subject 
it soon became apparent that Germany has been slow in implementing 
changes in its military over the last twenty years.  
Normalising the Bundeswehr 
However, the extend of the Bundeswehr reforms of the 1990s and 
early 2000s necessary to be better equipped for international out-of-area 
deployments shows a steady yet slow development towards a more active 
part in multilateral operations. Shortly after unification Germany argued that 
it could not contribute to out-of-area missions due to the restrictive nature of 
the Grundgesetz. The overall accepted interpretation only allowed Germany 
to use its military for defensive purposes on NATO territory and not outside 
it. In 1994, the constitutional court ruled that this interpretation was in fact 
incorrect, thus eradicating any legal boundaries for German foreign and 
security policy, making it much easier for Germany’s allies to apply 
pressure in this field. As chapter two has discussed, Germany slowly 
accepted more responsibilities especially in the Balkans and later in 
Afghanistan, yet only after external pressure from its allies had been 
applied. 
It soon became clear that the armed forces designed to defend West 
Germany from an assault from the east during the Cold War had to be 
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reformed in order to be able to take on the new tasks of peace-keeping and 
peace-enforcing outside NATO territory.  
Chapter three analysed the actual reform efforts made by 
governments throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Although the reforms 
undertaken during the 1990s were primarily concerned with reducing the 
overall costs of maintaining the armed forces by reducing the overall 
number of troops some structural amendments had been made. Most 
importantly, the Bundeswehr was divided into the Hauptverteidigungskräfte 
and the Krisenreaktionskräfte to quickly create a force which can be used in 
multilateral peace-keeping missions. This reform, however, effectively 
generated a two-class Bundeswehr with the well-equipped and trained KRK 
and the conscript-reliant HVK. From 2003 onwards the Bundeswehr was 
reformed more substantially. Not only did Defence Ministers Scharping and 
Struck address structural reforms, but they also addressed the economic 
restructuring of the Bundeswehr, thus making maintaining and equipping 
the armed forces more efficient. The Weißbuch 2006 picked up from that 
and expanded on Struck’s defence-political guidelines. Judging from the 
reform efforts undertaken since 2003 and taking into account the 
discontinuation of conscription in 2011 the Bundeswehr has completed its 
transition from a stationary force for homeland defence to a relatively 
mobile and versatile armed force.  
Yet, as chapter three also explained, especially the issues of 
funding, procurement of new equipment and the controversial practice of 
conscription have continued to inhibit the Bundeswehr’s overall capabilities 
to effectively contribute to multilateral operations. Although the economic 
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restructuring of the Bundeswehr has freed up some funds it remains 
seriously underfunded. Resolving these issues would require great political 
will to re-allocate funds in the federal budget, which would result in painful 
cuts in areas such as the welfare state with all of its consequences for 
domestic politics.  
The debate about the abolishing of conscription underlines this 
shortcoming as maintaining conscription is necessary for armed forces 
geared towards homeland defence whereas the discontinuation would steer 
the Bundeswehr towards a more professional and deployable army. The 
discussion of the end of conscription is therefore a good example which 
clearly shows that decision makers did not agree on what they actually want 
the Bundeswehr to do. In fact one can argue that by debating conscription 
for some 20 years, politicians have been counter-productive as they 
traditionally neglected the military constraints imposed by conscription while 
attempting to modernise the Bundeswehr. Even the decision to discontinue 
conscription by January 2011 is open for criticism as the likely drop in 
numbers of recruits has not been addressed accordingly. It will remain to be 
seen if Germany can maintain its commitment to multilateral operations 
should the Bundeswehr fail to recruit the 16,000 volunteers per year 
necessary to maintain the overall troop numbers. Should this scenario 
become reality, Germany will have to re-think its concept for its reservists in 
order to close the resulting gaps.  
Shortcomings of the Bundeswehr reform 
However, as has been shown in chapters four and five, the reforms 
did not create a Bundeswehr capable of effectively contributing to 
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international operations. The precise tasks of the Bundeswehr were never 
clearly defined resulting in an ineffective reform effort. Although the 
Weißbuch 2006 outlines general goals – peace, prosperity and European 
security – these goals are left open for interpretation. The lack of a clear 
strategy means that today the Bundeswehr may be more modern and 
compatible with its allied forces, yet at the same time confusions about the 
purpose of the Bundeswehr have mounted. With which means is the 
Bundeswehr to fulfil its goals of safeguarding Germany’s and contribute to 
Europe’s security? Under which circumstances is German security under 
threat? Overall, the ‘whens’ and ‘hows’ are left ambivalent.  
It has, however, become clear that these reforms continued to fall 
short since the Bundeswehr’s capabilities were repeatedly questioned every 
time a new mission was discussed in the Bundestag. Although the 
Bundeswehr is tasked for example with maintaining security in Europe the 
Weißbuch 2006 does not identify criteria for deployment; the effect of this 
being a different interpretation of the Bundeswehr’s tasks and resulting 
necessary capabilities. Whereas the majority of the parliamentarians 
argued for deployment (with the exception of the PDS) the actual nature of 
the military contribution was subject to debate – humanitarian relief, air 
campaign, ground campaign. 
Chapter four shows that although the Bundeswehr has been 
undergoing reforms it has not been kept out of missions. The crisis in 
Kosovo and the subsequent peace-keeping mission was the first actual 
combat mission for the Bundeswehr and proved to be highly controversial 
at the time. As has already been pointed out, opponents to the mission 
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
213 
 
argued that Germany had a moral obligation not to contribute, due to 
Germany’s history in the Balkans. Furthermore, since the United Nations 
had failed to agree on a resolution, the Kosovo war was not covered by 
international law. The proponents, however, also resorted to the history 
argument, only interpreting this differently. Due to its history, Germany had 
a moral obligation to stop the on-going genocide in Kosovo.  
These concerns were supported by concerns about the state of the 
Bundeswehr, its capabilities and structure, as well as its equipment as 
inhibiting factors showing that the Bundeswehr was simply not up for the job 
at hand. This in combination with the desire to maintain Germany’s 
Bündnisfähigkeit proved to become the main factors in the decision to 
contribute to KFOR. During the actual peace-keeping mission the 
Bundeswehr soon took on the role of the lead nation for the Multinational 
Brigade South, emphasising Germany’s desire to take on more 
responsibilities. Yet, although this represented the overall political will, the 
actual support for the mission with adequate equipment as well as political 
support left much for the commanders on the ground to desire for (see 
General Reinhardt’s difficulties in preparing his command over KFOR).  
The Kosovo Crisis therefore represented an important event for 
German foreign and security policy since it forced Germany to out of the 
prevailing Cold War thinking of concentrating on homeland defence. 
Although it can be argued that Germany had been on track of discarding 
that kind of thinking, Kosovo defiantly accelerated the process. Yet, seeing 
that the term Bündnisfähigkeit featured heavily in the Bundestag debates, it 
becomes clear that the Federal Government was in fact afraid to be 
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shamed into compliance by its allies. Also, as already pointed out, the 
actual interpretations on what the Bundeswehr was meant to do, differed 
thus contributing to confusions on what the actual Bundestag mandate 
should include.  
While Kosovo was important for German foreign and security policy 
due to it being the first actual combat mission, Afghanistan proved to be 
even more challenging due to the distance and more recently the 
asymmetrical warfare employed by the Taliban. Again, the Bundestag 
debates after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. 
centred primarily on the question of Bündnisfähigkeit, mostly in conjunction 
with Germany’s historical obligation to support the United States and its 
national interest of overall security from terrorism. Similar to Kosovo, 
however, as chapter five has shown, although the Bundeswehr has been 
deployed to contribute to the international effort to stabilise Afghanistan, the 
lack of political support in the form of restrictive mandates as well as 
inadequate equipment and funding inhibited the armed forces’ effectiveness 
in Afghanistan. The ISAF mission has become more and more difficult for 
the Federal Government in the light of increased fighting and German 
casualties combined with increasing demands from its allies to contribute 
more to the stabilisation effort. The deployment the six RECCE Tornados to 
Afghanistan was an attempt at appeasing NATO and keeping Germany 
from having to send more ground troops into an increasingly unpopular 
conflict.  
Again though, similar to the Kosovo conflict, the Bundestag debates 
show a differing interpretation on the Bundeswehr’s tasks in Afghanistan. 
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Although the government attempted to portrait the mission as a 
humanitarian mission, it soon turned into a combat operation. In the light of 
this development the government only slowly changed its stand on the 
mission and acknowledged the ‘war-like’ situation in Afghanistan. However, 
this change in perception has not yet resulted in a clear change in the 
mandate, as this would result in more heated debates as politicians 
continue to have differing interpretations of the Bundeswehr’s tasks.  
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that Germany has come some 
way in playing a more active part in multilateral military operations. It has 
moved away from its position that the Bundeswehr can only be deployed 
within NATO territory and has accepted the need for global deployment of 
the Bundeswehr. This development supports the claim, that Germany has 
become a more normal power, capable to take on its responsibilities in 
international politics.  
However, it has also been shown that these changes did neither 
occur swiftly, nor did they occur completely voluntarily. The importance 
politicians place on Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit demonstrates that 
Germany still sees itself as a strong supporter of multilateral operations, 
while at the same time it struggles to contribute to military operations 
effectively. This struggle is further supported by the apparent lack of will to 
adequately define the Bundeswehr’s tasks, so that it can better act in 
multinational deployments. Although the Bundeswehr has undergone 
considerable change over the last twenty years, there are still a number of 
issues that need to be addressed. 
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First, the Bundeswehr needs better and more suitable equipment to 
better perform its tasks in out-of-area missions. Although this is an issue 
with other nations’ armed forces as well, considering the Bundeswehr’s 
chronic underfunding, it is more of an issue here. It is unlikely however, that 
the defence budget will be increased in the near future, considering the 
numerous domestic problems that Germany (as do other European states) 
faces today – such as an over-stretched social system and economic and 
fiscal problems as a result of the latest financial crisis and the following 
crisis in the Euro zone.  
Second, and probably more important, Germans need to engage in a 
more fundamental debate about the purpose of their armed forces to 
develop a strategic understanding of military intervention. In the preamble 
of the Weißbuch 2006 Angela Merkel expresses her hope that this 
document will start this debate, yet core questions such as what exactly the 
Bundeswehr is meant to do and under what circumstances are left 
unanswered. Although both the Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinie 2003 and 
the Weißbuch 2006 outline a general purpose – in essence securing 
European peace and security – they remain extremely vague and open to 
interpretation. This vague outline can be accredited to Germany’s past and 
the resulting traditional reserve towards military issues and the politicians 
desire to keep some room for manoeuvres. However, until Germans have 
not clearly set out their strategy with regards to military contributions this 
will continue to impact their foreign policy as allies will not be able to clearly 
anticipate Germany’s reaction to new crises.  
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Although this lack of clear German military strategy is an inhibiting 
factor for Germany’s foreign and security policy it is a result of domestic 
rather than external considerations. With this in mind every other state has 
to cope with its own domestic inhibitors for its foreign and security policy, be 
it financial restraints, a highly sceptical public or other factors. In that 
respect Germany does no longer differ greatly from its allies and has over 
the last twenty years in fact become a normal state.  
However, these inhibiting factors have a profound effect on 
Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit as Bundeswehr contributions will continue to 
be highly controversial and mandates will continue to represent the lowest 
common denominator of the political parties, thus limiting the Bundeswehr’s 
efficiency in the field. Considering the lack of a clearly outlined catalogue of 
tasks this denominator is subject to current (domestic) affairs as can be 
seen during the debates on a Bundeswehr contribution to Iraqi Freedom 
when it has been argued that Chancellor Schröder made use of the public’s 
rejection of the war to get re-elected (see chapter 2). It can therefore be 
said that Bundeswehr contribution to future operations remains uncertain 
and will be dependent on the current political climate in Germany.  
An outlook 
It has been argued that Germany’s foreign and security policy and 
with this the outset of the armed forces have become more normal, while at 
the same time considerable shortcomings have been identified. These 
shortcomings, especially the lack of clear definitions regarding Germany’s 
security policy and tasks for the Bundeswehr, will continue to inhibit 
Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit. Considering Germany’s reaction to the Arab 
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Spring in 2011, and the crisis in Libya in particular, this is a problem that 
needs to be addressed soon. 
Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council and the 
subsequent refusal to contribute to NATO’s military operation to support the 
Libyan rebels was heavily criticised by its partners, seriously questioning 
Germany’s Bündnistreue and Bündnisfähigkeit. The question, therefore, is 
whether Germany has taken a step back in its rejection of military means or 
if this step can be explained using this thesis’ findings.  
The case of Libya was a difficult one for the German government 
considering that it ticked the right boxes – a humanitarian crisis, the fight 
against a dictatorial regime, and the threat for European security in the 
guise of possible refugees attempting to enter the EU – which normally 
would have resulted in a Bundeswehr deployment of some kind. The 
reason for not contributing to NATO’s operation can be found in the already 
over-stretched Bundeswehr itself. As its contribution to both KFOR and 
ISAF are still significant – Germany is still the biggest contributor to KFOR 
and the third largest to ISAF – taking on another large operation would not 
have been possible. This is especially the case, when said armed forces, 
which would have to perform in this new operation, are still undergoing 
reform and have to tackle the discontinuation of conscription. Taking the 
findings of this thesis it becomes clear that a Bundeswehr deployment in 
Libya was not possible, even though the reasons behind the mission ticked 
all the right boxes. Furthermore, considering the dwindling support for the 
ISAF operation another obvious combat mission would have sparked at 
least some public discontent.  
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy 
 
219 
 
Although this is an understandable reason for not contributing to 
NATO’s support effort the abstention in the UN Security Council is more 
difficult to explain. However, in the light of not being capable to contribute, a 
supportive vote in the UNSC would have most likely resulted in NATO 
asking for German contributions seeing that Germany supported military 
action in the UN at which time the German government would have had to 
disclose its shortage of military means. It can therefore be argued that the 
abstention was an attempt to prevent a situation in which the German 
government would have to refuse NATO’s demand for contribution, which 
would have seriously damaged its standing within the alliance. 
Germany: more normal but not normal enough 
Germany’s lack of a clear policy therefore puts Germany’s partners 
in a difficult situation as possible interventions must take into considerations 
that Germany will not contribute. Although future interventions will most 
likely go ahead with or without German contributions, seeing that these 
interventions will be planned by NATO or possibly the EU, a German 
refusal to contribute could delay the intervention, or as was the case in 
Libya put into question Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit. More importantly, 
considering Germany’s political weight, especially within the EU, this could 
have an impact on other member states’ decision to participate, which 
would result in a demise of legitimacy for the intervention at the least. It 
would also force other nations towards unilateral operations, thus 
undermining multilateralism as one of the foundations of Germany’s foreign 
policy.  
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To prevent this Germany will need to clearly define the 
circumstances under which the Bundeswehr will be deployed in order to 
facilitate a more effective multilateralism. Considering the EU’s desire to 
formulate its own foreign and security along with its common defence 
policy, this might be necessary earlier than expected. If one of the largest 
EU member states is unclear about its own defence policy, how can it 
contribute to formulate one which is acceptable and workable for 27 
member states? A clear definition of the Bundeswehr tasks will therefore 
result in a better Bündnisfähigkeit and an overall more effective 
multilateralism, which in a globalised and integrated world has become the 
normal way to conduct foreign and security policy. 
Germany has made advances in becoming a more normal actor in 
foreign policy, but especially in the field of military contributions to 
multilateral operations, more work needs to be done. An open debate about 
Germany’s role in the world and the role of the Bundeswehr needs to take 
place within Germany. The reforms of the armed forces have created a 
more mobile and effective Bundeswehr, yet it is Germany’s difficulties in 
coming to a clear definition on when, how and where the Bundeswehr is 
meant to be deployed which prevents Germany from becoming a truly 
normal power in the post-Westphalian world.  
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